











THE

STAFF DEPARTMENTS

OF THE

UNITED STATES ARMY,

THEIR VALUE IN WAR AND IN PEACE, THE NEED OF A  
PERMANENT STAFF, THE ADVISABILITY OF DETAILS,  
AND THE PRACTICABILITY OF CONSOLIDATION;

BEING

EXTRACTS FROM THE GARFIELD, COBURN, BANNING, MAISH,  
AND BURNSIDE REPORTS, PUBLISHED IN CONGRES-  
SIONAL DOCUMENTS FROM 1869 TO 1878,

GIVING

THE VIEWS OF ARMY OFFICERS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE  
SEVERAL COMMITTEES, AND EXTRACTS FROM BILLS SUBMIT-  
TED BY THEM RELATIVE TO STAFF ORGANIZATION:

TOGETHER WITH

A STATEMENT OF THE EXISTING LAW ON THE SUBJECT, AND THE VIEWS  
OF WASHINGTON ON THE NEED OF A STANDING ARMY.

*U.S. Congress. House. Committee on  
Military Affairs*

Compiled for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs,  
House of Representatives,

BY

HERMAN D. REEVE,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*

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# STAFF DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

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## REPORTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

February 26, 1869, Hon. James A. Garfield, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a report with accompanying testimony on "Army organization" (H. R. 33, Fortieth Congress, third session, 132 pages), which was laid on the table and ordered to be printed.

### MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

James A. Garfield, of Ohio, R.	Green B. Raum, of Illinois, R.
William A. Pile, of Missouri, R.	Isaac R. Hawkins, of Tennessee, R.
John H. Ketcham, of New York, R.	Charles Sitgraves, of New Jersey, D.
Henry D. Washburn, of Indiana, R.	Benjamin M. Boyer, of Pennsylvania, D.
Grenville M. Dodge, of Iowa, R.	

February 2, 1873, Hon. John Coburn, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a report with views of a number of officers of the Army on "army staff organization" (H. R. 74, Forty-second Congress, third session, 309 pages), which was ordered to be printed and recommitted to the Committee on Military Affairs. H. R. No. 495 had been referred to the committee, and the committee with their report submitted a bill embodying their suggestions. The bill is printed with the report.

### MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

John Coburn, of Indiana, R.	George E. Harris, of Mississippi, R.
William L. Stoughton, of Michigan, R.	Henry W. Slocum, of New York, D.
John B. Hay, of Illinois, R.	Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, D.
William G. Donnan, of Iowa, R.	William Terry, of Virginia, D.
Frank Morey, of Louisiana, R.	

April 6, 1874, Hon. John Coburn, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a report with testimony of a large number of witnesses, both in the Army and civil life, to accompany the bill (H. R. 2546) "to provide for the gradual reduction of the Army of the United States" (H. R. 384, Forty-third Congress, first session, 415 pages), which was recommitted to the Committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be printed. The bill submitted by the committee is printed with their report.

## MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

John Coburn, of Indiana, R.	Clinton D. MacDougall, of New York, R.
William G. Donnan, of Iowa, R.	Jacob M. Thornburgh, of Tennessee, R.
John B. Hawley, of Illinois, R.	James W. Nesmith, of Oregon, D.
Joseph R. Hawley, of Connecticut, R.	Pierce M. B. Young, of Georgia, D.
Lewis B. Gunkel, of Ohio, R.	Eppa Hunton, of Virginia, D.
Charles Albright, of Pennsylvania, R.	

March 9, 1876, Hon. Henry B. Banning, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a report to accompany bills H. R. 2817, 2935, and 2592, on the "Reduction of Army officers' pay, reorganization of the Army, and transfer of the Indian Bureau" (H. R. No. 354, Forty-fourth Congress, first session, 234 pages). The report was ordered to be printed with the testimony and the replies of a number of officers to a circular letter of the committee.

## MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Henry B. Banning, of Ohio, D.	• Augustus A. Hardenbergh, of New Jersey, D.
John M. Glover, of Missouri, D.	
Alpheus S. Williams, of Michigan, D.	Clinton D. MacDougall, of New York, R.
William Terry, of Virginia, D.	Jacob M. Thornburgh, of Tennessee, R.
Philip Cook, of Georgia, D.	Stephen A. Hurlbut, of Illinois, R.
John Reilly, of Pennsylvania, D.	Horace B. Strait, of Minnesota, R.

Section 4 of the act of Congress approved July 24, 1876, provided for a commission to examine "the whole subject-matter of reform and reorganization of the Army of the United States." The commission consisted of:

Hon. Joseph R. West, United States Senate.  
 Hon. Francis M. Cockrell, United States Senate.  
 Hon. Stephen A. Hurlbut, House of Representatives.  
 Hon. Henry B. Banning, House of Representatives.  
 Hon. James D. Cameron, Secretary of War.  
 Gen. William T. Sherman, United States Army.  
 Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General United States Army.

The commission met August 11, 1876, and elected the Hon. James D. Cameron, Secretary of War, president of the commission.

On motion of Mr. West it was—

*Resolved*, That the members of the commission have permission to submit their views in writing upon the matters confided to their attention by section 4 of the act approved July 24, 1876, 'making appropriations for the support of the Army, and for other purposes,' the same to be transmitted to the recorder, who is hereby authorized to have the same printed in confidence for the use of the commission."

In an article entitled "The Army of the United States," by Gen. James A. Garfield, published in the Burnside report, pages 101 to 115, it is stated (p. 103):

"The act required the commission to report to Congress the results of their deliberations by the 1st day of December following. The com-

mission accumulated much valuable material, but their term of service expired before it was possible to reach satisfactory conclusions. \* \* \* The papers laid before the commission already referred to, but not yet published, are of great value, both on account of the ability with which they were prepared, and the high character and varied experience of their authors."

Some of the documents referred to by General Garfield as having been laid before the commission of which Secretary Cameron was president were published with the Burnside report, Senate report 555, part 2, Forty-fifth Congress, third session.

March 21, 1878, Hon. Levi Maish, of the subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, submitted a report relating to "the organization of the Army," which, with the testimony, reports, letters, and copies of bills agreed to by the committee, was ordered to be printed. (House Miscellaneous Document No. 56, Forty-fifth Congress, second session, 459 pages.)

#### MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Henry B. Banning, of Ohio, D.	Edward S. Bragg, of Wisconsin, D.
Levi Maish, of Pennsylvania, D.	Horace B. Strait, of Minnesota, R.
James Williams, of Delaware, D.	Harry White, of Pennsylvania, R.
George G. Dibrell, of Tennessee, D.	Anson G. McCook, of New York, R.
Alvah A. Clark, of New Jersey, D.	Benjamin F. Marsh, of Illinois, R.
John H. Evins, of South Carolina, D.	

December 12, 1878, Hon. Ambrose E. Burnside, United States Senator, from the Joint Committee of the two Houses, appointed under sections 10, 11, and 12 of the act of Congress approved June 18, 1878, submitted a report, to accompany Senate bill 1491. The report was ordered to be printed and is published as Senate report No. 555, Forty-fifth Congress, third session. On the same day the bill (S. 1491) and papers accompanying the report were ordered printed. (See Senate report 555, part 2, Forty-fifth Congress, third session, 512 pages.)

#### MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Ambrose E. Burnside, of Rhode Island, United States Senate, R.  
 Preston B. Plumb, of Kansas, United States Senate, R.  
 Matthew C. Butler, of South Carolina, United States Senate, D.  
 Henry B. Banning, of Ohio, House of Representatives, D.  
 George G. Dibrell, of Tennessee, House of Representatives, D.  
 Horace B. Strait, of Minnesota, House of Representatives, R.  
 Harry White, of Pennsylvania, House of Representatives, R.

### METHODS PURSUED BY COMMITTEES IN CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION AND WITNESSES EXAMINED.

Garfield report, 1869, page 1.

"With a view to obtaining information respecting the present condition of the Army, its strength and distribution, the organization of

the several staff departments and the duties performed by them, to serve as a basis for such legislation as might be considered expedient, the committee have examined a number of prominent officers of the Army to ascertain not only the facts within their knowledge, but also what reforms or changes in organization their experience led them to recommend, and what measures could wisely be adopted to retrench the heavy expenses of the military establishment."

The committee examined Generals Thomas, Hancock, Schofield, McDowell, the Surgeon-General, the Paymaster-General, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General of Subsistence, two inspectors-general, and three other staff officers.

**Coburn report, 1873, page 1.**

"The question of reorganizing the staff of the Army is one of such magnitude that the committee were reluctant to act upon it without mature reflection and the fullest possible consultation with those who are practically as well as theoretically well informed upon the subjects involved, and as a preliminary step propounded certain interrogatories to a large number of officers of the Army, whose education, as well as experience on the staff and in the line, necessarily gave them the amplest opportunities to make themselves familiar with all the points in controversy."

The committee examined Secretary of War Belknap, Generals Sherman, Meade, Howard, Ord, and Augur, of the active list; Generals Hooker, Heintzelman, Wood, Ricketts, and Casey, of the retired list; Generals McClellan, Franklin, and Buell, of the volunteers; General Longstreet, of the Confederate service; chiefs of bureaus; 21 other staff officers, and 21 field officers of cavalry, artillery, and infantry.

**Coburn report, 1874, page 1.**

"The committee examined a large number of witnesses, composed of gentlemen of intelligence and prominence both in Army and civil life, and have accumulated a large amount of testimony upon the subjects named, which must of itself be of no little value as an aid to intelligent legislation upon all matters involved in the investigation."

The committee examined Secretary of War Belknap, Secretary of the Interior Delano, Generals Sherman, McDowell, Pope, Harney; the several chiefs of bureaus; Colonel Reynolds, of the Third Cavalry; the Commissioner of Pensions, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hon. Felix R. Brunot, and several Indian agents and inspectors.

**Banning report, 1876, page 1.**

"To obtain certain information relative to the military establishment and the management of Indian affairs as a basis for such legislation as might be deemed necessary, the committee caused to be sent to a number of officers a circular letter with a request for an expression of opinion."

The committee examined Secretary of War Taft, Generals Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, Schofield, McDowell, Howard, Terry, Ord, Augur, and Crook; the chiefs of bureaus; thirteen other staff officers; the colonels of the cavalry, artillery, and infantry regiments; one lieutenant-colonel and three captains of infantry; one captain of cavalry; Gen. John B. Sanborn, of Minnesota; Dr. W. A. Burleigh, of Dakota; and Hon. William Welsh, of Pennsylvania.

**Cameron commission, 1876. No report.**

The president of the commission was authorized to have printed such documents as he should judge necessary, and the members of the commission were permitted to submit their views in writing upon the matters confided to their attention by section 4 of the act approved July 24, 1876.

**Maish report, 1878, page 5.**

"The subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, who were charged with the collection of information and facts in relation to the organization of the Army, beg leave to submit the following testimony, reports, letters, and copies of bills agreed to by the committee."

The committee submitted letters and testimony from Secretary of War McCrary, Generals Sherman, Hancock, Schofield, Pope, Howard, and Ord; the chiefs of bureaus of the War Department, and nine other staff officers; four colonels of cavalry; one colonel, one major, and two captains of artillery; thirteen colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, one captain, and one lieutenant of infantry, and one retired officer.

**Burnside report, 1878, page 1.**

"After an informal discussion, it was decided to call upon the general officers and the chiefs of staff departments of the Army, and certain prominent men of military experience outside of the Army, for drafts of bills for the reorganization of the Army, and for such views upon the subject as they might see fit to present to the committee."

The committee submitted with their report drafts of bills from Generals Sherman, Hancock, Schofield, McDowell, Terry, Johnson, Upton, Adjutant-General Townsend, Inspector-General Marcy, Quartermaster-General Meigs, Commissary-General Macfeely, Paymaster-General Alvord, and Chief of Engineers Humphreys; also letters and opinions from the officers named, and also from Generals Sheridan, McClellan, Meade, Thomas, Pope, Howard, Ord, Crook, Franklin, Foster, Smith, Wright, Allen, Schriver, Longstreet, Surgeon-General Barnes, Acting Chief of Ordnance Lyford, Colonels Hazen and Hunt, and from two lieutenant-colonels, one major, one surgeon, one assistant surgeon, two captains, and four lieutenants.

## VALUE OF TESTIMONY OF ARMY OFFICERS.

**Coburn report, 1873, page 1.**

The committee said:

“Their views (the views of a large number of army officers) accompany this report, and form, it is believed, a representative collection of the various opinions of our army officers upon the subject of staff duties and organizations, and combine such a mass of thoughts upon the points mooted as can be found nowhere else. The differences of opinion upon many of the most important questions are radical and thorough, and involve the inquirer in an investigation of subjects which have exhausted the capacities of the most profound and successful leaders from the beginning of the period when the waging of war became a science.”

**Maish report, 1878.**

Brig. Gen. John Pope, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, served in the Florida and Mexican wars; during the civil war commanded Army of the Mississippi and Army of Virginia; afterwards major-general, United States Army:

(Page 31.) “The reason why there are so many differences of opinion among army officers concerning the details of army organization does not seem difficult to explain. Every officer, it is to be presumed, bases his opinion upon his own experience, which is greater or less, extended or limited, according to his years, his rank, and the nature of the service he has performed. What would be a complete and efficient system for a small force operating against hostile Indians in a remote district would perhaps be entirely unsuited by expansion to a whole army, in scarce any part of which would the same conditions be found. So, too, every officer is naturally more or less interested in the organization of the special arm to which he belongs, and is apt, unconsciously, to attach an undue importance to it relatively to other arms of the service. The staff being, to say the least, a semi-independent branch of the service, and controlling the disposition of so much that is needed by the line, is of course subjected more than any other branch of service to adverse criticism, which, instead of being confined, as in my opinion it should mainly be, to objection to methods of administration, applies itself almost wholly to forms of organization, and cites errors or failures as faults of organization rather than faults of administrative system.”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers. Served in the Florida war and Mexican war; in the civil war was division, corps, and department commander; afterwards major-general, U. S. A:

(Page 71.) “The staff corps and officers administering the principal duties pertaining thereto are called on and do pass upon the accounts and manner of expending funds and property of general officers commanding departments. The pay of the last-named officers is frequently

stopped at the suggestion of quartermaster, commissary, and other staff officers on duty at Washington, perhaps with reason, yet the different sorts of duty performed by the officer of the bureau and the officer in the field—the fact that the former is called on to hold back funds, supplies, or material which the latter may think indispensable, or to recommend stoppage of his pay—is likely to beget rather a want of good will than an affection between them, and under the circumstances I am not quite sure that an opinion of mine upon the subject of consolidation of the several staff corps into one or more would be free from prejudice, and, if it is not imperative, I would prefer to remain silent upon that subject.”

### VALUE OF AN EFFICIENT STAFF.

**Coburn report, 1873, p. 1.**

The committee said:

“To adjust and perfect the subtle and intricate machinery by which great masses of soldiers are to be fed, clothed, armed, moved, inspired with confidence, and carried through victorious battles, is, after all, wrapped up in the perfection of staff organization. Take the best field officers, take the best-drilled soldiers, take a good cause, take all natural advantages of situation, and take away from the general the indispensable aid he must have in an efficient staff, and neither courage, good conduct, nor skill in the line can redeem a large army from the character of a mob.”

**Banning report, 1876, p. 3.**

The committee said:

“The committee has endeavored to proceed on the basis that legislation should not be parsimonious, thus to avoid a temporary economy of an injurious character.

“Our Army is viewed as a nucleus wherein is to be acquired and preserved military knowledge, and from which should radiate the elements of instruction and discipline, thus to form in time of war a competent force endowed with talent to direct it as a whole, and provided with agencies capable of grasping the responsibility, organization, and distribution of numerous supplies necessary to the conduct of successful military operations.

“The principles of organization in peace must be such that there will be no departure from them in time of war, so that the country's strength may be readily developed when the Government shall be called to make known its force.”

**Burnside report, 1878.**

Letter submitted by Gen. W. T. Sherman, U. S. A., dated Department of War, December 11, 1818, and signed by J. C. Calhoun, Secretary of War,

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 140.) “In fact, no part of our military organization requires more attention in peace than the general staff. It is in every service invariably the last inattaining perfection, and, if neglected in peace,

when there is leisure, it will be impossible, in the midst of the hurry and bustle of war, to bring it to perfection. It is in peace that it should receive a perfect organization, and that the officers should be trained to method and punctuality, so that at the commencement of war, instead of creating anew, nothing more should be necessary than to give to it the necessary enlargement. In this country particularly the staff can not be neglected with impunity. \* \* \* With a defective staff we must carry on our military operations under great disadvantages and be exposed particularly at the commencement of a war, to great losses, embarrassments, and disasters."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 141.) \* \* \* "It is believed that the organization of the War Department, as well as the general staff of the Army, is not susceptible of much improvement. The act of the last session regulating the staff has not only made important savings in the expenses of the Army, but has given both to the Department and the staff a much more efficient organization than they ever before had. Every department of the Army charged with disbursements has now a proper head, who, under the laws and regulations, is responsible for its administration. The head of the Department is thus freed from detail, and has leisure to inspect and control the whole of the disbursements." \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. A.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 208.) "One of the greatest difficulties met with in organizing armies during the late war was in the deficiency of number of educated staff officers, aids-de-camp, etc. It is in this direction that efforts should be made to improve the organization and instruction of the Army, and it is absolutely certain that our proper policy is to make the number of officers on the permanent establishment very large in proportion to the number of men."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, division, corps, and department commander:

(Page 47.) "The Army in our country must always be small, but I think it should be of the very best (good Lord, deliver us from the perils and dangers of a cheap army); and the advantages attending its service should be such as to induce our brightest young men to engage therein, for it is to be the repository of the military customs and traditions of the country; it is to preserve and extend the military service, every day improving, and is to be the great fountain from which our volunteers are to draw the skill, knowledge, and morale which soon converts them into great and formidable armies."

#### Banning report, 1876.

Col. August V. Kautz, Eighth Infantry, brigadier-general in volunteer service, brevet major-general; commanded cavalry division, Army of the James, and First Division, Twenty-fifth Army Corps:

(Page 90.) "The staff is the most important part of a skeleton army. In it is preserved the military knowledge and experience necessary for

carrying on war in the most scientific and economical manner. Could we have had a staff sufficient to have fully controlled the late war, the expenses of the same would not have been one-half what they were."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Randolph B. Marcy, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, and chief of staff to General McClellan in the Army of West Virginia and in the Army of the Potomac:

(Page 26.) "The importance of this subject (staff corps) and the absolute necessity of properly organizing, educating, and training officers of the staff and supply departments in time of peace upon a basis adequate to the requirements of an army called suddenly into the field to encounter an enemy was probably never more forcibly illustrated than in the English army during the Crimean campaign.

"Sir Archibald Allison, baronet, colonel in the English army, an intelligent and sensible writer upon army organization, in discussing this subject, says:

"It is not too much to say that an army sent into the field without efficient and thoroughly well-organized and long previously trained staff and supply departments is an army foredoomed to dogs and vultures, and that *no expenditure at the moment, however lavish, can supply these wants or avert this doom.*

"Our army which embarked (for the Crimea) in 1854 was the finest this country ever produced, but it was bound together by a rope of sand, and it melted away like snow before the first touch of the hardships and inclemencies of winter; and this was the direct, necessary, and inevitable consequence of the ignorant economy of the Parliament of Britain in not sustaining in time of peace proper staff and supply departments.

"The green mounds in the quiet graveyards by Sebastopol where this same system (the defective staff and supply organizations) has laid in its still abode an army, rank and file, attest this. \* \* \*

"Our peace staff and supply departments should, therefore, be so organized that they could instantly furnish the number of fully trained officers required in their respective branches for our army upon a war footing. The necessity for this was fully recognized at the close of the Crimean war, but year by year since then the financial pruning hook is being applied in cutting down estimates as the lessons of the past fade away from the minds of a generation plunged in the strife and whirl of the present.'"

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Thomas M. Vincent, assistant adjutant-general, brevet brigadier-general, and afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Pages 203, 204.) "We can not but deprecate the interminable changes which staff organization seems doomed to undergo in our service. Any system which could be made stable would be preferable to the best one in theory that is never allowed time to develop itself in practice.

"In conclusion, the following additional extracts from Jomini will be found instructive:

"A government which neglects its army, under any pretext whatever, is then a government guilty in the eyes of posterity, since it pre-

pares humiliations for its colors and its country, instead of preparing them for successes, by following a contrary course. Far from us the thought that a government ought to sacrifice everything for the army. This would be an absurdity. But it ought to make it the subject of its constant cares, and if the prince have not himself a military education it is difficult to attain that end. In this case, which unfortunately happens but too often, it must be supplied by wise and provident institutions, at the head of which will be placed, without doubt, *a good staff system*, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of national reserves. It is, especially in times of protracted peace, important to watch over the preservation of armies, for it is then that they can more easily degenerate, and that it is important to maintain in them a proper spirit, and to exercise them in great maneuvers, very incomplete semblances, doubtless, of effective wars, but which incontestably prepare troops for them. It is not less important to prevent them from falling into effeminacy by employing them in labors useful for the defense of the country.

“ ‘It is important that the study of the military sciences be protected and recompensed as well as courage and zeal. The corps to which these sciences are necessary ought to be esteemed and honored. It is the only means of calling into them from all parts men of merit and genius.’ ”

“ ‘It has been well said by another writer that *‘by perfecting ourselves in military science, paradoxical as it may seem, we are thereby assisting in the diffusion of peace, and hastening on the approach of that period when swords shall be beaten into plowshares and spears into pruning hooks.’* ”

#### Banning report, 1876.

Maj. Thomas M. Vincent, assistant adjutant-general, brevet brigadier-general, and afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general:

(Page 135.) “Our staff is not merely for the Regular Army, but it should be viewed as the *national military staff*, applicable alike to the regular, volunteer, and militia forces; and it should be organized and trained in time of peace so as to be adequate to the wants of an army suddenly called into service.

“The staff and line—our peace establishment—are maintained for the acquirement and preservation of military knowledge and to perfect military discipline, to construct defenses and organize the material necessary in war, and generally to form the stock, in all its parts, on which an army competent to the defense of the country may be ingrafted.

“Past experience has pointed to the following facts: The saving in clothing, provisions, arms, and other things, by not being compelled to call out militia or volunteers, would amply supply a considerable force which, well officered, would be daily improving; the expenses of militia and volunteers invariably exceed those of the regulars by several hundred per cent; the Black Hawk and Florida wars necessitated 55,000 militia and an expenditure of \$30,000,000, and would have been avoided, in each case, had there been two regiments of regulars available for early service; a well-organized available force of 12,000 would have enabled the Government to avoid the Mexican war and its consequent expenditure of millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of human

life; and the recent rebellion would have been stayed by an available force of a few thousand men. \* \* \* The magnitude attained by the rebellion is the most instructive, for the public debt and money paid to pensioners \* \* \* would maintain our present force, costing, say, \$30,000,000 yearly, for ninety-nine and two-thirds years. Now, however, and as a result of a temporary economy, we have to pay the debt, expend nearly \$30,000,000 yearly for pensions, and support a military establishment costing \$30,000,000; consequently we have lost, by not having an available force to prevent rebellion, the enormous amount of \$2,998,447,641.49." \* \* \*

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Maj. Samuel Breck, assistant adjutant-general, brevet brigadier general, U. S. A., and afterwards Adjutant-General of the Army:

(Page 139.) "Had the Army been large enough so that President Lincoln could have put 35,000 or 40,000 regulars *at once* in the field, I believe the incipient war would have ended promptly and property and money been saved sufficient to pay the expenses of an army of 50,000 men three hundred years, not to speak of the lives of those who perished.

"Those who look forward to an unending period of peace may think with profit how few of the North in 1860 anticipated any war at all, and even when the first call for men was made the war was expected to be a small affair of sixty or ninety days. The last twenty-five years have given rise to the war in the Crimea, the war in Italy, the war between Prussia and Austria, the war in France, in addition to our own, and the wars with and among half-civilized peoples. Does this past promise a long future of peace? Few nations of the earth have been exempt from war in this period of twenty-five years, and the art of war, both on sea and land, has made progress hitherto without a parallel. Can we with safety disregard the wisdom contained in the maxim, 'In time of peace prepare for war?'

"The staff corps of the Army ought to be not merely for the present necessities of the Army, but also for the purpose of having an educated and trained body of experts to assist in raising an army and putting it in the field when war comes. This needs only to be thought of to be an acknowledged necessity. As a matter of fact, however, these corps are barely sufficient for the present wants of the service. The Quartermaster's Department and Subsistence Department have large numbers of line officers detailed for their duties, the Medical Corps has constantly a large number of contract surgeons, the Inspector-General's Department has a number of officers detailed to perform its duties. None of these officers, so far as I know, are idle except from disability." \* \* \*

#### **HOW THE PRESENT STAFF SYSTEM WORKED DURING THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.**

#### **Garfield report, 1869, page 2.**

The committee said:

"Much can be said in praise of these departments (staff departments) for their efficient services during the late war. No large army was

ever so well clothed and fed, so promptly transported, or had so efficient medical attendance or comfortable provision made for its sick and wounded as ours."

**Coburn report, 1873, page 2.**

The committee said:

"The present division of duties (staff duties) is the result of long experience, and very recently, in the struggle against rebellion, was found to work successfully in the widest theater of action. Is there any other system that will operate more favorably than this? If so, what are combinations and subdivisions that will secure the desired end?" (See the question further discussed under title "Consolidation," page 86, post.)

**Burnside report, 1878.**

Gen. W. T. Sherman, U. S. A.:

(Page 466.) "A staff system that has admitted of an increase of the line of the Army from the mere nucleus of 1860 to a million of men, and its reduction back to the present standard without confusion, and with the most perfect accountability as to property and money, at all times providing for the Army abundantly, is entitled to our respect."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Lieut. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. A.:

(Page 17.) "The present system has worked very satisfactorily, I think. It has carried us through a long war, and I believe that, properly managed, it is about as good as anything we can get. As other nations have different systems some officers want to make changes, but they forget that other nations are subjected to different conditions, so that what might be good for Germany or France in the staff organization would not be suitable for the United States."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. A.:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 207.) "It has grown up under the hands of able administrators and has met the wants of the peace establishment as well as of our various Indian wars, the Mexican war, and the late civil war. The test to which it was submitted during the war of 1861 to 1865, when an immense army was built up upon the narrow foundations of the old establishment, resulted so favorably that it would, in my judgment, be exceedingly unwise to revert to a system tried and condemned long years ago." (NOTE.—*A system of temporary details for staff duty terminated in 1837-38, when the present system of the staff was established. See testimony of Adjutant-General Townsend, Coburn report, 1873, pages 50 and 51, post.*)

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, commanded Army of the Potomac, at present (March 4, 1872) in command of the Military Division of the Atlantic:

(Page 15.) "I have had a fair opportunity to observe the workings of the present system both in time of war and peace. It has always

worked well. \* \* \* The distribution of labor to distinct departments, the characteristic of the system, was adopted from the very fact of the previous systems not working well. \* \* \* During the war I had, at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, visits from numerous foreign officers, and I do not remember a single instance where fault was found with our system. Among these there was a colonel of the French artillery who was permitted to remain several months at my headquarters and who very thoroughly studied our whole system of administration, and who considered our system of distribution of labor in our supply departments as greatly superior to the system in use in the French army, where all supplies are furnished by one department, that of the intendence."

**Garfield report, 1869.**

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, commanded Second Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, fifth military district, Military Division of the Atlantic, etc.:

(Page 90.) "Those departments (quartermaster's, commissary, and pay) as they conducted their work during the war, gave great satisfaction."

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Hancock:

(Page 26.) "From the recent experience of our great war we have an assurance that those (staff) departments can be relied upon under the present system to perform their respective duties in the most successful manner under all circumstances."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, commanded Army of the Ohio, Twenty-third Army Corps; now Lieutenant-General, U. S. A. (retired):

(Page 28.) "Our present system works well in time of peace, and proved remarkably effective in war, though I believe nearly all army commanders found defects which they were compelled to remedy by their own assumed authority."

**Garfield report, 1869.**

Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, commanded Army of the Potomac, Army of the Rappahannock, division, corps, and department commander:

(Page 110.) "Our Army was perhaps more abundantly supplied by far (during the civil war) than any other army that was ever put in the field. The amount of supplies allowed so far exceeds that allowed any other service that even if a portion of those supplies should be given to the men they would be better off than if all the supplies allowed in other armies were given them. Our men have a very abundant ration, which during the war was largely increased by act of Congress. They have more clothing than they can use, in addition to which they have their pay. The amount of transportation necessary to send forward the supplies was immense; but they were all

sent forward, and the Army, with very rare exceptions, was always abundantly fed and well clothed, far more so than the French and English armies.

“This resulted from the nature of our Army, the quality and kind of persons who went into it, and what they had been used to having at home. I do not think that the supplies were in any disproportion to what the men had been accustomed to as citizens. \* \* \*

“This abundance was due to the spirit that animated every part of the land—every town, every city, every club, every organization.” \* \* \*

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, commanded Fourth and Eleventh Army Corps, the Army of the Tennessee, and now Major-General, U. S. A. (retired):

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 148.) “When a great war surprised us we had the present system in the germ—only expansion, according to the emergency, was required. The Quartermaster, with slight additional help, forwarded camp and garrison equipage and moved armies with remarkable promptitude. The Commissary kept his eye upon his specialty and with great regularity supplied the vast numbers with the requisite food, and the Pay Department, doing only its own work, rarely failed to forestall one very fruitful source of discontent—the uncertain and irregular payment of troops in the field.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Augur, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, commanded a division in the Fifth Army Corps, the Department of Washington, and Twenty-second Army Corps:

(Page 48.) “Experience has shown that our staff organization is efficient for field service on the largest scale.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Brig. Gen. Edward D. Townsend, Adjutant-General U. S. A., brevet major-general. Prior to appointment in the Adjutant-General's Department served in the artillery in the Florida war and in the Cherokee Nation:

(Page 125.) “The present army organization is the product of gradual experience. It has stood the test of war and peace, and though it may not be perfect, is probably as nearly so as it is possible to make it.” \* \* \*

(Page 129.) “In 1837–38 the present system of the staff was established, and in two great wars which have occurred since the manner in which our armies have been clothed, transported, fed, paid, and provided with medical attendance has attracted the admiration of the military world.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Maj. Samuel Breck, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general, afterwards Adjutant-General of the Army. Prior

to appointment in the Adjutant-General's Department served in the artillery in the field during the civil war until July, 1862:

“The present organization certainly produced wonderful results during the war, and it is hard to conceive a more severe test of its merits.”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Randolph B. Marcy, inspector-general, U. S. A., brevet major-general, brigadier-general of volunteers, and chief of staff to General McClellan in the Army of West Virginia and in the Army of the Potomac; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A., inspector-general:

(Page 25.) “The lesson taught us during the rebellion, which I am confident every volunteer general officer will readily admit, is that our admirable staff system contributed largely toward our success. Without it we would have been unable to properly organize, equip, and supply such large armies as we were called upon suddenly to put in the field, but with it we achieved results that have elicited the commendation and applause of military men throughout the world.”

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Marcy:

(Page 143.) “No army of equal proportions was ever organized from raw levies in less time, and no mobilized troops ever so well supplied with transportation, subsistence, and war material, or more promptly paid or mustered in and out of service with as little dissatisfaction or complaint as were our forces during our late war, all of which was achieved through the direct agency of our admirably organized staff departments, and it is upon these departments we must in future, as in the past, mainly rely for great war exigencies.”

**Coburn report, 1874.**

Col. James A. Hardie, inspector-general, U. S. A., brevet major-general. Prior to appointment in the Inspector-General's Department served in the artillery; during the civil war served as aid on the staffs of Generals McClellan and Burnside:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 249.) “At the breaking out of the war of the rebellion our efficient staff system provided ample administrative service for the wants of the large body of men suddenly called into existence. An imperfect staff system would have frustrated military success.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Q. When the late war began, notwithstanding the staff was much smaller than it now is, there was great rapidity and efficiency manifested in putting armies into the field?—A. Yes; but the staff itself was manifestly too small. The body of experience that it had was diffused rapidly, it is true, among the officers; but I think that the experience of all the officers of both armies, North and South, was that there was a lamentable deficiency of capable staff officers of the superior grades. There was not an officer, from the Secretary of War to the major-generals commanding the troops who were charged with the

duties of the collecting of bodies of men and supplying them and moving them, who did not feel the great deficiency that there was in the higher grades of staff officers. As the war progressed we got some talented staff officers from the volunteer service, and we have some of them now in the service—some of the best officers we have.” \* \* \*

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Absalom Baird, assistant inspector-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general in volunteer service and brevet major-general; afterwards inspector-general with the rank of brigadier-general:

(Page 41.) “I served during nearly the whole of the rebellion as a general of volunteers, commanding either a brigade or a division in the field, and after the war had command of a geographical military department. \* \* \*

“In our short experience as a nation almost every conceivable method of staff organization has in some of its parts been experimented on, arriving at length at what we now have, and with this we have gone through two wars—one a very great one—with success.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Stewart Van Vliet, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., brevet major-general, served in the artillery before the civil war; was chief quartermaster Army of the Potomac; now colonel, U. S. A. (retired):

(Page 164.) “When large armies were suddenly called into the field the staff corps supplied their wants promptly and efficiently. While almost everything was changed during the war, the organization of the staff remained the same; they were expanded, but never changed.”

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Rufus Saxton, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, brevet major-general; served in artillery until 1861; on the staff of General McClellan; military governor Department of the South; now colonel, U. S. A. (retired):

(Page 33.) “I can not regard the present organization of the staff of our Army as faulty in any particular. It is the growth and result of years of experience. It stood the test in the late war nobly, and there is to-day no army in the world that has a staff organization so simple, effective, and common-sense, and it should not be changed without grave reasons.”

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Judson D. Bingham, quartermaster, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general; served in artillery before the civil war; was chief quartermaster Seventeenth Army Corps and of the Army of the Tennessee; now colonel, U. S. A. (retired):

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 62.) “Experience in war, especially during that of the rebellion, has shown our staff organization to be equal to any demands that

have been or are likely to be made on it, and without a superior in any other army in the world."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

Brig. Gen. Robert Macfeely, Commissary-General of Subsistence, U. S. A.; served in infantry before appointment in Subsistence Department; was chief commissary, Army of the Ohio, Fifteenth Army Corps, and Army of the Tennessee:

(Page 167.) "The experience of the past fifty years and the late war prove that each department as now organized had as much as it could do to perform its appropriate and legitimate duties, and the manner in which these duties were performed, and the immense armies supplied, proved the efficiency and wisdom of the separate organizations." \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Alexander E. Shiras, Assistant Commissary-General of Subsistence, U. S. A., brevet major-general, afterwards Commissary-General of Subsistence with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.; served in artillery prior to appointment in Subsistence Department:

(Page 55.) "The experience of the Mexican war and of our late civil war attests the advantage of our staff organization, and I fearlessly assert that in all history no example can be found where equally large numbers of troops operating over so large a territory were as well supplied with every requisite by its staff officers as was our Army."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. John G. Foster, Engineers, major-general of volunteers. Served in Mexican war; during civil war was a corps and department commander:

(Page 26.) "Our organization is essentially an *American one*, and has fully demonstrated its excellence during our recent wars. It is not too large or costly for a peace establishment, and is capable of expansion to meet the requirements of a great war."

\* \* \* \* \*

"It has stood the test of a great war successfully, and I should regret to see any changes made in the interest of mere experiment."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Quincey A. Gillmore, Engineers, major-general of volunteers, division, corps, and department commander during civil war, afterwards colonel of engineers:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 165.) "In my judgment, the duties of the Quartermaster's Department are so essentially different in character from those of either the Pay or the Subsistence departments, and in time of war especially are so varied and onerous, that separate organizations should be maintained for these services. \* \* \* During the war the duties of these three departments were discharged with conspicuous ability, and their general efficiency under the peace establishment has, I believe, never been questioned." \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. John G. Parke, Engineers, major-general of volunteers, corps commander during the civil war; afterwards colonel of engineers:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 73.) "I believe that our armies were supplied and administered as well as it was possible under all the circumstances and considering the very limited number of officers in our Army who had at the beginning of the war any practical knowledge or experience in the movement and supply of large bodies of troops." \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Maj. Godfrey Weitzel, Engineers, major-general of volunteers, division and corps commander during civil war:

(Page 185.) "The present army organization has carried the country through two wars in the most successful manner. I think as few changes as possible should be made in it, and these changes should be carefully matured." \* \* \*

**PERMANENT STAFF APPOINTMENTS, DETAILS FOR STAFF DUTY,  
THE VALUE OF SPECIALISTS, AND LEGISLATION SUGGESTED  
BY OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.**

**Coburn report, 1873.**

The committee said:

(Page iv.) "The committee made inquiry into the subject of the permanency of the staff, the confining of officers to specialties of the service, and their efficiency and ability in consequence of such limitation of their duties. Upon this subject there is a variety of opinion among officers.

"As to the question whether there should be a permanent staff there was no doubt. But as to what portion of it should be permanent and what detailed there is great diversity. Some would cut down the present number of staff officers largely, leaving but a few at the head of each branch; others would fix the number and fill up all vacancies permanently, from the lowest to the highest. Others occupy an intermediate position, and would leave the lower positions of each branch vacant, to be filled by detail from the line, as a school and preparation for the more responsible duties of the higher ranks of the staff or line, as future emergencies may require.

(Page v.) "The testimony is concurrent that the knowledge and experience gained by the performance of staff duties is of the highest value; that the officer has been fortunate who in his earlier career may have by practice acquired a complete knowledge of the adjutant's, the quartermaster's, commissary's, and the inspector's duties, each and all so necessary to daily efficiency in the service, whether in the camp or the field. And if he can add to these the practice in the Ordnance and Engineer Corps he may be safely said to combine in his experience the highest preparation for the great soldier.

"Can this experience be given to the younger officers of the Army by a system of details in different branches of the staff? It seems to be possible and worthy of experiment. The additional question here

arises. Should they be detailed from different branches of the permanent staff to do duties in the others alternately, or should they be detailed from the line to go back to it again to serve with the troops? If the former, then the vacancies of the staff should be filled at once, and a system of details adopted by which these officers could be transferred from one branch to another, so that the entire staff should in the shortest possible time become acquainted with all of its varied duties not strictly scientific specialties. On the other hand, if the latter proposition be the better one, the vacancies in the staff should be left open and provision be made for the selection of efficient, intelligent, and meritorious officers of the line to do the required staff duties. Will the service suffer by reason of such a system of details? is a question that here arises. It would seem that with capable heads to each branch of the staff and an experienced corps of officers to aid him no possible detriment could occur from a system of details from the officers of the line. In the volunteer service a system of details was absolutely essential, and worked well. If the detail for staff duties was made after a thorough examination and as a reward of meritorious service, competition would furnish capable and qualified officers for all the vacancies that could occur."

NOTE.—The bill reported by the committee provided for details from the line, for a period not to exceed four years, to fill vacancies in the staff as follows: Five vacancies in the grade of major in the Adjutant-General's Department; ten vacancies in the grade of captain in the Quartermaster's Department; six vacancies in the grade of captain in the Subsistence Department; ten vacancies in the grade of major in the Pay Department; ten vacancies in the grade of first lieutenant and five in the grade of second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers; and five vacancies in the grade of first lieutenant and five in the grade of second lieutenant in the Ordnance Department (see page 163, post).

#### Coburn report, 1874.

The committee said:

(Page iv): "It was also found to be expedient to reduce the staff in certain respects, and to provide, in addition, that certain portions of the staff shall not be filled permanently, but by details from the line, thus saving the expense of permanent officers in the staff and giving officers of the line a fair opportunity to become acquainted with many of the most important duties of the staff, and vice versa. No doubt it is true that officers of the staff may be benefited by service in the field with the troops, may become familiar with the duties of the line, and thus rendered more capable and efficient in great emergencies. A system of details gives to the Army an opportunity to have a selection of the best talent for staff duties in addition to the highest degree of training and development. Certain branches of the staff which require high professional knowledge and skill or great scientific attainments, such as the medical and legal departments and the Engineer Corps, would not admit of the application of this principle. To be a skillful physician, to be a profound lawyer, to be an able engineer require devotion to a specialty for years, and thorough and long-continued study. No officer of the Army could be detailed to act in

either corps with safety. But the duties of adjutants-general, inspectors, quartermasters, and commissaries come within the range of the knowledge and capacity of all of the officers of the Army, and they may be performed without difficulty by them."

NOTE.—The bill reported by the committee provided for details from the line to the staff for a period not to exceed four years, as follows: For 8 assistant adjutants-general, to rank as captains of cavalry; 4 officers to act as assistant inspectors-general; 10 assistant quartermasters, to rank as first lieutenants of cavalry; 6 commissaries of subsistence, to rank as captains of cavalry, and 6 first lieutenants and 10 second lieutenants of ordnance (see page 165, post).

#### Coburn report, 1874.

Gen. William T. Sherman, U. S. A., Commanding General of the Army from March 8, 1869, to February 8, 1884. Received the thanks of Congress for Chattanooga, the Atlanta campaign, and the march to the sea.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 276.) "Q. In your judgment, do the duties of the Ordnance and Engineer Corps, being scientific specialties, require their separation from the ordinary routine of army duties? Do they require seclusion, as it were, from the Army?—A. I think not. I think, on the contrary, that all officers of the Army, in their own interest, should know what a soldier can do, in order to know what works of defense and offense are proper. I asked the question of Field Marshal Von Moltke, in Prussia, who, I suppose, at this moment stands at the very head of the military profession. I said to him, 'You are chief of the staff which embraces all the staff departments of the Prussian army. You bring young officers to Berlin to school, as we send our young men to West Point. Do you ever send them to their regiments?' His reply was, 'Oh, yes; they go to their regiments. We never separate an officer from troops except by way of detail. He goes back to his troops again as soon as the special service is ended. No officer is ever permanently out of the line of the army.' \* \* \*

(Page 277.) My understanding, from the conversation I had with Von Moltke and others, however, was that officers of the staff departments in the Prussian army are detached as chiefs of staff and assigned to generals of corps, generals of divisions and brigades, but that these officers are at no time for a very long period separated from the troops of the line. In other words, every staff officer is required, for a considerable period of his life, to serve with soldiers. In our Army, as I have said, an ordnance or engineer officer knows no more about commanding soldiers and of the conduct of the men who carry the muskets than other well-educated gentlemen."

(Page 277.) "Q. Would you advise a change or transfer of the officers of these corps into the line, and officers of the line into these corps, as a general rule?—A. I would insist upon every officer of the Ordnance or Engineer Department for his own good and to enlarge the sphere of his usefulness, serving a portion of his time on duty with troops, and upon their not being kept so distinct and separate. They go to West Point and graduate there after four years' instruc-

tion. They then go into the Ordnance or Engineer Departments and settle down into ordnance and engineer officers; that is all, and nothing more."

(NOTE.—Vacancies in lowest ordnance grade, first lieutenant, now filled by transfer from the line.—Act June 23, 1874. See p. 181, post.)

"They are perfectly qualified for these duties, but, as I have said, they can know nothing about commanding soldiers except by inspiration. My own preference would be to require these graduates to serve for a length of time in the line of the Army before being eligible to either of these staff departments, and I would then require them, after a certain period of time, to be sent back to the line of the Army to serve for another period, when they might again be reeligible in the ordnance or engineer service.

"Q. It has been suggested by some of the officers who have answered questions to this committee that the term of staff duty be prescribed, and that officers should be limited to a short term of duty and then sent back to the troops. Would you regard that as a good policy?—A. I would regard that as an excellent policy.

"Q. Have you looked at the law to see what changes would be effectual to secure this result?—A. I have not; and I should not like even to suggest such a change, because to frame a law or to criticise a law presumes a knowledge of the principles of government greater than I aspire to. I merely say that such a law as would result in bringing harmony into all parts of the Army would be most desirable. \* \* \*

"Q. Do you think anything substantial is to be gained by confining these staff officers to special duty in their corps for a great length of time?—A. No, sir; they should go back and serve with the troops of the line a fair proportion of their period of service.

"Q. How would you regard a provision of law requiring every officer in the Engineer and Ordnance Corps below the grade of major or lieutenant-colonel to serve at least two out of every four years with the troops?—A. I think every officer should serve with troops four years before he is eligible to detail in any of the staff corps, and that, having remained on staff duty for four years, he should then return to the line and serve four years more before becoming reeligible for staff duty of a higher grade."

\* \* \* \* \*

(NOTE.—See legislation recommended by General Sherman in Burnside report, 1878, in which an organization is provided for all of the staff departments, with a provision (section 90) for transfers by the President from the line to the staff and from the staff to the line, and for details of quartermasters and commissaries with the rank of captain, p. 29, post.)

(Page 278.) "Q. In time of peace is it or is it not expedient to reduce the staff in proportion to the reduction of the Army?—A. No, sir; the staff ought to be liberal in its number. They are undergoing a system of instruction and preparation for war. We found in the Mexican war and in our civil war the large number of staff officers very advantageous.

(Page 279.) "Q. Would it be better to allow generals in command of armies, corps, or departments to select their adjutants-general, or

allow them to be selected, as at present, by the head of that department?—A. \* \* \* In the field, during war, a general should choose from among his own officers the best men he can find for his adjutant and inspectors, without reference to the departments. In time of peace I rather think it is better that the officer should be assigned from the Adjutant-General's Department. These are more familiar with the routine, which insures regularity in returns and reports, which is extremely desirable.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Q. What is your opinion as to the comparative number and rank of the staff corps and officers of the line?—A. \* \* \* I think the present organization of the staff corps was recommended by General Thomas, General Meade, and myself in 1868. And I feel, therefore, committed to the conclusion that the present grades are about fair and just and sufficiently remunerative to make them desirable. It makes men more careful if they occupy a position of high rank and trust.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 280.) “\* \* \* My idea is that the fighting soldier, pure and simple, should be the very highest part of the military profession, and all these other be adjuncts; never the reverse. In other words, we should make it for the interest of the officer to be with his company and regiment wherever that company and regiment may be, and he should feel more honored in the discharge of the particular duty attached to his company or regiment than in any other detached duty whatever.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Burnside report, 1878.**

General Sherman:

(Page 79.) “We need more first lieutenants, because of the many details for civil colleges, signal service, recruiting, West Point, and for detail as quartermasters, commissaries, etc., below the rank of major.

\* \* \* \* \*

“In the proposed plan of organization you will notice that I vary slightly from that suggested in a former paper submitted to the board of reorganization two years ago, in this, that I now omit all regimental quartermasters and commissaries, and all officers of the general staff below the grade of major, adhering to my recommendation that every company in the Army should have two first and one second lieutenants, so as to form a sufficient number of first lieutenants for detail for temporary service in the various staff bureaus, limiting details to four years, and then compelling them to return to their companies and to be replaced by the detail of others, thus affording some variety of employment for this most valuable class of officers.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Burnside report, 1878.**

General Sherman.—Extract from his letter to commission on reorganization, dated September, 1876:

(Page 107.) “On considering any paper organization it is safe to assume that about one-third are usually absent. This seems a large

proportion, but it is the result of experience extending back for centuries. Good discipline and good administration diminish this ratio; while bad discipline and worse administration increase it largely. The usual causes of diminished ranks are wounds and sickness, furloughs and leaves of absence, confinement by way of punishment, details for cooking, for care of sick, as teamsters, care and distribution of supplies, detachments for escorts of trains and exposed points along the routes of supply, etc. These causes are common to all armies in peace and in war, besides which our peace establishment is specially subject to causes which take officers away from their legitimate regiments and companies. It is a very common popular error that an army is necessarily idle in time of peace, and for this alleged reason influential families strive to draw their sons and friends away from their duty. No army in war performs more real hard work than does our American peace establishment, building forts and posts along our ever-changing frontier, building roads hundreds and thousands of miles in extent, guarding trains, and in explorations, which cause them to march thousands of miles in a single season, etc. Among these special causes I will enumerate the following: The Military Academy at all times draws from the regiments thirty officers, the civil universities are entitled to thirty by law, the recruiting service requires forty, besides which are courts-martial, boards of survey, boards to examine new inventions in arms, accouterments, clothing, and equipments, centennial boards, etc. At this very time there are three hundred and thirty-five officers so absent from their proper companies, besides many more who have leave of absence from their division and department commanders. I am satisfied that discipline and good economy demand that there never should be less than two, and habitually not less than three, officers present with each organized company; and it is for this reason that I have added one first lieutenant to each company of cavalry and infantry, the same as now exists in the artillery companies."

#### **Burnside report, 1878.**

General Sherman.—Suggestions regarding revision of Revised Statutes of the United States, Title XIV, Chapter I, "The Army:"

\*                    \*                    \*                    \*                    \*                    \*

(Page 83.) "SEC. 31. The Adjutant-General's Department of the Army shall consist of one Adjutant-General, with the rank of brigadier-general; two assistant adjutants-general, with the rank of colonel of cavalry; four assistant adjutants-general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; and eight assistant adjutants-general, with the rank of major of cavalry.

"SEC. 32. All vacancies in the grade of major in the Adjutant-General's Department shall, when filled, be filled by selection from captains of the Army.

"SEC. 33. The Inspector-General's Department of the Army shall consist of one Inspector-General, with the rank of brigadier-general; one assistant inspector-general, with the rank of colonel of cavalry; and two assistant inspectors-general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry.

(Page 84.) "SEC. 34. The Quartermaster's Department of the Army shall consist of one Quartermaster-General, with the rank of brigadier-

general; four assistant quartermasters-general, with the rank of colonel of cavalry; eight deputy quartermasters-general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; twelve quartermasters, with the rank of major of cavalry; — assistant quartermasters, with the rank of captain of cavalry; and such number of military storekeepers, not exceeding —, as may be required, with the rank of captain of cavalry. Nothing herein shall deprive of his office any person now holding the office of quartermaster, with the rank of major.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 41. The Subsistence Department of the Army shall consist of one Commissary-General of Subsistence, with the rank of brigadier-general; two assistant commissaries-general of subsistence, with the rank of colonel of cavalry; two assistant commissaries-general of subsistence, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; eight commissaries of subsistence, with the rank of major of cavalry; and — commissaries of subsistence, with the rank of captain of cavalry.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 43. The commanding officer of each military post, or of a detachment in the field of two or more companies, when there is not present a regular quartermaster or commissary, may appoint, from among the subalterns present for duty, one to act as assistant quartermaster and commissary, who shall be subject to all the rules and regulations for officers of these departments, and shall perform the duties thereof, and be entitled to receive, as full compensation therefor, in addition to the pay and allowances of his rank, the sum of fifteen dollars a month if the command be one hundred enlisted men or less, and the sum of twenty dollars a month if the command exceed one hundred enlisted men.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 85.) “SEC. 51. The Corps of Engineers shall consist of one brigadier-general, six colonels, twelve lieutenant-colonels, twenty-four majors, thirty captains, thirty first lieutenants, ten second lieutenants, and one battalion of engineers.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 58. The Corps of Ordnance shall consist of one brigadier-general, two colonels, four lieutenant-colonels, eight majors, ten captains, twenty first lieutenants, ten second lieutenants, and a battalion of ordnance.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 86.) “SEC. 65. The Medical Department shall consist of one Surgeon-General, one assistant surgeon-general, sixty surgeons, and one hundred and twenty assistant surgeons: *Provided*, That at least one surgeon and two assistant surgeons be assigned to duty with each of the regiments provided for in this act. The Surgeon-General to have the pay and allowances of brigadier-general, the assistant surgeon-general to have the pay and allowances of colonel, the surgeons of majors, and assistant surgeons of captains mounted.

“SEC. 66. There shall be one purveyor or apothecary-general, with the pay and allowances of colonel, and four assistants, with the pay and allowances of lieutenant-colonel, and who may be required to perform the duties of a surgeon, at the discretion of the President.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 76. The Pay Department shall consist of one Paymaster-General, two assistant paymasters-general, two deputy paymasters-general, and fifty paymasters. The Paymaster-General to have the pay and allowances of brigadier-general, the assistant paymasters-general of colonel, the deputy paymasters-general of lieutenant-colonels, and paymasters of majors.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 87.) “SEC. 83. The Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General of Subsistence, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Paymaster-General shall be appointed by selection from the Army at large.

“SEC. 84. There shall be one Chief Signal Officer, with the rank of colonel of cavalry, who shall have charge, under the direction of the Secretary of War, of all signal duty and of all books, papers, and apparatus connected therewith.

“SEC. 85. The Department of Military Justice shall consist of one Judge-Advocate-General, as brigadier-general; one assistant judge-advocate-general, lieutenant-colonel, and four judge-advocates, majors.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 90. Officers may be transferred from the line to the staff and from the staff to the line by the President without prejudice to the grade and date of commission of either party so transferred; and the President may appoint from among the first lieutenants of the line not to exceed twenty quartermasters and ten commissaries, who shall serve four years and no more, with the pay and allowances of captains, and then return to their proper companies and regiments, to be replaced by a like number; these officers to serve as depot or post quartermasters and commissaries of subsistence under the rules and regulations for officers for these departments.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 88.) “SEC. 98. None of the provisions of this title relating to the organization of the Army shall be construed to vacate the commission of any officer now properly in the service or borne on the Army Register as an officer retired from active service, or to require new appointments to fill the grades mentioned herein, which are now properly filled according to said provisions.”

\* \* \* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. A., commanding general of the Army from November 1, 1861, to March 11, 1862:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 208.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps of the staff is, with a proper organization and under proper restrictions, to render them competent to perform their duties.

“It is very desirable that candidates for every staff corps or department should be examined with great care as to their professional, physical, and moral capacity—their soldierly feeling; and it is very important that, prior to their permanent appointment on the staff, they should have served long enough in at least two branches of the service to render them fully acquainted with all the duties of officers of the line

and with all the requirements of troops—the mode of handling them, as well as to show their own military capacity.

“It is also desirable that the functions of the lower grades in the various staff corps should be performed by officers detailed from the line for a period long enough to instruct them fully, and that the higher grades should be permanently filled by selections from among the best of the line officers who have been thus detailed. These details should not continue longer than some four years. In this manner the knowledge of staff duties would be widely spread through the line, to the benefit of the whole service. To provide for this without injury to the regimental and company service there should, of course, be a sufficient number of supernumerary officers.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Burnside report, 1878.

General McClellan:

(Page 454.) “\* \* \* The statesmen must control, but if wise and equal to the responsibility they will obtain their data from not too many soldiers of wisdom and experience, and, after determining the general principles, will leave most of the details to the professional men. In determining the proper organization of our Army it would appear indispensable first to establish the conditions of the problem in some such way as this.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 455.) “The experience of our own and other countries proves that it is false economy to reduce the peace establishment of the Army unduly, for the reason that the employment of large masses of new troops upon the breaking out of war involves an immense expenditure out of all proportion with the savings resulting from reducing the peace establishment too much. For similar reasons it is wise and necessary to furnish in peace due supplies of all war materials not liable to deterioration.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 457.) “Another question which merits careful consideration and comes to a great extent within the domain of the statesman is whether the arms, equipments, ammunition, etc., for the Army should be made in the arsenals or obtained by purchase from private firms, under a system of rigid inspection. There enters here not only the question of costs, including interest on capital invested, etc., but also the consideration of encouraging private companies in time of peace, so that in emergencies the Government may have larger facilities at their disposal.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### “ENGINEER CORPS.

“I can imagine no good reason for changing the existing organization of these companies, which was established for strong and sufficient reasons. The proposed organization would destroy or seriously impair their efficiency.

#### “ORDNANCE CORPS.

“The strength of this corps must depend upon the solution of the question presented above—in regard to the manufacture of arms, etc.

“The clause permitting the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Commissary-General, Surgeon-General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, and Paymaster-General to be selected from the Army at large instead of, as at present, from their respective corps, seems to me most objectionable, and opens the door to grave abuses, without any corresponding advantage. In the vast majority of cases, officers better fitted for the responsible duties of the positions named will be found in the corps than outside of it, and the chances are that improper motives would guide a selection made outside of the corps.

“In such an army as ours the principle of seniority in promotion is the safest one, qualified by the condition that the first promotion to any vacancy shall be entirely fit for it. If the first is not, then the next who is fit should be taken. If no one in the corps is fit, then the best outside of the corps at once. Any system other than that of promoting the next senior officer possessing the requisite qualifications will destroy all pride and interest in the service. From the nature of the case, this principle does not apply to the selection of general officers.

“The clause authorizing the President to promote an officer from one grade to the next higher, on the occurrence of the first vacancy in the same corps or regiment, for distinguished services in battle, is liable to the same grave objection.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U. S. A.; Secretary of War; now lieutenant-general U. S. A. (retired); major-general in the volunteer service; Commanding General of the Army from August 14, 1888, to September 29, 1895:

(Page 123.) “I am of the opinion that losses occur under the present system to a very considerable extent from the practice and necessity of detailing officers of the line at the various minor posts, for the discharge of the duties of these several departments, who are not bonded officers and who are frequently officers of no experience in the duties of these departments. I think, perhaps, that a most important reform could be effected in this regard with or without consolidation, but especially if these corps were consolidated by the enactment of a law authorizing an addition to the supply department of a pretty large number of officers of the line, they still retaining their commissions in their regiments and being subject to be relieved from staff duty and returning to their respective regiments whenever it might be deemed expedient. I would require these officers to be bonded officers. I think that would make the service safer and would secure to the supply department a greater permanence of character than can be secured under the present system. \* \* \*

“I do not think bonds are always a safeguard. I think the advantage of bonds is rather in their moral effect than otherwise.”

(Page 125.) “Q. State your opinion as to what would be the effect of discontinuing the Adjutant-General as a permanent officer and assigning a brigadier-general to perform the duties of Adjutant-General.—A. I do not know that it would be objectionable. The principal effect of it would be to add what might be called a chief of staff to the present organization. As a matter of course the officer going into the

department would know little of the duties of Adjutant-General, and would depend for all the details of the office upon some one permanently in the Adjutant-General's Department. The adoption of such a plan would amount to what has been advocated a great deal—the assignment of an officer as chief of staff. I think, myself, the principle is pernicious; I think that every officer in command should perform his own duties, and that in time of peace, and when not in the field with a separate army, the general should command the whole Army, staff as well as line. When that occurs the Adjutant-General will become what he ought to be—an officer in charge of the mere details of his department. \* \* \*

“Of course the consolidation of the staff bureaus spoken of must be done by legislation if at all. I may say in this connection that as a general thing whatever can possibly be done by Executive action in relation to military matters had better be done in that way than by legislation. It is a pretty difficult thing to command an army by law.”

#### Maish report, 1878.

General Schofield:

(Page 26.) “The number of staff officers actually required is much greater than the numbers composing the several corps of the general staff of the Army. A large number of line officers are at all times on staff duty. The number so actually employed, as shown by the returns in the War Department, will give a just indication of the required number. This will be found to be nearly independent of the numerical strength of the Army. A still larger proportion of staff duties in the Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments might be performed by line officers. This would probably be wise in view of the very large proportion of staff officers required in our service.

\* \* \* \* \*

“\* \* \* The greatest evil of our present military system, or lack of system, is that the staff departments are practically ‘independent corps.’ These departments are excellent in themselves. Their organization, though it might be improved, is good enough. Any possible question of their consolidation or reorganization in any way is utterly insignificant as compared with that of their union with the line as part of the whole under one head.

“So far as I can see, consolidation would not justify any material reduction in the number of staff officers, though it might be fairly advocated on other grounds. The number of staff officers can be reduced only by devolving their duties upon officers of the line. If the latter are to have only skeleton companies to command they may as well do all the required staff duties. But if the companies are to be kept at effective strength, then the line officers have enough to do in their proper sphere.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Burnside report, 1878.

General Schofield:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 246.) “The permanent organization of the Adjutant-General's, Inspector-General's, Ordnance, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay

departments, to consist of the chiefs and the necessary field officers; all other officers, captains and lieutenants, required for service in these departments to be detailed from the line for limited periods, say six years. Details for the ordnance should be made from the artillery only.

“Appointments to the grade of major in any of these staff departments should be made from captains of the line who have served a certain period—say not less than six years—with troops and a like period in the staff department to which they are to be appointed, and should be based upon a competitive examination as to qualifications for service in such staff department, in addition to the general examination required before all promotions.

“Every officer should be entitled, upon passing a satisfactory examination as to his moral, physical, and professional qualifications, to promotion to the next higher grade up to that of colonel upon the completion of a definite period of service in each grade.

“And no officer should be promoted without such examination.

“The periods of service in the several grades should be fixed so that the grade of colonel would be reached in about thirty years. The greatest periods should be about six years for a second lieutenant, eight years for a first lieutenant, ten years for a captain, six years for a major, and four years for a lieutenant-colonel; total, 34 years. Every officer to be retired after 44 years of service, or at 66 years of age.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Burnside report, 1878.

Proposed reorganization of the Army, submitted by General Schofield August 2, 1878. He provides a permanent organization for each of the staff departments with modifications as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page. 248.) “SEC. —. The general staff of the Army shall consist of \* \* \* and such additional officers of the line as may be necessary, in the judgment of the President, to perform the service required in the general staff. The officers of the general staff shall perform the duties which have heretofore been performed by the officers of the Adjutant-General’s Department and of the Inspector-General’s Department.

(Page. 249.) “Sec. —. All vacancies in the grade of major in this department shall be filled by selection from captains of the Army.

“SEC. —. The Quartermaster’s Department of the Army shall consist of \* \* \* and such number of captains and first lieutenants of the line as the President may assign to duty in this department, not to exceed the number of military posts and detachments of troops in the field requiring the service of such officers.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. —. The Subsistence Department of the Army shall consist of \* \* \* and such number of captains and first lieutenants of the line as the President may assign to duty in this department, not to exceed the number of military posts and detachments of troops in the field requiring the services of such officers.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 250.) “SEC. —. The Corps of Engineers shall consist of  
\* \* \*

“SEC. —. The Corps of Ordnance shall consist of \* \* \* and such number of captains and first lieutenants of artillery as the President may assign to duty in the corps.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 252.) “SEC. —. The Signal Bureau shall consist of \* \* \* and such number of first lieutenants of the Army as the President may assign to duty in that Bureau, and not to exceed four hundred and fifty enlisted men.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. —. The Chief of the General Staff, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General of Subsistence, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, the Paymaster-General, the Judge-Advocate-General, and the Chief Signal Officer shall be appointed by selection from the Army at large.

“SEC. —. Appointments to the grade of major in any of the staff departments shall be made from captains of the line who have served not less than four years in such department, and not less than six years with troops in the duties of the line.

“SEC. —. The period of services of officers of the line assigned to duty in any staff department shall be limited to six years, and no officer shall be detached from the duties of his corps until he has served therewith at least four years.

“SEC. —. Lieutenants of engineers before their promotion to the grade of captain shall be assigned to and serve with troops not less than two years.

(Page 253.) “SEC. —. Officers of the line shall be assigned by the War Department to regiments and companies or other duties authorized by law, according to the necessities of the service from time to time, in such manner that the junior officers of the line generally shall have experience in the administrative duties of the staff, and that officers appointed in the staff shall have served not less than six years with troops before such appointment.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. —. None of the provisions of this title relating to the organization of the Army shall be construed to vacate the commission of any officer now properly in the service, or borne on the Army Register as an officer retired from active service, or to require new appointments to fill the grades mentioned herein, which are now properly filled according to said provisions. But the President may transfer officers made supernumerary in any corps to fill vacancies in any other corps.”

\* \* \* \* \*

Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; commanded the Army of the Potomac; then (March 4, 1872) in command of the military division of the Atlantic:

(Page 16.) “The experience and knowledge acquired by an officer in discharging special duties ought to add to his efficiency and render

his retention beneficial to the service; being retained, it is but justice to give him such promotion as his corps affords. \* \* \*

"In all departments of life education and experience are considered valuable, and are followed by rewards and promotion. I see no reason why the same consideration should not hold good in the military profession. \* \* \*

"I do not think it would be good policy [to allow commanders of corps, armies, or departments to select their adjutant-generals from the line or staff]. In some instances the personal convenience of the general and, perhaps, the public interests might be promoted, but the tendency to indulge in friendly and personal considerations would be more likely to detract from than to add to the efficiency of the service."

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, division, corps, and army commander—commanded the Army of the Cumberland:

(Page 114.) "It is not natural to suppose that an officer detailed temporarily to do such duty [ordnance duty] would take so much interest in it as one who had been appointed to the position on account of his scientific attainments. The latter would take special pains not only to keep himself up to the mark, but would endeavor so far as possible to improve. A person only engaged temporarily in a thing will not take so much interest in it as one who is engaged in it permanently."

(Page 116.) "Q. What would you say of its influence on the Army, as being good or bad, to have the Adjutant-General of the Army assigned by selection from prominent officers of the Army anywhere, without regard to promotion in his own corps?—A. We might get by the selection, if judiciously made, a much more efficient Adjutant-General; but the duties of an Adjutant-General are so peculiar that it would be a difficult matter to select an officer from the Army qualified in all respects to perform those duties. The duties of the Adjutant-General are very much detail duties—exact and statistical, too. It requires a good deal of close study and a peculiar turn of mind to master the duties of the office and to retain sufficient recollection of them so as to keep the papers always correct; therefore I am inclined to think that on the whole it would be better to select the Adjutant-General of the Army from the corps of adjutants-general."

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; commanded Second Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, Fifth Military District, Military Division of the Atlantic:

(Page 87.) "I would suggest that general officers might be allowed to take from the Army officers of not higher rank than major or captain, and let them be detailed from time to time as adjutants-general in their respective commands. In that way we would be able to secure the services of the most talented young men in the Army, and it would be a great improvement on the present system. If the Adjutant-General should be taken in the way I have suggested—by detail from the

brigadier-generals of the Army—he might be detailed by the President or the Secretary of War, and might be relieved from time to time, to be succeeded by some other officer, selected from among those officers most useful and distinguished. The same rule in reference to the captains and majors detailed.”

#### Maish report, 1878.

General Hancock:

(Page 5.) \* \* \* “We rely upon creating armies from our population when the necessity for them has actually arisen or is impending. But ‘In peace prepare for war’ is an accepted and respected maxim among us. Under the operations of these somewhat contradictory principles we have been led to the compromise of a small standing Army, which is expected to keep pace with the progress of the profession, construct adequate and suitable national defenses, hold some of our most important military positions, preventing their sudden seizure by an enemy, his occupation of our harbors and destruction of our great commercial cities; be prepared at all times to supply the national forces with the most improved weapons, implements, and munitions of war, and to guard these and other public property until distributed for service; be ready at a moment’s notice to organize, equip, and supply, with efficiency and economy, armies of any magnitude which the occasion may call for, and, lastly, to serve as a nucleus for the raw levies raised as needed.

“These I understand to be the main purposes for which our Regular Army is maintained. As a physical force, our little standing Army can never be of appreciable importance after a great contest has set in. Its value consists in its serving as a model and a standard for the militia, and in the knowledge and system, the spirit of discipline, and the military information which its members store up in peace, and disseminate among the national forces when the struggle comes.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 7.) \* \* \* “Our standing army should be a small, complete, compact, vigorous, healthy body, always in a thorough state of discipline and instruction, serving as a model and a standard for the national forces, and not preserved as a skeleton into which it is expected to infuse vitality, activity, and knowledge at the moment an emergency arises.

#### “THE ENGINEER CORPS.

“This branch of the service is of special importance in time of peace. Speaking generally, its duties consist mainly in the preparation of permanent defenses. \* \* \* The strength which the corps should have for its military duties is, like the artillery, quite independent of the strength of any other arm of service or of all of them combined. If their duties required it and their services justified it, the corps might even be largely increased in both the numbers and rank of its officers without any just criticism from the rest of the Army. \* \* \* As far as I am able to judge from the limited information I possess, the corps is not larger than it ought to be for the performance of the duties required of it.

\* \* \* \* \*

## “THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

“The relations of the Ordnance Department to our governmental system and to our small standing Army are quite similar to those of the Engineer Corps. \* \* \* It is the duty of the Ordnance Department to lead in, or at least to keep pace with, these improvements, and all of the military interests, not only of the Regular Army, but of the nation, are largely dependent upon the rapidity of its progress and the certainty of its conclusions in the specialty confided to it. \* \*

## “THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

“The Medical Department, like the Engineer Corps and Ordnance Department, is, properly speaking, rather a special corps than a part of the staff. \* \* \*

\* \* \* “But there are great questions in time of war which can only be properly handled by a regular medical corps. \* \* \*

\* \* \* “But the Army medical officer is expected to maintain a high degree of proficiency in all branches, and if he does this it can only be by hard and constant study of a profession in which theories vary more rapidly, perhaps, than in any other.

\* \* \* \* \*

“It would not be correct to say that the oldest man in this branch is necessarily the best doctor, but it must, I think, be admitted that experience in this corps is of peculiar and especial value—that it is obtained only by extra hazardous risk from contagion, etc.—and hence length of service in the Medical Department is entitled to marked consideration and full compensation. \* \* \*

## “CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER.

(Page 9.) \* \* \* “It, however, strikes me as very anomalous that a proposition should be entertained to increase the Army by creating a number of high grades for a signal corps about the time that a reduction is made in a corps so necessary and so valuable as the Judge-Advocate’s Department.”

## “THE QUARTERMASTER’S, SUBSISTENCE, AND PAY DEPARTMENTS.

“These are essentially the supply departments of the Army. I do not see why any one of them should ever be larger than necessary to fill the demand made on it by the Army actually in service. Regulated by this rule in time of peace, I have no doubt that each would in the future, as it has in the past, be found a complete and sufficiently large nucleus on which to build in case of war. In my judgment the Subsistence and Pay departments are now, in their strength and organization, well suited to the wants of the Army. \* \* \*

“It is generally, if not universally, admitted that these corps, with their present distinct organizations, have worked well both in war and peace. No great failure, perhaps no important shortcoming even, was charged to them during all the trials and difficulties of our last great war.

\* \* \* \* \*

“THE BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE CORPS OF JUDGE-ADVOCATES.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The duties of judge-advocates are inseparable from the military system. They can only be fully and properly performed by men who make a specialty of them.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 11.) \* \* \* “A thorough knowledge of military law in its higher principles as well as the intricacies of its details is particularly necessary in new armies. Its prompt and correct application is one of the principal proceedings in the establishment of discipline and order in the armies which we rely upon in time of need. This can only be accomplished through a corps prepared beforehand. Ours is peculiarly a government of law in the Army as well as out of it.

\* \* \* \* \*

“These are some of the general considerations which lead me to the conviction that a judge-advocate’s department is an important and necessary feature of our military establishment, whether the Regular Army be large or small.

“INSPECTOR-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT.

“This is one of the most important branches of the staff. Unlike most others, its officers can not simply make a specialty of some one subject, but they should be well acquainted with every arm and department of the service. They must examine and report whether proper and thorough instruction is given, whether discipline is maintained, whether administration is honestly and efficiently conducted, whether arms and equipments are suitable and sufficient, whether accounts are properly kept and rendered, whether punishments are conformable to law, and, in general, whether laws, regulations, and orders are impartially and rigidly enforced throughout the military service. To pass properly upon all these questions they must understand the subjects. This requires a high and peculiar order of ability, great industry, large experience, and matured judgment. I have adverted only to the general duties of this department. In addition to them, its officers have a variety of special duties of great significance which I need not mention in detail. \* \* \*

“THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT.

(Page 12.) “Our Regular Army is composed of three parts—the general officers, the general staff, and the line. As we use the term ‘staff,’ it comprises some thirteen distinct legal organizations, with specific duties allotted to each. \* \* \* And thus we have the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments, constituting the supply staff; the Adjutant-General’s Department, the Inspector-General’s Department, aids-de-camp, etc., constituting the military staff, while others, such as the Engineers, Ordnance, etc., are special corps.

“Staff duties have their origin in the fact that it is beyond human capacity for a commander to attend in person to all of those details of service which are unavoidable in large military commands, and which

have increased with the progress of military science. The staff officer, speaking in general terms, is one who aids the commander in the labors which belong directly to his office.

“In this view of the subject, the Adjutant-General’s Department is essentially the staff corps of our Army. Every other branch of the staff (except, perhaps, the Inspector-General’s Department) aids the commander, as a general thing, only in the direction of the specialty intrusted to it. But the duties of an Adjutant-General, as essential on the battlefield as in the bureau, extend not only to all arms of the line, but to all branches of the staff. In addition to certain office duties which belong to him under the routine of his bureau, he is practically the principal assistant to the commander.

“He of necessity exercises vast power. Although he acts invariably in the name of the commander, and not, as the Secretary of War does, in his own name, yet the relations between an adjutant-general and his commander are in principle the same as those between the Secretary of War and the President.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Of daily importance to the peace establishment, there is no corps or department in the military service on which the prompt and effective organization of a war establishment so largely depends as on the Adjutant-General’s Department, which furnishes an additional and potent reason for preserving the strength and efficiency of the corps. It is charged with the preservation and care of records of great public and personal interest, but this is a minor duty of the corps which might be sufficiently well performed by faithful and intelligent clerks.

“In fact, this duty must and ought to be left mainly to that class of employees, in order that the officers of the corps may be able to concern themselves with the living, active affairs of the profession. It is a serious defect in our system that the officers of the corps by their limited numbers and the constant and pressing routine duties of their offices are prevented from acquainting themselves as thoroughly as they otherwise might with the details of the various arms of our own service, as well as with those of foreign services. It has even been suggested that this defect is so grave that the corps should be abolished and its duties performed by officers detailed at will from the line of the Army. The officer detailed would, however, rarely be as well qualified in all respects for staff duty as the Adjutant-General, supposed to have been selected originally for aptitude in that branch and who had received the benefit of long study and practice in it, and the detailed officer, being taken from either the artillery, cavalry, or infantry, would, from his training and interest in a particular arm, probably be more of a specialist than an adjutant-general now is. The wiser course, it seems to me, is to enable this valuable corps to acquire the additional information and experience which it may be thought to need. The officers of this department are ex officio inspectors-general, and from time to time for short periods should be placed on duty as inspectors-general to enable them to become acquainted with the localities at which the troops are stationed throughout the country or throughout the geographical command to which they are assigned, to learn the routes for transportation of supplies, to become acquainted with the personnel of the officers of the Army, and to observe the discipline of the service. \* \* \*

## Burnside report, 1878.

Draft of a bill from General Hancock, which provides a permanent organization for each of the staff departments with modifications as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Pages 240-243.) "SEC. 18. That the organization of the Adjutant-General's Department shall be as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

"As many captains may be detailed from the line of the Army for service as assistant adjutants-general with the commanding generals of military divisions and departments as, in addition to said officers of the Adjutant-General's Department, will provide a sufficient number for the public service, such officers to remain on such detail not longer than four years. And while on such duty such officers shall have the rank, pay, emoluments, and allowances of mounted officers one grade higher than that held by them in their regiments or corps. And all vacancies which may occur in the rank of major and assistant adjutant-general shall be filled by selection from the officers so serving, or who shall have so served, by detail as aforesaid, if any there be, and otherwise from officers of the Army of the rank of captain.

"SEC. 19. That the organization of the Inspector-General's Department shall be as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

"As many majors may be detailed from the line of the Army for service with the commanding generals of military divisions and departments as, in addition to said officers of the Inspector-General's Department, will provide a sufficient number for the public service, such officers to remain on such detail not longer than four years. And while on such duty the officers so detailed shall have the rank, pay, emoluments, and allowances of mounted officers one grade higher than that held by them in their regiment or corps. And all vacancies which may occur in the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Inspector-General's Department shall be filled by selection from the officers so serving, or who shall have so served by detail as aforesaid, if any there be, and otherwise from officers of the Army of the rank of major.

"SEC. 20. That the organization of the Judge-Advocate's Department shall be as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

"As many captains may be detailed from the line of the Army for service as judge-advocates with the commanding generals of military divisions and departments as, in addition to said officers of the Judge-Advocate's Department, will provide a sufficient number for the public service, such officers to remain on such detail not longer than four years. And while on such duty the officers so detailed shall have the rank, pay, emoluments, and allowances of mounted officers one grade higher than that held by them in their regiments or corps. And all vacancies which may occur in the rank of major in the Judge-Advocate's Department shall be filled by selection from the officers so serving, or who shall have so served by detail as aforesaid, if any there be, and otherwise from officers of the Army of the rank of captain.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 22. That the organization of the Quartermaster’s Department shall be as follows: \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

“Vacancies in the grade of captain in the Quartermaster’s Department shall be filled by selection from the regimental quartermasters or from the first lieutenants of the Army serving or who may have served as post quartermasters, but such selection shall be limited to officers who shall have served at least two years either as regimental or post quartermasters, or both.

“SEC. 23. That the organization of the Subsistence Department shall be as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

“Vacancies in the grade of captain in the Subsistence Department shall be filled by selection from the first lieutenants of the Army serving or who may have served as post commissaries of subsistence, as provided for in section 38 of this act. But such selection shall be limited to officers who shall have served as post commissaries of subsistence for at least two years.

“SEC. 24. That the organization of the Medical Department shall be as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

“As many medical purveyors may, from time to time, be detailed from the surgeons of the Army of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or major as may be necessary for the public service; such medical purveyors to have the rank, pay, emoluments, and allowances of mounted officers one grade higher than that held by them as surgeons.

“SEC. 25. That the organization of the Pay Department shall be as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

“There may be detailed from the officers of the line of the Army, of the rank of captain, as many officers as, in addition to said officers of the Pay Department, may be necessary for service in said Department; such officers to remain on such detail for not more than four years, and to have while so detailed the rank, pay, emoluments, and allowances of mounted officers one grade higher than that held by them in their regiments or corps. All vacancies in the rank of major in the Pay Department shall be filled by selection from the officers so serving or who shall have so served by detail as aforesaid, if any there be, and otherwise from the officers of the Army of the rank of captain.”

\* \* \* \* \*

**Burnside report, 1878.**

Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; commanded Army of the Potomac, Army of the Rappahannock; division, corps, and department commander. Draft of a bill to reduce and reorganize the Army, submitted by General McDowell, which provides a permanent organization for each of the staff departments, with modifications as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 260.) “SEC. 21. The officers of the present Adjutant-General’s Department and the officers of the Inspector-General’s Department

shall be merged into the Adjutant and Inspector-General's Department, and shall take place therein according to grade and date of commission.

\* \* \* \* \*

"SEC. 23. In addition to the foregoing permanent officers, there shall be attached to the department twelve assistant adjutant and inspector generals, who shall be detailed from the majors and captains of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and who shall remain in the department for a tour of service not to exceed three years, and who shall not be eligible to a second detail till after having served at least two years with their regiments.

"SEC. 24. Appointments to the grade of major in the Adjutant and Inspector General's Department shall be made only by selection from those officers who have been attached to and served in the department, as provided for in section 23, and who shall have received special certificates from the Adjutant and Inspector General, approved by the General or Lieutenant-General of the Army as the case may be, setting forth that they have, while serving in the department, received the special approbation of the commander to whose staff they were attached.

(Page 261.) "SEC. 25. No officer now in the Adjutant-General's or the Inspector-General's Department shall, by reason of the provisions of section 22 of this act, be either reduced in grade or discharged from the military service. \* \* \*

"SEC. 26. The officers of the present Quartermaster's Department and the officers of the Subsistence Department shall be merged into the Quartermaster and Commissary Department, regard being had to grade and date of commission.

"SEC. 27. \* \* \* And as many post quartermasters and commissaries as the service may require, not exceeding one for each post, exclusive of those at which a regimental quartermaster and commissary may be serving.

\* \* \* \* \*

"SEC. 30. Promotion to the grade of captain in the Quartermaster and Commissary Department will be made only by selection, under such rules as the Secretary of War may establish, from the regimental quartermasters and commissaries who have distinguished themselves in the knowledge and practice of the duties of their office.

"SEC. 31. No officer now in service in the Quartermaster's or Subsistence Department shall, by reason of the provisions of section 27 of this act, be either reduced in grade or be discharged from the military service. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

**Maish report, 1878.**

Brig. Gen. John Pope, U. S. A., afterward major-general, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, commanded Army of the Mississippi, Army of Virginia, also department and division commander:

(Page 28.) "I presume that all military men are agreed that there must be a staff; that is, a body of officers specially selected and instructed for special duties. This has been an axiom in all modern armies, and nothing in army organization is better settled than the need of a staff. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 31.) "To say that a staff should consist of officers temporarily detached from the line and to be interchanged at short intervals does not appear sound, except in a very limited sense, and for the transaction of the mere local business of military posts. To extend such a system generally would be as unwise as to apply the same rule to a railroad, and to interchange conductors with locomotive engineers, train dispatchers with freight agents, or brakemen with porters, or superintendents with civil engineers, etc., indiscriminately. Such a proposition carries no greater absurdity on its face in railroad than in army matters. I do not consider any proposition to do without a staff and to depend upon details from the line for staff duties at all tenable, except in the limited sense referred to, and in that sense this practice is and practically has always been in operation.

"The reason why there are so many differences of opinion among army officers concerning the details of army organization does not seem difficult to explain. Every officer, it is to be presumed, bases his opinions upon his own experience, which is greater or less extensive or limited, according to his years, his rank, and the nature of the service he has performed. What would be a complete and efficient system for a small force operating against hostile Indians in a remote district would perhaps be entirely unsuited by expansion to a whole army in scarce any part of which would the same conditions be found. So, too, every officer is naturally more or less interested in the organization of the special arm to which he belongs, and is apt, unconsciously, to attach an undue importance to it relatively to other arms of the service. The staff being, to say the least, a semi-independent branch of the service and controlling the disposition of so much that is needed by the line is, of course, subjected more than any other branch of service to adverse criticism, which, instead of being confined, as in my opinion it should mainly be, to objection to methods of administration, applies itself almost wholly to forms of organization and cites errors or failures as faults of organization rather than faults of administrative system.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 32.) "I propose, therefore, with all respect, that, to determine the question of staff organization and administration, the committee recommend an act or joint resolution of Congress, appointing a board of five or seven officers, to be designated in the act itself, and to be officers of rank and experience most likely to be best acquainted with all the facts, and whose opinions from their known character and standing before the country would carry weight and command respect—the board thus appointed to submit a plan of organization for the staff of the Army and a system of administering the details of its business, the latter to be embodied in a code of Army Regulations. When completed, their plan to be laid before the military committees of Congress for their consideration, and subject to such modifications and alterations as they consider judicious, to be enacted into law and to be thereafter only susceptible of change by law. Of course it is understood that the committees, if they think proper, should invite opinion and criticism of every portion of the work of the board from such officials or others as they believe competent to criticise, allowing, however, the officers of the board to present replies and to maintain, by reason and argument, the provisions they have adopted.

“By these means it is believed that the best opinion of the Army on the questions involved can be obtained in such succinct form that the committee and Congress can understand and act intelligently upon them. The practice heretofore has only loaded down committees of Congress with a great mass of conflicting or inharmonious opinions and suggestions which can not be reconciled, and many of which, it is not unfair to say, have not been carefully considered in a broad view of general results, or are mainly devoted to the discussion of specialties of those particular arms of service in which the writers are naturally most interested.

“I do not know what success the committee has met with in the effort to evolve from the great mass of papers submitted to them any well-considered or well-understood system of army organization and administration, but I do know that there are not many army officers, if indeed there be one, who could deduce any well-defined opinion concerning these matters from the mass of letters addressed to the committees of Congress heretofore which it has been my fortune to read.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 33.) “\* \* \* To say that because a system of army organization and administration has worked well in Germany or France, or elsewhere, where there exists such wide differences both in the character and habits of the people and the nature of the military service to be performed, it should therefore be adopted in this country, is no more sound than to say the same thing of a political form of government. The logic of such a proposition leads absolutely to the opposite conclusion.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. A., now major-general, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of volunteers, commanded Fourth and Eleventh Corps, and the Army of the Tennessee. Received the thanks of Congress for services at Gettysburg.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 148.) “A reduction of force would be gained by a more frequent temporary detail of officers to quartermaster and commissary duty, but it would be necessarily at the expense of the efficiency of the companies, which are already suffering by the large number of absentee officers, and also at a loss of efficiency of service rendered, by reason of inexperience, and because few men ever do their best in the functions of an office not their own.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 149.) “There are evils resulting from the assignment of staff officers to generals with whom they have no personal sympathy. This is sought to be avoided by courtesy and some previous arrangement. The freedom of details proposed would doubtless facilitate such harmonious arrangements by enlarging the field of selection. A more frequent detail would relieve the monotony of service often in time of peace, and give those who have the rougher work an opportunity to take their turn at more pleasant posts; yet my judgment inclines against the detail and transfer system, as involving inevitable loss of

efficiency, on the principle I have named above, that a trained officer working in his specialty, *ceteris paribus*, is superior to any other. For variety, let quartermasters change posts with quartermasters, and commissaries with commissaries, artillery officers with artillery officers, and so on. Thus, every variety of service, after its kind, is passed through in the course of a term of years."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Burnside report, 1878.

Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. A., afterwards major-general, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; division and corps commander. Received the thanks of Congress for the capture of Fort Fisher:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 421.) "I would suggest that the present division of duties among the several staff departments should remain unchanged. The present staff system has been severely tried, and has endured every test to which it has been submitted.

"In my judgment, it is more than doubtful whether any other system could be substituted for it without injury to the service. I feel sure that the consolidation of any two or more of these departments would be productive of evil alone. That the internal organization of some of these departments might be improved is probable, but on this point the heads of the departments respectively can advise the committee much more wisely than I can."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 422.) "Notes upon General Sherman's bill for the reorganization of the Army.

\* \* \* \* \*

"SEC. 34. Add to this section: 'All vacancies in the grade of assistant quartermaster shall be filled by selection from the first lieutenants of the Army.'

"SEC. 41. Add to this section: 'All vacancies in the grade of commissary of subsistence with the rank of captain shall be filled by selection from the first lieutenants of the Army.'

\* \* \* \* \*

"SEC. 65. Amend this section by striking out the words '*Provided*, That at least one surgeon and two assistant surgeons shall be assigned to duty with each of the regiments provided for in this act.' This provision is impracticable in time of peace; the regiments are broken up into small detachments, which are often widely separated. In time of peace the medical officers are therefore stationed at posts and with troops in the field, not with regiments.

"SEC. 85. The corps of judge-advocates provided for in this section is too small. There should be at least ten judge-advocates with the rank of major.

"SEC. 90. Insert after the words 'the staff,' wherever they occur in the second line of this section, the words 'excepting the Pay Department.' The reason for this amendment is this: Civilians, or perhaps lieutenants in the Army, may be appointed to the semicivil, semimilitary position of paymasters with the rank of major. And, under this section as it now stands, persons so appointed, if they could find a major of the line willing to transfer with them, would become field

officers of the line over the heads of captains grown gray in service. This section formally sanctions what has heretofore been of at least doubtful legality." \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, U. S. A., afterwards major-general, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war, the Mexican war, and the war of the rebellion; division, corps, and department commander:

(Page 72.) "I think the President should be allowed to transfer or assign officers of the same rank from the staff to the line, or the reverse, at his option. It would be a check on disbursing officers, and would enable the President to select for either duty from a much larger number of officers, and until he could find a man fit for the place, besides giving the staff officer an opportunity of learning by actual experience something about the wants of the troops. The laws as they now stand are unequal. If a vacancy occurs among the general officers of the line, any staff officer is eligible for appointment to it, but a vacancy of brigadier-general in a staff bureau is not open to officers of the line."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Augur, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; commanded a division in the Fifth Army Corps, the Department of Washington, and Twenty-second Army Corps.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Pages 132, 133.) "This depends entirely upon the character of the men selected for educating, training, etc. I doubt the good effect of great latitude in transferring from one corps to another, unless restrained by the consent of the officers transferred.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I do not think an officer should be put on the general staff until he is thoroughly familiar with the duties and responsibilities of a line officer. After that he should confine himself to the specialties of the particular branch of the staff to which he is assigned."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. A. (retired); served in Florida war, Mexican war, and war of the rebellion; corps commander.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 70.) "Special corps have the advantage which a long course of devotion to one branch of service affords, but if carried too far you lose sight of the human material with which you have to work."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of volunteers; division and corps commander; commanded Army of the Potomac, and Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, Army of the Cumberland.

(Page 99.) "By the system of our education at the Military Academy, officers are educated in all the arms of service alike, and that, to my mind, is the beauty of the system. It should be extended to the staff corps and preserved in the line of the Army after they become officers. All other things being equal, that army which is the best instructed in all the branches of the service will be the most efficient. It also more readily adapts itself to expansion when required."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Volunteers, colonel and assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A.; commanded Department and Army of the Ohio.

(Page 60.) "The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps of the staff is to promote economy and to increase the efficiency of the department and of the officers themselves. Of course the selections should be carefully made in the first place. \* \* \*

"Officers are rendered more efficient by being educated and trained for specialties of the service; and I do not, at this moment, see how any improvement could be made upon the present system, unless by greater care in original selections. The system has not been unsuccessful heretofore, and no system of temporary details from the line for staff service can ever be otherwise than pernicious."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Volunteers, brevet major-general, U. S. A.; brigade, division, and corps commander; commanded Sixth Army Corps, Army of the Potomac.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 78.) "I think that officers are more efficient from special training. But I believe that it would improve the present status of the Army if there would be assigned from the graduates of the Military Academy every year a small number of officers who would be at once rated as staff officers. They should serve two years in each arm of the line (artillery, infantry, and cavalry) as company officers, should then undergo a rigid examination, and if they are found qualified, should then be eligible for appointment in the lowest grades of the various staff departments, which grades should in some of the corps be lower than they are now.

"This arrangement would virtually allow a greater freedom of detail and transfer, and I think would conduce to a higher grade of knowledge among the officers of the staff departments. The reasons are obvious, for every intelligent officer will have learned by his six years' service details that he never will forget, nor can learn later in life. This knowledge would be of enormous service to the country and to the officers.

\* \* \* \* \*

"But if in time of peace we are to hold ourselves in readiness to raise an enormous army rapidly when war comes upon us, it will be impossible to attain this end without a staff at the very commencement

quite as large and quite as much separated into corps as that which now exists. Troops must be raised and organized at many centers throughout the United States. Any one who remembers the confusion and extravagance which attended these organizations at the commencement of our late war at points where officers of the old Army were not present, and who knows the waste of life and of money consequent upon the ignorance and inefficiency there shown, will, I think, conclude that although a large staff is in time of peace an expensive appendage to the Army, yet when war comes on it is so entirely indispensable, and becomes immediately so entirely inadequate in numbers to the wants of the service, that it ought to be kept up to its present strength and with nearly its present organization, so long as the country has any expectation that it will ever have another war.

“When the war of the rebellion broke out the staff was as large in proportion to the size of the Army (except the Medical Corps) as it is now. The appointment of an enormous number of staff officers at once showed the feeling of deficiency that existed, and there were not nearly enough staff officers in the old Army to give even a little instruction to the large army of new staff officers. If the staff be materially reduced now, and no change of policy take place before the occurrence of the next war, we will be then even worse off if possible than we were at the commencement of the last war.”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. James B. Ricketts, U. S. A. (retired), brigadier-general, U. S. Volunteers; served in the artillery in the Mexican war and war of the rebellion.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 161.) “Specialties in all branches, military or civil, have been fully proven to secure superior efficiency, and transfer or detail impairs usefulness and weakens knowledge already acquired by mental application and experience.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Staff officers should be exclusively confined to the special duties of their separate departments for which they have been selected.”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war and war of the rebellion; division and corps commander, Army of the Ohio and Army of the Cumberland.

(Page 11.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps of the staff, and of allowing only promotion within them, is generally of a twofold nature—one beneficial, the other detrimental. \* \* \* The first, or beneficial, effect \* \* \* is to render them more expert and efficient, \* \* \* and a sense of permanent responsibility is necessary to give the highest degree of cultivated and enlightened capacity. \* \* \* To exert himself to the full measure of his ability every man must feel that his position is reasonably well assured, and that a just and fair reward for efficient and useful performance of his duties is equally well assured. The

deleterious influence is to render officers of staff corps or departments, to some extent at least, arrogant and offensive to the great body of the Army, and the influence of the system is to narrow and cramp their intellects for general usefulness at first, and after a long service, even for their own special duties; in short, to fossilize them. \* \* \*

“Officers educated, trained, and promoted for specialties are more efficient, provided that real merit, and not nepotism or political influence, has been the controlling element in the selection. \* \* \* Greater freedom of detail and transfer than is at present exercised would not be beneficial. \* \* \* A well organized military establishment should be well adjusted to its position, and work without friction; and this implies special training, education, and experience. \* \* \*

(Page 12.) “In a representative form of government a thousand political and personal intrigues for reciprocal personal and political advantage and advancement come into play in all cases of detail and selection. \* \* \* No more baneful influence ever infested a military establishment than the determination of promotion and advancement from consideration of nepotism, political influence, or personal solicitation. This the danger likely to arise from allowing a wide field of selection in this matter of staff appointments or details. \* \* \* Staff corps and organizations are an undeniable necessity. \* \* \*

(Page 13.) “The allowing generals to select their adjutant-generals from the line or staff would open the door to nepotism—a curse to any army. \* \* \* The most trifling class of officers in the service is composed of those who are constantly seeking fancy details, which take them away from their lineal or staff positions. The less field for the gratification of this disposition to get on details, the better for the efficiency of the Army.”

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Gen. James Longstreet, surveyor of customs at New Orleans; lieutenant-general in the Confederate service:

(Page 35.) “Officers should be kept, as a rule, in the department or corps to which they belong. Great care should be exercised, however, in selecting officers for service. \* \* \*

“Military science is similar to that of law, medicine, philosophy, etc., in this, that military men should be selected and promoted according to their special qualifications, \* \* \* and when selected, if well selected, should be kept at such duties.

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Brig. Gen. Edward D. Townsend, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., brevet major-general: prior to appointment in the Adjutant General's Department, served in the artillery in the Florida war, and in the Cherokee Nation:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 96.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular branch of the staff, and of allowing promotions only within them, is to give them a motive and pride in perfecting themselves in every sort of information that can make them efficient. If sure of a continuance and promotion in the line of duties of their choice, their zeal and

fidelity rarely flag. If always under the apprehension or certainty of being transferred to other duties, perhaps by no means so genial to their tastes and talents, they can not be expected to take interest in their staff duties, except so far as to acquit themselves without actual blame. The hope of promotion is always a healthy stimulus.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The system of keeping all kinds of records originating in the Adjutant-General’s Office and carried out by officers instructed by its means contributed, first, to the preservation, in good form, of valuable papers, and second, to having them safely deposited in the War Office after their use at the headquarters where they originated had ceased. That this is due to an organized staff department appears from the fact that there are no such records relating to the times when commanding generals detailed for acting assistant adjutant-generals any officers they chose for the time being. In those days the generals were apt to consider all letters and correspondence not immediately forwarded for action to Washington as their own private property. The slight traces of those old records now to be found show a great contrast with the elaborate files of recent dates, so carefully arranged and preserved as to afford, without loss of time in searching, almost all necessary data in any given case.

“The conclusion is that general staff officers are more efficient and valuable than line officers, temporarily detailed, would be, because they take a pride in the department to which they belong, and not being, as it were, the creatures of their generals, they feel the responsibility constantly weighing upon them of accountability to the War Department. Nor does this in any degree weaken their obligation to perfect military subordination to their commanding general for the time being. The generals have, on the other hand, aids-de-camp who are chosen by themselves and bear to them a more *personal* relation as staff officers, fulfilling in this respect all needful purposes. Besides the objections already mentioned to freedom of detail or transfer of staff officers from one branch of the service to another, there is a serious one of a political nature. Had the Executive the uncontrolled power to transfer and appoint there might be a time when, by skillful collection of agents from all branches of the Army, at influential political centers, with large contracts and heavy disbursements to be made, a most dangerous power could be wielded. Under the present system such a thing would not be possible once in a century.

“Corps of officers trained in special staff duties, while performing these duties in time of peace, are perfecting themselves and keeping alive their system. When war comes they are so many skilled directors and instructors for volunteer officers appointed to their departments for service with volunteer troops called into action. There is no more perfect mode of rapidly organizing and mobilizing bodies of raw troops.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The old Florida war is a standing exemplification of the inefficiency of the system of temporary details for staff duty. There were constant well-grounded complaints of want of supplies and facilities of all kinds for the troops, and, as the records will show, no lack of expenditure of money meantime. In several instances large commands were well-nigh losing their scalps in consequence of starvation in their beleaguered forts.

“In 1837–38 the present system of the staff was established, and, in the two great wars which have occurred since, the manner in which our armies have been clothed, transported, fed, paid, and provided with medical attendance has attracted the admiration of the military world. Undue extravagance during the late war has been alleged against the disbursing branches of the staff; but it should be remembered that the people through their governors, State and national legislatures, demanded that every comfort and convenience should be given to the men who left their homes and business to serve in the war. Special enactments were passed to this end, and appropriations made to carry them out. The officers concerned, then, only did their duty in obedience to those behests. Since the war closed a rigid economy has been more and more carefully enforced, until the Army can not fail to perceive the contrast between the supplies of the war time and the mere necessities now furnished them.”

\* \* \* \* \*

### **Burnside report, 1878.**

The draft of a bill submitted by General Townsend provides a permanent organization for each of the staff departments, with notes as follows:

(Page 265.) “SEC. 4. Adjutant-General’s Department:

“NOTE.— \* \* \* It is well known that in this, as in every country, deference is shown to rank and title, and this trait of human nature can not be ignored without weakening the legitimate influence of the most zealous and judicious officers holding such high and responsible positions. The same remark is applicable to the other heads of staff departments. This fact was recognized when the Army consisted of only 10,000 or 12,000 men, for all the heads of staff departments who held brevet rank of general officers were assigned to duty as such and drew the pay, while the Quartermaster-General held the full rank of brigadier-general.”

“SEC. 5. Inspectors-General:

“NOTE.—These officers should inspect the Army under the orders of the President, Secretary of War, and Commanding General of the Army, who, through their means, ought to be well informed as to the discipline and condition of every part of the military establishment. They should not be assigned to subordinate commanders. The latter can detail officers to perform such duties for their commands.”

(Page 266.) “SEC. 6. Judge-Advocate-General’s Department:

“NOTE.—The Judge-Advocate-General needs two assistants in his office, and one as professor of law at the Military Academy.

“Officers of the line can be detailed for all other duties in this department.”

“SEC. 7. Quartermaster’s Department:

“NOTE.— \* \* \* The assistant quartermasters would have charge of depots and transportation to expeditions in the field; other duties of the Quartermaster’s Department can be performed by regimental quartermasters and officers detailed from the line.”

“SEC. 9. That in the absence of any officer of the Quartermaster’s or Subsistence Department, a captain or subaltern may be assigned to perform the duties of such department at any post or depot; and the officer so assigned shall, with the authority of the Secretary of War, receive \$20 a month extra pay while actually performing such duties.”

## Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general; served in the Mexican war; during the war of the rebellion was brigadier-general and provost-marshal-general:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 162.) “ \* \* \* I have no more doubt that officers are ‘more efficient who are educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service,’ than I have that a patent lawyer is more efficient in a patent suit than a criminal or admiralty lawyer. Though it may be true that the legislation fixing our present staff system has been influenced, in a few instances, by personal considerations, it is a fact that this system is well adapted to our service, and has the special merit of being, in the main, the result of our own experience and necessities. It is, therefore, far more valuable to us than the systems of other countries could be, which systems, so far as we are concerned, are mere theories. The division of labor under it is about as near the natural and proper one as we can get without further experience; both in peace and war it has proved eminently successful for our purposes.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 163.) “ \* \* \* I do not see that ‘a greater freedom of detail and transfer than at present exercised, from one branch to another, would be beneficial.’ In weighing this point, it is necessary to consider the probable evil, as well as the possible good, to arise from the change proposed. It is always pretty well known to the chiefs of staff bureaus, and to the Army at large, before a vacancy in the staff is filled, who is, and who is not, qualified for the place. Notwithstanding this, improper appointments are sometimes made, but so far as there is an evil in this respect, it is not in the system but in the administration of it. The power to transfer would, I believe, aggravate the evil. There is no reason to suppose that more wisdom would, in any instance, be practiced in transfers or details than in permanent appointments. The probabilities are, in fact, the other way. They would be more easily made, appear less important, and be more influenced by merely personal considerations; and the selection of unfit persons might, therefore, be expected more frequently under the system of temporary than under the system of permanent selection. The evils from an old bad bargain—there being time and opportunity to make the most of it—are not as great as those from oft-recurring new ones. But there is a danger beyond that of transferring unfit men *in*. If vacancies could be created so easily by transfer, it is not going too far to say that they might often be produced by transferring *out* better staff officers than they brought in. Without further elaborating the point, I will say that, as a feature of the military system, that now under consideration seems to me very objectionable, and likely to produce damaging confusion, if not demoralization.”

\* \* \* \* \*

## Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. William D. Whipple, assistant adjutant-general, afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general; brigadier-general of volunteers, and chief of staff to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas:

(Page 30.) "Officers of the staff are generally selected on account of particular aptitude displayed in the performance of duties appertaining to some particular department, and appointed accordingly. Continuance therein must advance their education, and consequently increase their fitness. \* \* \*

"An officer temporarily detailed to such duty, and liable to be returned to his regiment at any time, could not be expected to devote himself to the interests of such staff department and the service to the extent of an officer who was permanent in his position."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Thomas M. Vincent, assistant adjutant-general, afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general; brigadier-general by brevet. Served in Florida hostilities, and in the field during the civil war to August, 1861; in charge of organization and muster out of the volunteer armies:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 184.) "The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps of the staff, and of only allowing promotion within them, is to increase efficiency, and, consequently, to promote the public interest.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 185.) "Military officers are more efficient who are educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service, and a greater freedom of *detail* and *transfer* than at present exercised would prove detrimental to the efficiency of the Army.

"General officers now select their aids-de-camp from the troops, and on the list at the present time we find several relatives of the generals. Of the others, several were evidently selected through personal or political considerations. Therefore we see in the practical working that the good of the service and the *military* value of an aid are out of sight. If such is the case with the present limited field, the evil would not be less by granting a greater freedom.

"Where officers are transferred, by new appointments, *permanently* to the staff, the same abuses exist to a certain extent, but the door to favoritism is in such cases more difficult to open than in those of temporary transfer by detail."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Maish report, 1878.

General Vincent:

(Page 42.) "Experience has fully established the fact that a small army requires *proportionally* a larger staff and a greater number of line officers than a large one." \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 43.) "No doubt the contemplated new and revised Army Regulations will embrace all that may be necessary to the discipline of the Army." \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Randolph B. Marcy, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, and chief of staff to Major-General McClellan

in the Army of West Virginia, and in the Army of the Potomac; afterwards brigadier-general and Inspector-General:

(Page 25.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or staff corps, and of allowing promotions only therein is to encourage them in devoting their time and energies in gaining knowledge and proficiency in their special duties. If these officers were relieved periodically they would not be likely to take that pride or interest in perfecting themselves in their duties that they would when permanently assigned. Moreover they would be likely to forget the greater part of what they had learned after a few years.”

#### Coburn report, 1874.

General Marcy:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 309.) “Under the act of 1869 most of the staff corps are now being materially reduced by casualties, and some of the vacancies in the lower grades might advantageously be filled by periodical details from the line, which would instruct a good many young officers in staff duties and render them available for extensive military operations in time of war, but the officers in the higher grades should have matured experience in their special branches of service.

\* \* \* \* \*

“So far as a reduction of officers now holding position in the staff corps is concerned, the results of my own observation and the reports of other inspectors go to show that their time is fully occupied in the performance of their duties. If, therefore, any reduction is made in the number of these officers, the work necessarily imposed upon those remaining would be too burdensome.” \* \* \*

#### Maish report, 1878.

General Marcy:

(Page 46.) \* \* \* “It is admitted by almost all military men who are not actuated by personal motives that the staff of an army should in time of peace be so constituted, organized, and instructed as to admit of rapid expansion sufficient to meet all war exigencies, and that to this end it should be permanent. The lesson taught us during the civil war, the truth of which I am confident every volunteer general officer will readily admit, is that our admirable staff system contributed largely toward success. Without it we would have been unable to properly and speedily organize, equip, and supply such vast armies as we were called upon suddenly to mobilize and put in the field; whereas, by its direct agency, we achieved results that elicited the commendation and applause of military men throughout the civilized world.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 47.) “Mr. Crawford, Secretary of War in 1815, in a letter to the Military Committee of the House in response to certain inquiries touching the peace establishment, said:

“The experience of the two first campaigns of the last war, which has furnished volumes of evidence upon this subject, has incontestably established not only the expediency but the necessity of giving to the military establishment in time of peace the organization which it must have to render it efficient in a state of war.

“It is believed to be demonstrable that a complete organization of the staff will contribute as much to the economy of the establishment as its efficiency.

“The stationary staff of a military establishment should be substantially the same in peace as in war, without reference to the number of troops of which it is composed.”

“Mr. Calhoun, Secretary of War in 1818, who studied the subject of military affairs more and probably understood it better than any other civilian Secretary of War who has ever occupied that position, and whose opinions are entitled to great consideration, in speaking of army organization, said:

\* \* \* \* \*

“In fact no part of our military organization requires more attention in peace than the general staff. It is in every service invariably the last in attaining perfection; and if neglected in peace, when there is leisure, it will be impossible, in the midst of the hurry and bustle of war, to bring it to perfection. In this country particularly the staff can not be neglected with impunity.”

“General Sherman, in his annual report for 1869, says of staff corps:

“In number and rank they do seem disproportionate to the line of the Army; but this has been the case for a number of years, and the experience of the war of the rebellion demonstrated its wisdom. A staff system that has admitted of an increase of the line of the Army from the mere nucleus of 1860 to a million of men, and the reduction back to the present standard without confusion, and with the most perfect accountability as to property and money—at all times providing for the Army abundantly—is entitled to our respect.”

\* \* \* \* \*

“General McClellan, in a letter to the House Committee on Military Affairs, in May, 1872, in answer to certain inquiries, stated:

“It (our staff organization) has grown up under the hands of able administrators, and has met the wants of the peace establishment as well as of our various Indian wars, the Mexican war, and the late civil war. The test to which it was submitted during the war of 1861 to 1865, when an immense army was built up upon the narrow foundations of the old establishment resulted so favorably that it would, in my judgment, be exceedingly unwise to revert to a system tried and condemned long years ago. I have no reason to believe that the number of officers in the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments is now in excess of the demands of the service, nor do I believe that a consolidation would decrease the number; and, in this connection, I may be permitted to say that the number of staff officers in peace should be kept as large as possible in order to provide for the contingency of a sudden increase in the event of war. The difficulty in efficiently organizing a new army is more in the special and staff corps than in the line.”

“Our present staff system was introduced into the service in 1837–38, and was the result of extended experience, matured study, and thought on the part of our best military minds; and, although it has been somewhat modified since to meet the requirements of the service during the late war, the principles of its original organization have not been materially changed.

“The personnel of some of the staff departments as now constituted may appear large in comparison with the strength of the line, but when the fact is borne in mind that no army of equal proportions was ever organized from raw levies in as brief a period and no such large body of mobilized troops ever was as well supplied with transportation, subsistence, medical attendance, and war material, or as promptly paid or mustered into and out of service with as little dissatisfaction or complaint as were our forces during the late civil war, all of which was achieved through the direct and masterly working of our admirably organized permanent staff departments, and that it is upon these agencies that we must in the future as in the past mainly rely for great and sudden war requirements, I believe it will be acknowledged by the gentlemen of your committee that retrenchment in this direction would be unwise in the extreme. In view of these significant facts it must be admitted that economy, integrity, and accountability are, under the present system, as well secured as they can be by any other, and it seems to me hazardous to attempt by experiments of doubtful expediency to improve upon organizations which exhibit results of such satisfactory character.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Burnside report, 1878.

Draft of a bill submitted by General Marey; provides for each of the staff departments:

(Page 273.) “SEC. 6. That hereafter no officer shall be detailed to any staff appointment or other situation the duties of which will detach him from his company, regiment, or corps until he has served at least four years with the regiment or corps to which he properly belongs; and no such detail shall be for a longer period than four years at any one time.

“REMARKS.—\* \* \*

“I beg leave to state, for the information of the joint committee, that, in my judgment, the existing organization of the staff corps, with some slight modifications, is well adapted to the requirements of the service.

“Our present staff system was introduced into the Army in 1837–38 and was the result of extended experience, as well as of matured study and thought, on the part of our able military administrators, and although it has been somewhat modified since to meet war exigencies the principles of the original scheme have not been materially changed.”

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Edmund Schriver, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brevet major-general, U. S. A.; served in the Florida war; during the war of the rebellion was chief of staff, First and Second Army Corps; also inspector-general, Army of the Potomac.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 84.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps is, generally, to promote efficiency, and to encourage them to perfect themselves by constant and systematic

study, for the skillful performance of their duties. Experience is gained, and this quality often is preferable, and more useful in the transaction of business than talent. Should an officer on the eve of promotion, or at any other time, be unfit for the proper performance of his duty, there are existing agencies for ridding the department of him. With these, and the introduction of fresh and competent personnel from the lower grades, the department may be kept in a healthy condition."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1874.

Col. James A. Hardie, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brevet major-general; served in the Mexican war, and in the civil war as aid-de-camp to Generals McClellan and Burnside.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 243.) "One advantage to be derived from details from the line for the staff is, that there is and always has been a feeling on the part of the line that the staff is the most privileged branch of the service, without being the more deserving. This jealousy works mischief. I would be glad for the line officers to share our labors and our privileges, whatever they amount to. I think there might be harmony produced possibly, and a better state of feeling, which would be greatly to the benefit of the public service. \* \* \* Another advantage, and a very important one, would be this: we would be training up a set of younger officers from whom the permanent officers of the corps could be taken if these should be the more favored candidates, as they ought to be. Appointments from outside, forced upon the staff corps without consulting the heads of those corps, have not been the most fortunate appointments made. \* \* \*

"I would rather see things as they are than have them disturbed. The advantages possessed are ascertained; those promised by any new arrangement are not certain." \* \* \*

#### Corburn report, 1873.

Maj. Absalom Baird, assistant inspector-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; chief of staff, Fourth Army Corps; brigade and division commander; commanded a division in the Army of the Cumberland; afterwards Inspector-General with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 45.) "I think that all staff duties, except those of aids-de-camp, should be made specialties, and that officers should be kept at those in which they have acquired skill."

#### Coburn report, 1874.

General Baird.

(Page 181.) "Q. Would it not be a good plan to detail officers of the line to do duty temporarily in the staff corps, requiring them to go back to their regiments after a tour of duty here of four or five years?

"A. No, sir; I think not. There are some always detailed to perform that duty, but this detail would soon become a matter of favor-

itism, and there would be constant trouble and change resulting from it. I do not think it would be as just as it is now.

“Q. Would it be any more a matter of favoritism than the appointment in the first place?

“A. Yes; I think it would be. Every lieutenant in the Army would be using all the political and other influence he could get to get a detail of this kind. Of course, they do use influence now to receive the appointment, but after they are once in the office there is but little trouble afterwards.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Burnside report, 1878.

Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, U. S. A.: served in artillery, engineers, and infantry; was Quartermaster-General during the civil war.

Draft of a bill submitted by General Meigs, provides a permanent organization for each of the staff departments; the proposed general staff includes a combined Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's Department and a Quartermaster's Department; other modifications are as follows:

(Page 276). “Organization for an army of twenty-five thousand enlisted men.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Much is said lately against the strength and rank of our present general staff. \* \* \* But the general staff is the staff, not of 25,000 men, not of a corps d'armée, not of a State or province of 40,000 square miles, but it is the staff of an empire of 45,000,000 people and occupying 3,000,000 square miles of territory; and the Secretary of War, the lawful head of the military administration, must be prepared at shortest notice, through the officers of the general staff, to place a soldier or a body of soldiers on any square mile of the 3,000,000, and there to keep them fully equipped, clothed, armed, munitioned, fed, and efficient for any required duty.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 278.) “GENERAL STAFF.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Thirty-two assistant quartermasters, with rank of captain, who, as vacancies occur, shall be replaced by lieutenants of the line, detailed for terms of not more than three years, during which term they shall hold the temporary rank and pay of captain in the Quartermaster's Department. At the end of three years they shall return to their companies, and serve at least one year therewith before being eligible to be detailed again.

“Vacancies among the majors of the Quartermaster's Department shall be filled by promotion of the assistant quartermasters now in service, and thereafter by selection from army officers who have served for three years in the Quartermaster's Department and shown capacity and merit.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Vacancies occurring among the captains to be filled by detail of lieutenants of the line, with temporary rank of captain and commissary of subsistence, for not longer than three years, and then to return for not less than one year's service with their companies before being eligible for another such detail.

“Vacancies occurring among the majors to be filled by selection from officers of the line who, having served for three years as captains and assistant commissaries of subsistence, have shown capacity and merit in the duties of the department.

“CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

\* \* \* \* \*

“No officer to be appointed into the Corps of Engineers until he has served two years with troops as lieutenant.

“All vacancies occurring among the lieutenants to be filled by detail of three years from the line, after which the officer shall return for at least one year's service with his company.

(Page 279.)

“ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Twenty captains, who, as vacancies occur, are to be detailed with temporary rank of captain of ordnance for terms of three years from the lieutenants of the line who show the necessary qualities and who have served at least two years as lieutenants.

“After three years' service as captains of ordnance these officers shall return to the line and serve at least one year with their companies before being eligible for another detail to ordnance duty and rank.

“Vacancies among the majors of ordnance to be filled by selection from officers who have served in the corps for three years and shown capacity and merit in its duties.

\* \* \* \* \*

“PAY DEPARTMENT.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Vacancies occurring among the captains to be filled by lieutenants detailed from the line for not longer than three years, with temporary rank of captain and assistant paymaster, then to return for at least one year to their companies before being again eligible for detail.

“These officers to be assisted at remote posts by officers of the staff corps there stationed, or by the commanders of companies to whom, as may be directed in general orders, the funds for paying the troops may be sent by the Pay Department so as to insure frequent and punctual payment to all soldiers of their just dues.

“JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The captains to be officers detailed from the lieutenants of the line for not more than three years at any one time, and to return for at

least one year's service with their companies before being eligible to another detail.

“NOTES.

\* \* \* \* \*

“STAFF CORPS.

(Page 280.) “A system of detail and promotion and appointment which opens staff service to all officers who are best qualified, and grants permanent commissions only to those who have shown practical knowledge, merit, and ability, will also hold out rewards and encouragement to all officers to excel in their respective duties, and will secure in the permanent positions on the staff men who are qualified and who like the service.

“By the time an officer attains the rank of major it is thought that his career should become fixed and definite, and, though still liable to sudden changes of station, he should be safe against sudden and unexpected changes in the character of his line of business or duty.

“By that time he will be a skilled and tried adjutant, quartermaster, commissary, etc., and unless a foreign or great domestic war calls for radical changes, he should be protected in the exercise of his particular specialty in the profession of arms.

“Should another great war break out, the experience of the last will be repeated. It is from the captains of the Army that the greater number of successful generals will be drawn. Field officers will be generally too far advanced in life, and too much accustomed to routine duties, to suddenly expand into successful generals.

“The more captains and first lieutenants we have for training in the Army, therefore, the better will be that greater army which must be organized on the outbreak of foreign or domestic war.

“The standing army of the United States of 25,000 men is nothing but a training school and a police force to keep alive military knowledge and practice, and to protect the frontier, exterior, or interior from insult or ravage, either by foreign nations or subject barbarians and savages.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 281.) “Proper provision should be made in any bill reorganizing the Army to protect the interests of officers who have given their life service to the country, and who should not be discharged without their consent or without liberal provision on such a misfortune happening to them. If in reorganization any become surplus, they should be placed on leave of absence, until recalled to fill vacancies. The ordinary casualties of service would soon deplete the present lists of regiments and corps and provide places for all who would become supernumerary under the organization herein proposed.”

\* \* \* \* \*

**Maish report, 1878.**

Col. Rufus Ingalls, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, served in the Mexican war, and in the civil war as chief quartermaster Army of the Potomac, succeeding General

Van Vliet, afterwards quartermaster-general with rank of brigadier-general.

(Page 55.) \*\* \* \* A regular, well-organized, highly experienced staff, such as we now have, is indispensable to render an army actively efficient. The really invaluable services rendered by the staff in the early stages of the rebellion demonstrated its necessity and usefulness. The present organization of the staff should no more be subject to change than that of a regiment of infantry. It can be excused in a line officer to think differently, certainly should he be seeking a high staff detail. The staff should be filled by *selection* from the line, but rotation, particularly in the disbursing departments, would impair the efficiency of the service."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Stewart Van Vliet, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, served in the artillery before the war; was chief quartermaster Army of the Potomac.

(Page 64.) "From long experience, I am satisfied that the best results are obtained by continuing officers in a particular department or corps of the staff. By this means they become familiar with their duties and acquire that esprit de corps which exercises such a power not only in the Army, but in all civil pursuits."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Judson D. Bingham, quartermaster, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general, served in the artillery before the war; was chief quartermaster Seventeenth Army Corps and of the Army of the Tennessee; afterwards colonel and assistant quartermaster-general.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 62.) "The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps is to better qualify them for their duties than they would be if subject to details for duty in several departments. No officer should be appointed in a staff department until he has served from six to ten years in the line of the Army. Service in the line will give an officer some knowledge of the duties of the different staff corps and of their relations to each other. After appointment in a staff department, service should be continuous in it."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Alexander E. Shiras, assistant commissary-general, afterwards Commissary-General with rank of brigadier-general; in the artillery before appointment in Subsistence Department; served in the Florida and Mexican wars and war of the rebellion.

(Page 55.) "The effect of continuing the same officer in a particular department or corps of the staff is that he becomes more perfect in his

duties, understanding them better and better; and the advantage of 'allowing only promotions in them' is to hold up a stimulus for exertion. While it is to be supposed that, when placed in the corps, the officers were at least the equals for the place of those who were not selected, their experience renders them better for promotion therein. At the same time, by such rule of promotion, less room is given for favoritism. \* \* \*

"Military officers, as a general rule, are more efficient by being educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service. The advantage of a division of labor holds good with them as with those employed in other walks of life, and the skillful workman is found to be formed by this division of duties. A greater freedom of detail and transfer would be likely to prevent proficiency and destroy the pride in their particular branches. The old adage that 'a Jack of all trades is master of none' holds good here."

#### **Burnside report, 1878.**

Brig. Gen. Robert Macfeely, Commissary-General of Subsistence, U. S. A.; served in infantry; was chief commissary Army of the Ohio, Fifteenth Army Corps, and Army of the Tennessee.

Draft of a bill submitted by General Macfeely. (Relates only to Subsistence Department.)

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 282.) "And the President may appoint from among the first lieutenants of the line, not to exceed ten, acting commissaries of subsistence, who, while so acting, shall receive the pay of captain of cavalry; these officers to serve for four years and no more; no officer to be eligible for such appointment until he has served for a period of four years with his regiment.

"Appointments to rank of captain and commissary of subsistence shall be made from among first lieutenants who have performed duty as acting commissary of subsistence under the provisions of this section, but no such officer shall be so appointed until he shall have been examined by a board of not less than three officers, a majority of whom shall be officers of the Subsistence Department, and recommended by said board for such appointment.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Capt. John P. Hawkins, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, chief commissary Thirteenth Army Corps and Army of the Tennessee; brigade and division commander; afterwards Commissary-General, with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 67.) "I think that when an officer has been assigned to a particular staff department he should feel that it is to be his sole business to learn its duties. If he were to feel that he might soon be transferred to another branch of the service he would probably take but little interest in perfecting himself.

"The best work of the world, in all branches of knowledge and in

all kinds of practice, is performed by those who make a specialty of some particular subject.

“It might make our officers apparently more accomplished to transfer them every year or two from one branch of the service to another. It would give them a superficial knowledge of many things; but as officers are kept in the employ of the Government for getting needed work done well, and not for their having an appearance of knowing all possible things, it would be an injury to the service to make the tenure of office in any branch of the Army less secure than it now is.”

### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Benjamin Alvord, paymaster, Acting Paymaster-General, brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Florida and Mexican wars; was district commander in the civil war; afterwards Paymaster-General, with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 21.) “Under the councils of the first Napoleon a permanent organization was given to the staff of the French army. \* \* \* Of this corps, this great military critic (Jomini) said: ‘It should be permanent, and should be employed in time of peace in labors preparatory to all possible eventualities of war. A good staff has the advantage of being more durable than the genius of any single man, and must be regarded as the nursery whence the commanding general can raise his principal support, as a body of officers whose intelligence can aid his own.’ \* \* \* Baron Staffél, in his report on the Prussian staff, says: ‘In Prussia the composition of the staff is controlled by neither law nor regulations; General de Moltke is ‘the absolute commander,’ details and sends away at will ‘every member of the body.’” \* \* \* A later Prussian writer, Baron von Leedinghausen, says ‘that promotion takes place according to seniority in the staff after the officer is finally appointed; and that the process, under General Moltke, described by Baron Staffél is only one of probation before final appointment.’ \* \* \* The lieutenant-general of our Army, who witnessed the Prussian war, has stated that their supply departments were very imperfect. \* \* \* The force (of the British army) that landed at Balaklava was nearly starved the first winter, when only 7 miles from the sea, before Sébastopol. It was for want of responsible staff departments, who could have planned beforehand the whole programme of transportation and subsistence. \* \* \* An English military critic says: ‘It is not too much to say that an army sent into the field without efficient and thoroughly well-organized and long previously trained staff and supply departments is an army foredoomed to dogs and vultures.’ \* \* \*

“In forming a cool judgment of the value of our present staff organization, it is but just and reasonable to reflect that for half a century these separate departments have had their growth; each has naturally had its special sources of pride and ambition, and each has written its name on the history of the country. They have been separately identified with great events in peace and in war—each corps has its distinct record and traditions. Are such traditions and such ties to be lightly esteemed and suddenly snapped asunder?”

**Coburn report, 1874.**

General Alvord:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 315.) "In the war of 1812 there were some regimental paymasters, and it was found that the percentage of loss to the Government by defalcation and by immature experience in the discharge of their duties was startling. Gen. Nathan Towson, under Mr. Calhoun as Secretary of War, devised the present system of organization of the Pay Department, giving rank, respectability, and permanence to the position, and it must be said that the experience of half a century has justified the prophecy of Mr. Calhoun as to the propriety of the system adopted. The percentage of loss during the Mexican and civil wars was trifling in comparison with the percentage of loss during the war of 1812." \* \* \*

**Burnside report, 1878.**

Draft of bill submitted by General Alvord, Paymaster-General, U. S. A.:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 284.) "Sec. 5. That the number of paymasters in the Army of the grade of major shall gradually be reduced, as vacancies shall occur, to forty-five, and appointments to that grade shall hereafter be made from captains of the line of the Army or from those who may have served as additional paymasters: *Provided*, That no one shall be appointed to such office who is over forty-five years of age, nor until he shall pass a satisfactory examination before a board of three officers, designated by the Secretary of War, one of whom shall be a medical officer."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Burnside report, 1878.**

Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers; major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war; during civil war was division and corps commander; chief of staff to General Meade.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 285.) "Mr. Calhoun reported a plan December 12, 1820, reducing the noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates to that number (6,000), but without reducing the Corps of Engineers and the Topographical Engineers, as then existing.

"Among his principles are:

"The great and leading objects of a military establishment in peace ought to be to create and perpetuate military skill and experience, so that at all times the country may have at its command a body of officers sufficiently numerous and well instructed in every branch of duty, both of the line and staff, and the organization of the Army ought to be such as to enable the Government, at the commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular force adequate to the emergencies of the country, properly organized and prepared for actual service."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 286.) "Respecting any modifications in the organizations, practical working, or system of administration of the Corps of Engineers, the Ordnance Department, and the several staff departments of

the Army, by which their efficiency and usefulness can be increased and their cost of maintenance be reduced, after a careful consideration of all that has been presented to Congress and its committees in the last ten years, I am of the opinion that the weight of testimony is greatly in favor of maintaining those branches of the service under their existing organization and system."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 287.) Draft of a bill submitted by General Humphreys (relates only to the line of the Army).

\* \* \* \* \*

"SEC. —. That the officers made supernumerary by this act shall be retained in service for such special duty as they may be required for, and as vacancies occur shall be assigned by the President to regiments without prejudice to their rank."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Burnside report, 1878, p. 288.**

[Extract from Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1875.]

\* \* \* \* \*

"A.—THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, 1869.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 293.) " \* \* \* The term general staff, as used by us, means usually something very different from the same term in France, where it is used to designate the marshals and general officers only. In France there is but one staff corps, the highest grade in it being that of colonel. Officers of all the arms of service in the French army do staff duty by detail."

\* \* \* \* \*

"B.—THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 299.) "The 'staff' in this country really now consists, the word being used in its proper sense, of the General, the Lieutenant-General, the five major-generals, the eight brigadier-generals, the adjutant-generals, the inspector-generals, and the officers attached to the personal staff of commanding officers. The duties of the adjutant-generals relate in time of peace to orders, reports, recruiting, records, etc. In time of war they may act also as aids-de-camp. The duties of inspectors are defined by their title. What in our service are called sometimes 'staff departments,' such as the quartermaster, commissary, medical, pay, and law departments, are called in the French service 'intendance.' Their officers have no real military rank or command whatever. The engineers belong neither to the 'staff' nor to the 'intendance,' but to the 'line,' and constitute an independent 'arm of the service.'"

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Horatio G. Wright, engineers, major-general of volunteers; during civil war was brigade, division, and corps commander;

commanded Sixth Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, afterwards brigadier-general and Chief of Engineers.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 131.) “I think the effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps of the staff, and of allowing only promotions within them, is calculated to secure the greatest efficiency possible. The different branches of the staff as at present subdivided are specialties of the military service, requiring the whole attention and study of the officer.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I am satisfied that military officers are most efficient who are educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service, and that no greater freedom of detail and transfer than at present exercised, from one branch to another, would be beneficial, inasmuch, as before stated, the whole study and attention of the officer is needed to secure his greatest efficiency in his particular specialty.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. John Newton, engineers, major-general of volunteers; brigade, division, and corps commander; afterwards brigadier-general and Chief of Engineers.

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(Page 91.) “As a general rule, I think it proper to continue officers and promote them in their own departments of the staff, such practice tending to greater efficiency and a proper esprit de corps.

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“As a rule, officers are more efficient who are educated and trained for specialties of service. However, details from the artillery or cavalry to the infantry would be more proper than from the latter to the former.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. John G. Foster, engineers; major-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during civil war was brigade, corps, and department commander.

(Page 28). “Military officers educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service are more efficient. Any freedom of detail or transfer would not be beneficial, and would probably degenerate into a mere favoritism. \* \* \*

“Every staff duty is a specialty, and should have officers exclusively devoted to it. \* \* \*

“Selection in the Army means, in most cases *favoritism*, and officers selected do not generally perform their duties as well as those who are *detailed* for duty from a corps especially trained for the service. I have tried both classes, and like the detailed officers best. They generally perform their duties with care, intelligence, and expedition.”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Quincy A. Gillmore, engineers; major-general of volunteers; division, corps, and department commander; afterwards colonel of engineers.

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(Page 168.) "The effect of continuing the same officers in particular departments or corps of the staff, each with a distinct and separate line of promotion, is to secure a greater degree of efficiency than would be practicable under any organization where the principle was recognized of temporary transfer from corps to corps, from the line to the staff, or the reverse. Any attempt to distribute the duties of any special service among more officers than are really required for their performance can only result in impaired efficiency. This is a fact patent to all men who have enjoyed even limited opportunities for reading or observation upon army organization. Moreover, the principle of temporary transfer, or special assignment, once legalized and put in practice, would almost immediately degenerate into favoritism, than which nothing can be more demoralizing to an army or destructive of laudable ambition and esprit.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Military officers are more efficient who are educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of service. A greater freedom of detail and transfer than at present exercised would result in injury to the service in proportion, as it would subdivide and dissipate the special knowledge which it is essential that only comparatively few should possess. It might secure respectable mediocrity among the many, but it would be at the expense of professional eminence among the efficient few. There are few men possessing unusual genius. With rare exceptions all great results have been achieved by excellence in specialties. Mediocrity accomplishes little, and is practically destitute of all the elements of aggressive progress."

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**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. John G. Parke, engineers; major-general of volunteers; corps commander; afterwards colonel of engineers.

(Page 75.) \* \* \* "Officers who are educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service are more efficient than those who are not thus trained; but whether it would be better for the service that there should be greater freedom of detail and transfer than at present exercised, from one branch to another, is a question that I am not fully prepared to answer."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gouverneur K. Warren, engineers; major-general of volunteers; chief engineer Army of the Potomac; commanded Fifth Army Corps, Army of the Potomac; afterwards lieutenant-colonel of engineers.

(Page 50.) "Details would be sought by men incompetent perhaps in their own corps, and at any rate depriving that corps of an essential member, if he is good for anything, and injuring his own esprit decorps."

## Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. William E. Merrill, Corps of Engineers; colonel U. S. Volunteer Engineers; assistant engineer, Army of the Potomac; chief engineer, Army of Kentucky and Army of the Cumberland; afterwards lieutenant-colonel of engineers.

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(Page 81.) "If officers are properly selected in the first place, they are undoubtedly more efficient for paying special, though not exclusive, attention to their specialties, just as in civil life we always go to a dentist to have a tooth drawn, although we might go to a physician in an emergency. All arms of the military service are mutually dependent, and the thorough officer will be well informed in them all, though specially studying his own. Considering that the staff departments and the engineer and ordnance are meant by the term 'specialties of the service,' I will answer in detail. Engineer officers when they first join would be much benefited by a brief service with troops, but afterwards they will have more than they can attend to in their own profession. My views on the ordnance I have already given. Should the Ordnance Corps be reconstructed, as I suggest, its permanent officers should remain exclusively on ordnance duty. Medical officers, of course, need not practice any other than their legitimate duty. The other 'specialties' of the service are filled by appointment from the line, in which it may be assumed that all the members have seen sufficient service. I think, therefore, that they should not be returned to the line, believing that such a course would tend to discourage efforts to become perfect in the specialty."

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## Burnside report, 1878.

Brig. Gen. Stephen V. Benét, Chief of Ordnance; served during the civil war as captain of ordnance.

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(Page 369.) "Two vital principles underlie this subject, and must be considered together:

"First. The organization of an army is *for war*.

"Second. The best organization is one that has *proved most efficient in war*.

"The present organization has shown itself an efficient one, certainly in two wars, the latter of such proportions as to strain it to the utmost. For war purposes, therefore, the Army ought not to be reorganized.

"Is it the part of wisdom to so organize it *in peace* that in the confusion, haste, and turmoil of war the peace organization shall have to be transformed for war purposes? The mere mention of such a necessity carries with it its own condemnation. In my opinion the organization of both line and staff should remain undisturbed.

"So many special conditions necessarily enter into the organization for each country that it is a matter of surprise that organizations based on the experience of foreign countries should in their details be expected to fit in with the peculiar conditions of ours; as if our wars have not been of sufficient magnitude, not only as regards men and supplies, but in extent of strategical operations, to supply all the varied experience with armies upon which to base correct conclusions."

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**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Albert J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general; afterwards Chief Signal Officer with the rank of brigadier-general.

(Page 156.) "This is a government of law; and in the Army, where especially law is too apt to be ignored or disregarded, competent law officers, in my opinion, are absolutely necessary. The officers of the Judge-Advocate's Department, so far as I know them, are experts in military law and general legal knowledge. I have had occasion myself, from time to time, to consult the officers of the Bureau of Military Justice upon questions of law arising in my office, and have always received valuable assistance from them." \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. A. (retired), brevet brigadier-general, late of Ordnance Corps; served in Mexican war; during the civil war was chief ordnance officer, Department of the Ohio and Army of the Potomac:

(Page 38.) "The natural effect of transfers from one duty to another is to enlarge the mind and liberalize the ideas of the officer, and thus qualify him for a wider range of duties, and better fit him for those sudden exigencies of service which he may at any moment be called to meet."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Joseph J. Reynolds, Third Cavalry, major-general of volunteers, chief of staff Army of the Cumberland; corps and department commander:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 210.) "Q. State what is the effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps of the staff, and of allowing only promotions within them.—A. This must be done as at present, unless all staff duties are performed by details from officers of the line of the Army; and no promotion in staff corps.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Would advise 'a greater freedom of detail and transfer.'"

\* \* \* \* \*

"A better system for the efficiency and harmony of the service would be to have the duties of staff departments referred to performed by officers detailed for that purpose, and not to be retained on such duty for a longer time than four years for one tour of staff duty."

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**Coburn report, 1874.**

General Reynolds:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 402.) "If you leave out the Medical Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Ordnance, and Bureau of Military Justice, there is no

department of the staff requiring any special and prolonged training to discharge its duties.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The duties of the other staff corps, after those I have named, can be performed by any officer who is competent to hold a commission in the Army. The alternation from duty with troops to staff duty, from time to time, would be beneficial to the officers of the Army, without, I conceive, being in the least detrimental to the staff departments.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Q. How long a period of duty would you detail these officers for?—A. I would say four years on any one detail; not longer than that.

“Q. Would you let these details run into the higher branches of the staff, or into the lower grades?—A. There is no reason why it should not run throughout the department staff corps. It may require a few surplus officers, but I would have them attached to regiments, and I would have promotions in the staff corps, if it exists at all, confined to a very few men.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Q. Please state how you would obtain a sufficient supply of officers to fill the various grades in the staff.—A. You would simply want to attach to the regiments a number over and above those required for regimental duty equal to the number required for staff duty.”

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### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Benjamin S. Roberts, U. S. A. (retired), late of Third Cavalry; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in Mexican war; during the civil war was chief of cavalry, Department of the Gulf, and commanded cavalry division in District of West Tennessee.

(Page 7.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps of the staff tends to destroy army esprit de corps that should run through all branches, arms, and departments. \* \* \* Officers can not be eminently and generally useful when they are unfamiliar and inexperienced in the duties and practical functions of the great arms of service that play the principal parts in actual war. The experience of the great civil war of the rebellion has demonstrated that the more valuable officers were developed from the general service, such as Grant, George H. Thomas, Phil. Sheridan, Sedgwick, J. F. Reynolds, Lyon, Hancock, et al. Therefore greater freedom of detail and transfer than at present exercised from one branch of service to another would be highly beneficial. \* \* \* I qualify my answer by saying the peculiar duties of inspecting officers, the quartermasters, the medical officers, and the officers of the judge-advocate’s departments, require permanence of organization and special promotion, as independent supplying and staff corps. Any system of detail in these departments would impair efficiency, as they are specialties of quasi-military characterization, requiring great experience, study, and peculiar capabilities to perfect their usefulness.”

**Maish report, 1878.**

Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, Fourth Cavalry, brigadier-general of volunteers; assistant engineer, Ninth Army Corps; regimental, brigade, and division commander; commanded cavalry division, Army of the James; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 80.) "The staff, as it is called in our Army, may be divided into the military staff and the department of supply.

"The military staff, having charge of correspondence and orders, and of the duty of collecting, arranging, and furnishing information on questions of detail to the President and various general officers, which is the real staff of the Army, embraces the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

"The Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay departments may be grouped together under the general head of supply department, while the ordnance is, in part, a special scientific corps and in part a department of supply.

"Probably the most important organization of the Army is its staff proper.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 81.) "The routine life of an officer in one of our large cities may perhaps produce an officer of great method and care in the management of important records, but is little likely to form a kind and judicious adviser on great military questions which the higher officers of the staff should be always. Probably no officer of the line of the Army who has been brought into immediate contact with troops who has not thought very often, with perhaps some bitterness, how very much time and effort were expended over the little by the staff, how matters were carefully considered that should be disposed of by subordinates, and how on questions of quite serious public business it was sometimes impossible to obtain even an answer.

"The legislation making the positions in the Adjutant and Inspector General's departments permanent is at the root of the present want of harmony between the line and the staff, at the root of a discouragement which is quite general, and of a bitter feeling that those who should be the first to represent what would benefit the mass in legislation are far more taken up with what will benefit themselves. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 82.) "There is a simple, practical remedy for the present state of affairs which will not work the least injustice to any staff officer. Consolidate the Adjutant and Inspector General's departments in one staff corps, with one brigadier-general as chief, three colonels, six lieutenant-colonels, and twelve majors, the same number now allowed by law. After the decrease in the Inspector-General's Department shall have taken place, enact, first, that in case a vacancy in the position of Adjutant-General, it be filled by the transfer of any officer of the same grade on selection and promotion of any officer in the Army. Second. That on the 1st day of January of every alternate year, commencing with 1879, that the colonels of longest service in the Adjutant-General's Department be transferred to the line, and

an officer, by a method to be hereafter designated, be transferred to fill his place. Third. That on the 1st of January of every year the lieutenant-colonel and the two majors of the longest service in the corps be transferred to positions in the same grade in the line, the vacancies being filled in a manner to be hereafter indicated. Fourth. That no officer be transferred from the grade of brigadier-general to the position of Adjutant-General, or promoted from any grade to be Adjutant-General, except on the recommendation of the General of the Army. That department commanders shall yearly recommend such lieutenant-colonels and majors serving in their departments as are, in their opinion, suitable for transfer to the Adjutant-General's Department; that the General shall select and be authorized to transfer yearly one lieutenant-colonel and two majors to the Adjutant-General's Department, who will be chosen from those recommended by department commanders and approved by all higher authority in the usual course, below the commanding general. That the General of the Army be authorized to transfer one colonel every alternate year, commencing with the 1st of January, 1879, from the line of the Army, but such colonel must have been recommended by the department commander and every higher military authority in due course. That the officers of longest service in the Adjutant-General's Department, referred to in the various grades of colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and major, be transferred to the vacancies in the line, occasioned by the transfer of the officers of corresponding grades in the line. That all officers of the staff department thus transferred shall be eligible for a retransfer to the staff, after four years' continuous service with troops in the departments which embrace the wilder portions of the country, but that no officer shall be eligible until four years of such continuous service have been performed.

"In writing what I have I wish it understood that I am making no personal attack on the present Adjutant-General, but on what I consider a very false system and bad legislation, to the great injury of the Government in the interest of a few officers.

"The Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments could be consolidated, and a very great decrease in number of officers made.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 83.) "The consolidation of these two corps should be made with great care, and no officer should be retained in the new organization who was not only of unquestionable integrity, but of far more than ordinary business capacity. All worthy officers who were not considered sufficiently capable should be provided for by retirement or otherwise, while those who were not thought particularly entitled to consideration might very well be dropped from the service.

"In this corps the positions might be to a degree made more permanent than in the staff corps proper formed from the union of the Adjutant-General's Department and that of the Inspector-General; but the principle should be recognized that an officer of good character, but found to have little business capacity, might, on recommendation of the chief of the corps, be transferred to the line of the Army, and an officer of similar grade in the line, who had received the recommendation of fitness from his department commander and all superiors, in due course be transferred to the department in his stead.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The Corps of Engineers and of Ordnance are special in their nature. The engineers are rarely brought in contact with the line of the Army. The ordnance, so far as the infantry and cavalry are concerned, endeavors with judgment to give satisfaction.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. Wesley Merritt, Ninth Cavalry, major-general of volunteers; commanded cavalry brigade and division, Army of the Potomac, and in the Shenandoah and Richmond campaigns; afterwards major-general, U. S. A.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 157.) “Although the effect of continuing the same officers in a particular staff, corps, or department has disadvantages, I have grave doubts as to whether an advantage would accrue by making selections and transfers from the line or other staff corps. Promotion in the Army in time of peace in any other way than by seniority and in the same arm of the service would, I fear, produce one of two effects, viz, a disregard of duty by those who had no prospects of promotion, either from want of influence or merit, or a struggle for favor and consequent discord among those whose chances of preferment were, in their individual opinion, substantial.

\* \* \* \* \*

“If some safe checks could be applied to prevent an ill-considered discrimination in favor of political influence in promotions, it would, I have no doubt, be greatly for the benefit of the service to promote by selections and transfers. Until safety from unworthy selections and promotions by improper influence can be assured, the Army is safer from needing a service reform as promotions and details now stand than if a change was made.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The special duties for which the staff departments and corps are organized are all important. I do not think that a study, even of the army organizations in the Old World, will suggest any important change or modification in this particular in our Army as it now exists.”

#### Maish report, 1878.

General Merritt:

(Page 86.) “The general and staff officers, as now allowed by law, are few enough, in my opinion. The staff of general officers should, I think, be extra officers. In my regiment (the Fifth Cavalry) there are eight first lieutenants permanently detached; five as aids to general officers, one on signal service, one as an instructor at West Point, and one on recruiting service. In addition to this, there is one first lieutenant who is suspended from rank for a year, and two who are sick and disabled for duty, leaving but one first lieutenant out of twelve in the line for duty in the regiment. \* \* \* Thus it will be seen that from natural causes and details the regiment is left in scarcely an efficient state because of lack of officers. This evil would be partially avoided by making the officers detailed for staff duty extra lieutenants by law, requiring them to vacate their regimental commissions on

being advanced to the grade of a captain, or else to return to their regiments.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The staff departments of the Army, as now organized, despite the criticisms of thoughtless persons, are well enough. I am of the opinion that there should be captains in the Adjutant-General’s and Pay departments as well as in the Commissary and Quartermaster’s departments.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Edward Hatch, Ninth Cavalry, brigadier-general of volunteers; brigade and division commander; commanded cavalry division Army of the Tennessee.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 101.) “The effect of continuing the same officer in a particular department or staff and allowing only promotions in the same, I consider bad. Officers serving in departments become so assured of their positions and advancement that they lose all emulation to excel, knowing that no degree of excellence can advance them. They should be selected from the Army at large by the General of the Army. This would create a strong wish to excel in their duties and to acquire a knowledge of their profession, for which there is not the same inducement at present.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Benjamin H. Grierson, Tenth Cavalry; major-general of volunteers; commanding cavalry brigade, division, and corps; brevetted major-general for gallant services in raid through Mississippi; afterwards brigadier-general U. S. A.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 151.) “A greater freedom of detail for the several branches would be beneficial, for the reason that an officer educated for one branch does not know enough of other duties. An opportunity should be given officers to transfer, and every officer should be *compelled* to serve a portion of his time with troops in the field.”

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#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. Emory Upton, First Artillery; brigadier-general of volunteers; commanded artillery brigade, Sixth Army Corps; brigade and division commander; afterwards colonel Fourth Artillery.

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(Page 140.) “Staff corps, some of which from the nature of their duties must be permanent, are necessary in every army. In such corps promotions must be confined within themselves.

\* \* \* \* \*

“In special corps, like the Engineer or Medical Corps, officers are unquestionably more efficient who are educated, trained, and promoted

specially for these services. But in order to increase the amount of staff knowledge in the Army and to keep the officers of the staff corps acquainted with the wants and requirements of the line, transfers from the staff to the line, and the reverse, for a period not exceeding four years, would in the highest degree be beneficial.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The staff corps to which officers should especially be confined are the Engineer, Ordnance, and Medical Corps. The duties of the adjutant and inspector generals, quartermasters, commissaries, and paymasters are in no degree scientific, and can be learned from officers detailed from the line.

\* \* \* \* \*

“It is also my opinion that the efficiency of the Engineer and Ordnance corps would be increased by prohibiting graduates of the Military Academy from entering them immediately upon graduation, and providing (after abolishing the grade of second lieutenant in each corps) that promotions to the grade of first lieutenant should be made by selection after competitive examination from among first or second lieutenants who had served three years in the line.”

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#### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. John M. Brannan, First Artillery, brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was division commander in the Army of the Cumberland; afterwards colonel Fourth Artillery.

(Page 47.) “An adjutant-general requires knowledge which can only be obtained by long experience; a detail might only give place to a favorite, who would not always be relieved in proving himself inefficient. \* \* \* With a proper selection of officers as adjutants-general I should prefer a permanency, but would retain the power to transfer to the line anyone who failed to come up to the standard. \* \* \*

“As a general rule, where an officer takes an interest and pride in the profession and has the necessary ability and industry to make himself perfectly acquainted with the peculiar duty of the department or staff corps in which he is serving, the promotion should be within that department or staff corps.”

#### Burnside report, 1878.

Maj. John Hamilton, First Artillery; served in the Mexican war; brevetted in the war of the rebellion for gallantry at Fort Pulaski, Ga., Secessionville, James Island, S. C., and at Olustee, Fla.; afterwards colonel Fifth Artillery.

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(Page 482.) “I will here venture a few of the arguments cogent to me in favor of detail for staff duties:

“1. There is no more danger of an improper favoritism in making these details than now actually exists in making permanent appointments.

\* \* \* \* \*

“4. An officer, knowing that he is to be for detail for a staff duty and still that selection can be exercised against him, will do everything to prepare himself for the proper discharge of the duty.

“5. An officer, knowing that on his return to the line he will have to give an account to his brother officers for the proper discharge of his duties on the staff, will avoid those supercilious airs that have made the line so inimical to the staff. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

“We think that permanent appointments in the staff enervates officers. Just as soon as an officer is planted in Washington we all think he becomes a trimmer. He is afraid of his position and he is generally so easily disposed of that he fears to tell unpalatable truths. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 483.) “We think that accountability, returns, renderings of law, and accumulation of regulations are unnecessarily complicated forms that have been devised for carrying out the original intention of enactments; that by putting a detailed officer in charge for a period it would become his interest to simplify rather than complicate affairs and the administration of his department.

\* \* \* \* \*

“10. This merging should only be of the supply departments. I have never seen any serious cause of complaint against the Adjutant-General's Department. The Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments should be merged and in the Army. The Pay Department should be reduced by lapsing of incumbency by casualty until there be a head at Washington, an assistant, and one paymaster to each military department. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

“The Engineer Corps I consider so good that it would be dangerous to tamper with it. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 484.) “The merging of the staff would necessarily affect the company and regimental organization, for supernumeraries for detail to all detached service would have to be provided for. One thing I will venture to say, that a regiment does not need two supply officers. One officer should transport, feed, and pay his regiment; he should have as many warrant officers and clerks as would be necessary to enable him to perform his duties, and they and he should be paid extra.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I should not recommend any interference with the Adjutant-General's Department, at all events with the officers above a certain rank. I think that probably one-half its number might be filled by detail from the line, the senior half to be of permanent appointment selected from the best of those having had service in the department by detail.

“\* \* \* As keeping brushed up in professional books and physical science, I consider myself not the inferior of a very large majority of graduates. Yet I know that the Army would lose by putting me on engineer or ordnance duty to-morrow, even in a very subordinate position. The duties are and should be a special profession or branch. There is no doubt that the present incumbents are well fitted for it

and that they have able chiefs who work them systematically and well. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 485.) “Make details for the inferior grades of the Adjutant-General’s Department; for all of the one supply department (Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence combined) except its chief, who should be permanent; for the Pay Department, which by my scheme would have only about a dozen in it—its chief would not need to be more than a colonel. To subject most officers to but two years’ staff duty, during which time they would be liable to move, would be very unpopular and distasteful. Moving is our bane in the Army, and any unnecessary move is more than distasteful.” \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. William F. Barry, Second Artillery, brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; was chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac and Military Division of the Mississippi, during the civil war.

(Page 3.) “The effect of continuing the same officers in Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments is, as a general thing, injurious to the best interests of the service; but if selections in the first instance are properly made for certain officers of Inspector-General’s, Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments, and if those officers retain their aptitude and ability, it would be injurious to change them for others. \* \* \* Military officers are decidedly more efficient who are educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of service; but this presupposes that, in the first instance, a judicious and wise selection puts the right man in the right place. \* \* \* If the officer justifies the wisdom of the original selection or assignment, it would be injurious to the military service to remove him from any of its specialties.”

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. William H. French, Second Artillery, major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida and Mexican wars; corps commander during the civil war; afterwards colonel Fourth Artillery.

(Page 53.) “Continuing officers in the same corps of the staff heightens their esprit de corps. They aim to be more efficient in their specialty. \* \* \*

“I think an educated officer commences with more efficiency than an uneducated officer. The transfer from one branch of the service to another is as well left to the course of events as in any other way. An infantry officer is President of the United States, an artillery officer is general in chief, a topographical officer is Chief Engineer, and a military engineer is Quartermaster-General of the Army, and so throughout.”

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Horace Brooks, Fourth Artillery, and brevet brigadier-general. U. S. A.; served in the Florida and Mexican wars and in the war of the rebellion.

(Page 52.) “It often creates a laxity of discipline to transfer officers to and from different corps.”

### Banning report, 1876.

Col. Henry J. Hunt, Fifth Artillery; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, succeeding General Barry:

(Page 70.) "Ordnance Department: In all other armies the duties of this department are, and for many good reasons ought to be, devolved on the artillery, which is provided with its special staff for the purpose. Our former separate Ordnance Department was merged in the artillery in 1821, and with the best results to the service. \* \* \* A separate Ordnance Department gives us no advantages commensurate with its cost to the country, and when we take into account the positive evils its simple existence entails on other branches of the service, in diminished efficiency, we may well feel justified in condemning its establishment as an error.

(Page 71.) "Adjutant-General's Department: It is doubtful if there should be such a 'department'. The functions of its officers are, like those of inspectors-general, essentially of a personal character, and their true and proper heads are the generals to whose staffs they belong. Their functions, in comparison with those of 'general staff' officers, properly so called, are, in a military sense, extremely limited, and their real places in the military system are those of 'aids' for special purposes. They are the proper officers to put in form and distribute the military orders of the generals under whom they serve, to receive, examine, consolidate, and preserve the reports and stated returns of his command, and to prepare for his signature those he himself renders. \* \* \* The law of 1821 required that the duties of the Adjutant-General should be performed by one of the aids of the general, and this indicates very clearly the nature of their proper status. In my former letter I stated that the department assumes to be the 'general staff' corps of the Army, and its bureau attempts as such to regulate and control the affairs of the Army by absorbing the functions of the commanders of troops (this to an extent unprecedented in other armies), and that so far as my own branch of the service is concerned, such interference has been mischievous. I now add that the whole system of the absorption of the powers of the immediate commanders of troops, by higher headquarters and by this bureau, which system finds its main support in this department, is not only unnecessary, costly, and injurious to the efficiency of the routine of the service, but that it tends to the destruction of discipline; is incompatible with the established organization of the Army and the laws passed for its government, and for the protection of the rights of officers and soldiers. \* \* \*

"The mode of payment to troops should be changed, so that they may be paid oftener, and that when soldiers are discharged their accounts may be settled and paid off without subjecting them to plunder by usurers. Captains who settle the accounts of their men should also pay them. Of all the fallacies by which an evil is perpetuated in our service, this one, that captains can not pay their men, is the greatest. When lieutenants these same captains could act as quartermasters and commissaries, receive and disburse larger sums to soldiers and others than they would have to handle as captains, and this with little or no difficulty." \* \* \*

**Maish report, 1878.**

General Hunt:

(Page 112.) "However useful a large and well-ordered permanent staff may be as a preparation for war, and no one recognizes this fact more clearly than I do, one that is *not* well ordered can not add to the value of any army, and ours is not now well ordered either in the mode of selection and appointment, which is by pure favor, or in its relations to the troops."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Truman Seymour, Fifth Artillery; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was brigade and division commander:

(Page 58.) "Special education and training are indispensable in any good service; and if selections for the lower grades of the staff corps be made from the line of the Army, and never without due examination, all the benefits likely to accrue from 'greater freedom of detail and transfer' will be realized."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Samuel W. Crawford, Second Infantry; brigadier-general of volunteers; brevet major-general, U. S. A.; division commander at Antietam and Gettysburg:

(Page 89.) "\* \* \* The effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department of corps of the staff tends, in my judgment, to separate to an unwise degree the staff and line of the Army."

\* \* \* \* \*

"I am not clear that any benefit would result from a transfer from one branch to another of the staff, unless it is contemplated that after a term of service the officer is to return to the line."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Whatever system is adopted, it should be one capable of great expansion in case of emergency or in time of war. The most serious obstacle to the efficiency of the Army in the beginning of the war was the lack of trained or experienced staff officers. Had the Government been able to have furnished such officers to the general officers, as they were appointed, or to corps, division, and brigade headquarters, the difference both in economy and efficiency would have been very great. I see every reason why, in any peace establishment, the freest opportunity should be given to the officers of the line of the Army to learn these important duties."

"There are many officers of experience and wisdom who think that the nuclei of the present corps should be preserved and made the basis of unlimited expansion in any emergency, and they point, and with reason, to the unparalleled efficiency of these corps during the war."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Silas Casey, U. S. A. (retired), was colonel Fourth Infantry; major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war, Mexican war, and war of the rebellion:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 93.) “By continuing officers in the same corps an esprit de corps is excited, and I doubt if any advantage which might inure from a different system of promotion would make amends for the loss of that spirit.”

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. William B. Hazen, Sixth Infantry; major-general of volunteers; brigade, division, and corps commander; afterwards Chief Signal Officer, with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 171.) “Except the officers of the supply department, who need no technical military education, all officers should have a well-grounded technical and military education, besides a good general education, after which they should receive special training for their special services, but never should be entirely detached from troops, but have regular alternate periods of duty with them.” \* \* \*

**Maish report, 1878.**

General Hazen:

(Page 122.) “\* \* \* The organization of a general staff for an army I believe to be of very great importance. At present, while all other armies have such a body of men, which they are constantly improving and increasingly feel the need of, we have none, but in its place a number of special branches, all lacking the great essential to military efficiency—occasional tours of duty with troops. They are essentially office men, performing many of those clerical duties which ought to be done by officers detailed from regiments preparatory to regular staff duty. Their special character unfits them for the general purposes which become all-important in war as aids of the highest grade of military experience to general commanders.” \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. John Gibbon, Seventh Infantry; major-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during civil war was chief of artillery to General McDowell; brigade, division, and corps commander; commanded Second Corps at Gettysburg; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 147.) “The staff of an army should consist of the very first brains of the service, thoroughly conversant with all of its details; and such a knowledge can only be attained by service in the different arms.

\* \* \* \* \*

“All persons educated, trained, and promoted for a specialty, are more efficient for that *particular specialty*, but officers of the Army

are not more efficient as *military officers* from being so educated; and there is no reason why their efficiency as such should not be increased by greater freedom of detail and transfer, as described above.

“In conclusion, I will state that the staff organization in our service should be such that in case of war it could be at once and efficiently used to organize and supply an immensely larger force than we are in the habit of maintaining in time of peace; in other words, should be capable of indefinite extension.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Maish report, 1878.

Col. John H. King, Ninth Infantry; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; brigade and division commander in civil war:

(Page 128.) “I have the honor to recommend the following:

\* \* \* \* \*

“That the staff departments remain as independent corps, organized as now, but the number of paymasters should be reduced, and line officers detailed to pay the troops monthly, on a more simple roll than the one now used. Paymasters could be stationed at important points and furnish enough money for each payment as required.” \* \* \*

#### Maish report, 1878.

Maj. Thomas M. Anderson, Tenth Infantry; in the field during the civil war; commanded Twelfth Infantry in Wilderness campaigns; major-general of volunteers, Spanish war; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.:

(Page 152.) “I should be very sorry to see the organization of our staff department changed. \* \* \* They should come back to the line now and then, if for no other reason, to learn from practical experience our necessities.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. George P. Buell, Eleventh Infantry; brevet brigadier-general, U. S. A.; during civil war was colonel Fifty-eighth Indiana Volunteers; brigade commander; afterwards colonel Fifteenth Infantry:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 155.) “Any man is more efficient in his particular business who follows it closely for a period of years, but he is fit for nothing else. The Army would be much more efficient if a greater freedom of detail were authorized. There is no branch of the service (except the engineer, medical, and ordnance) that any officer of ordinary education, good sense, energy, industry, ambition, pride, and courage can not accomplish in a few years.” \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Orlando B. Willcox, Twelfth Infantry; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; in the civil war was division and corps commander; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.:

(Page 96.) "These corps (the Adjutant-General's, Quartermaster's, and Commissary Departments) should be constantly replenished with young officers, to be selected from the line, for peculiar fitness, and if not found fit, to be returned to their regiments. With this object in view, I would urge the readoption of the plan of appointing captains in each of these corps from first lieutenants of the line, to serve until promoted to their own regiments, and then either returned or retained."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Isaac V. D. Reeve, U. S. A. (retired), late of Thirteenth Infantry; brevet brigadier-general; served in the Florida war, Mexican war, and in the civil war; was captured by General Twiggs; on recruiting duty and in command of draft rendezvous:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 160.) "10. Q. State what is the effect of continuing the same officers in a particular department or corps of the staff and of allowing only promotions within them.

"A. The effect is to make the department more efficient by its members having a thorough knowledge of its duties by acquiring excellence from long practice and study and a pride in their performance. After years of service in a special and congenial duty it certainly would be detrimental to the service to promote an officer to strange duties in which he can not feel the same interest as in those he has left. This would often be the result of promoting *out* of the departments, because the members of those departments have usually sought them from *preference* for their duties."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Maish report, 1878.**

Lieut. Col. William P. Carlin, Seventeenth Infantry; brigadier-general of volunteers; brigade and division commander; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.:

(Page 143.) "The Quartermaster-General's Department, Adjutant-General's Department, Inspector-General's Department, and Ordnance Department, as separate staff corps should be abolished, and the duties now performed by these separate corps should be performed by officers detailed for a term of years from the line of the Army. The number of such officers should be regulated by the exigencies of the service and be determined by the President.

\* \* \* \* \*

"1. Adjutant-General's Department: One of the 10 brigadier-generals of the Army should be detailed as adjutant-general for a term of years; there should be such number of officers detailed from the line of the Army to act as assistant adjutants-general as the President may direct, and they should be assigned to such duties as he may deem necessary."

(Page 144.) “2. Inspector-General’s Department: The inspector-general should be a colonel detailed from the line of the Army for a term of years; there should be such assistant inspectors-general as the President may decide to be necessary, and they should be detailed from the line of the Army for a term of years.

“3. Quartermaster-General’s Department: One of the general officers of the Army should be detailed to act as quartermaster-general for a term of years. Such quartermasters and assistants as the President may deem necessary to perform services required should be detailed for a term of years from the line of the Army.

“4. Subsistence Department: A brigadier-general of the Army should be detailed to act as Commissary-General of Subsistence. The other officers of the department should be selected as now provided by law. If any more should be required they should be detailed from the line of the Army for a term of years, or so long as their services may be deemed necessary by the President.

“5. The Ordnance Department: A colonel of the line should be detailed for a term of years to act as Chief of Ordnance, and such assistants as the President may deem necessary should be detailed from the line of the Army for a term of years.

“6. Medical Department: This should consist of a surgeon-general with the rank of colonel, 1 surgeon, and 2 assistant surgeons for each regiment of the line, whose rank shall be the same as now provided by law. Such other surgeons and physicians as may be required should be employed by contract.

“7. Pay Department: The paymaster-general should be a colonel of the line detailed for a term of years. The department should in other respects remain as at present organized by law.

“8. Bureau of Military Justice: The Judge-Advocate-General should be a colonel learned in the law, and should be selected by the President. The Bureau should in other respects remain as now organized.

“9. The Signal Corps: A captain of the Corps of Engineers should be placed in charge of this corps, and he should be on the staff of the General of the Army. His assistants should be such young lieutenants and enlisted men as may be deemed necessary by the General of the Army.

“10. Engineer Corps: This should be organized as advised above, and reduced to the number required by the actual necessities of the military service.”

\* \* \* \* \*

### Maish report, 1878.

Col. Charles H. Smith, Nineteenth Infantry, brevet major-general. During the civil war was colonel First Maine Cavalry; commanded cavalry brigade in army of the Potomac:

(Page 137.) “I do not think I can offer with advantage any views relating to staff officers in addition to the mass of conflicting opinions already before the military committee. \* \* \* A company should have a captain, a first lieutenant, and a second lieutenant. Captains and second lieutenants should serve with their companies; first lieutenants should be available for detail and detached service.” \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Alfred Sully, Nineteenth Infantry, brigadier-general of volunteers. Served in the Florida war, the Mexican war, and in the civil war was brigade commander; afterwards colonel Twenty-first Infantry:

(Page 40.) “I approve of officers holding the higher positions being continued in a particular department or corps of the staff and promotion being made only in them, provided the officer proves himself to be fitted for the position. \* \* \*

“Unquestionably, officers educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of the service are much more efficient, but the greatest care should be taken in selecting proper officers to fill staff appointments. \* \* \*

“I think, before an officer is appointed in the staff, he should serve at least five years as a company officer and most of that time in the field, so that he may become thoroughly acquainted with the wants and necessities of the enlisted men and the service generally.”

**Maish report, 1878.**

Colonel Sully:

(Page 138.) “I think the younger officers of the line should be detailed to serve for a period of time in all the staff corps, except the Engineer Corps and the Medical Department, to acquaint them with these duties and to give the authorities in Washington an opportunity to select those best fitted for such important positions.”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. David S. Stanley, Twenty-second Infantry; major-general of volunteers, division and corps commander; chief of cavalry, army of the Cumberland; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 145.) “That the staff duties of the Army are difficult to acquire, that the correspondence, the feeding, clothing, quartering, and transportation of troops are difficult subjects, we have seen contradicted by the rapidity with which the volunteer staff officers acquired the knowledge and practice of these duties in the field during the late war. I do not think I ever saw a regular quartermaster or commissary in the field, but we had, in the army of the Cumberland, an old ex-railroad superintendent who seemed as much at home amid pork and hard bread as though he had spent a lifetime apprenticeship at it. As there is nothing special in these duties, the transfer of an officer from one to the other is beneficial in extending his business education and preparing him for general usefulness.”

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. George Crook, Twenty-third Infantry; major-general of volunteers, division commander; in command of cavalry, army of the Potomac; afterwards major-general, U. S. A.:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 152). "If staff officers were to go more among the troops I think it would be better to have them educated, trained, and promoted for specialties of service, but under the present management I think a greater freedom of transfer and detail would be better."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Lieut. Col. Richard I. Dodge, Twenty-third Infantry; during the civil war lieutenant-colonel and assistant inspector-general, Fourth Army Corps; afterwards colonel Eleventh Infantry:

(Page 121.) "Engineer Department: It would be a work of super-erogation to comment upon a body of men whose genius and whose labors have identified them with almost every important work of the country, and to whose ability as engineers the shipping and commercial interests of the world are indebted."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Signal Corps: The same remarks apply to this admirable, well-managed, and most important corps." \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Abner Doubleday, Twenty-fourth Infantry; major-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; was brigade, division, and corps commander during the civil war; commanded First Corps at Gettysburg:

(Page 143.) \* \* \* "In my opinion, everything in the Army should be subordinate to the fighting element. To transfer from the line to the staff and from the staff to the line has a tendency to bind all parts of the service together and to excite the young officers to study and to emulate each other."

\* \* \* \* \*

"I think the Engineer, Ordnance, and Medical departments should still be retained as special branches of service, not subject to transfers except for very special reasons."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. George L. Andrews, Twenty-fifth Infantry; during civil war was lieutenant-colonel First Missouri Volunteers; major Seventeenth Infantry, and lieutenant-colonel Thirteenth Infantry; regimental and brigade commander, Army of the Potomac:

(Page 117.) "I think, with the exception of the Medical Department, that details from the line, under proper restrictions as to length of detail and service with their proper commands before being eligible for new detail, will supply the necessary number of officers of all grades for the administrative and supply departments, and will alone preserve that harmony and unity of interests so essential to effective service." \* \* \*

## CONSOLIDATION OF STAFF DEPARTMENTS.

### Garfield report, 1869.

The committee said:

(Page 2.) "Little fault can be found with the efficiency of the staff, but their work was done at a very great expense. There is no doubt that with less diversity of organization the cost might have been largely diminished."

(Pages 2 and 3.) "The committee recommend the consolidation of the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay departments into one department of supply. Such a department could, it is believed, do all the work of the three departments named, with not more than two-thirds of the officers now employed, and with a considerable saving of expense in other particulars, such as office rent, transportation, mileage, clerk hire, etc. \* \* \* The considerations in favor of the union of the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay departments are freely and ably given in the annexed evidence of the Secretary of War, and of Generals Hancock, McDowell, Ingalls, and others."

(Page 3.) "The departments of the Adjutant-General and Inspector-General can with propriety be combined, as both have to do with the personnel of the Army. There appears to be no good reason for their separation, and the consolidation will simplify their organization and reduce in some degree their expenses."

"In the opinion of the committee the duties of the Signal Corps can be as well performed by the Engineer Corps."

"The committee are also of the opinion that the Engineer Corps could do the work of the Coast Survey, now a bureau of the Treasury Department."

"A union of the Ordnance Department with the artillery is recommended, and would effect a large saving of expense."

(Page 4.) "The committee invite especial attention to the considerations in favor of a union of the War and Navy departments, suggested by the Secretary of War in his evidence."

(Page 1.) "As the committee will not have an opportunity to report any bill to be acted upon before the expiration of the present Congress they can only present the information they have gathered, and ask that it be printed for the information of all concerned, and for use in the next Congress."

### Coburn report, 1873.

The committee said:

(Page 2.) "It (the Army) is designed for a state of hostilities in some measure commensurate with the power of our people, and with the foreign foes of great force against whom we may be compelled to contend. And the question arises whether, in a momentous emergency of that kind, we can safely trust under the control of any single man more than one of the present departments or corps of the staff. Has the Quartermaster-General any less than he can do well at such a time? And so with the Inspector, the Adjutant, the Paymaster, and the Commissary generals, and the Chief of Ordnance and the Chief of Engineers."

"The classification of staff duties should be such that those of any branch can be promptly and efficiently discharged in time of war on a

large scale. And unless we have an organization capable of expansion to an almost unlimited extent we may well question whether it rests upon a safe basis. \* \* \* The head of each department should be able to have a thorough and personal knowledge of all its affairs, and should be able at all times to know its entire operations and manage them with facility. Not to be able to do this is regarded justly as a defect; while, on the other hand, a counterbalancing evil occurs by the fact that these departments, having a different responsibility, do not at times work in harmony with each other.

“The head of each department should be thoroughly acquainted with all the minutiae of it, and never at a loss to detect errors or derelictions of duty. Nothing but long experience as a permanent officer can give this. The danger is that, by long custom and routine, he may become rigid, formal, technical, and unable to accommodate himself to circumstances and to rise with great emergencies; may ‘rust in the staff.’ But this evil is more than counterbalanced by the superior knowledge, skill, and ability gathered by long and faithful service; indeed, such qualifications then become almost invaluable.

“A perfect acquaintance with his duties, a familiarity with all its details, a pride and spirit in their prompt and exact discharge are the result of veteran service in the staff departments, and while many of the duties in the different branches are similar in part, yet the division is sufficiently marked to prevent collisions or discord.” \* \* \*

(Page 3.) “The first three departments (the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and some of the duties of the Ordnance Department) have many points in common, and yet are sufficiently diverse to justify their separation when great emergencies require a sudden and important effort from each. At such a time it would seem that the duties of any one of these departments are sufficient for the officers assigned to their discharge. To consolidate them in peace would but require their separation in war in effect, if not in name. The duties to be performed under the head of a single great department of supply, embracing these three, would be classified and arranged at least to fall into different hands, and whatever might be their appellation could hardly be better disposed of than at present.

“While in time of peace the number of officers and their clerks would be somewhat decreased, on the other hand, in time of war it would not be materially reduced, and it is very questionable whether the efficiency of one head for the three departments would be as great with the vastly increased responsibility thus thrown upon him. The danger would be that the overburdened department would at the very time when its efforts were most needed sink beneath the load.

“On the other hand, it is urged that ‘the general similarity of duties, unity of action, some reduction in the aggregate number of officers, more uniform promotion, greater room for economy in the distribution of officers to particular bureaus or branches of duty, according to their fitness, and a larger field from which to select officers for important administrative positions in times of emergency,’ would justify a consolidation of the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay and the administrative branch of the Ordnance Department into a single one of supply. The advantages thus to be gained can not be denied, but are deemed of less importance than those the present system affords, with its division of labor and distribution of responsibility.

\* \* \* “It certainly would require higher cultivation to be able

to do the scientific duties of the present Ordnance and Engineer Corps than of either one separately, as at present, and the training of officers to do the duties of both is no doubt desirable, but a consolidation of two corps that have done so well hardly rises above the range of experiment.

“The distribution of scientific labor, like that of all other kinds, has been found to be advantageous, and the greatest skill, as well as the most rapid progress, is the sure result of such division. There seems to be no more reason why the Ordnance Corps should be consolidated with the artillery than the infantry or cavalry, for it is the duty of that corps to make, improve, and supply all kinds of ammunition and arms to the service, small as well as great. The evidence goes mainly to show that the ordnance should be kept as a separate branch of the staff, as at present.”

(Page 4.) \* \* \* “The consolidation of the Inspector’s with the Adjutant-General’s Department, though advocated by a few, has met with general disfavor. The duties are but slightly akin, and the independence of the inspectors from all branches of the line and staff can only be secured by a complete separation from them. The duties of the adjutant-general confine him closely to his post \* \* \* those of the inspector carry him over a wide field.

“The Medical Department and the Bureau of Military Justice, being professional and scientific specialties of the highest order, are removed from all questions of consolidation with any other branches of the staff.

“In view of these reflections and of the testimony adduced from the most respectable authority it is fair to conclude that the consolidation of any one of the different staff corps and departments with another is inexpedient. Whatever may be gained in expense in time of peace would possibly and probably be lost in war when a divided responsibility, as at present, would become necessary and might devolve upon inexperienced hands.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

The committee said:

(Page 4.) “The question of consolidation in the staff has been a vexed one, and the results reached are embraced in the section of the bill looking to a department of supplies.

“The Pay Department has not, as recommended by some officers, been consolidated with the Quartermaster’s and Subsistence departments, but it has been reduced in number of 20 majors, one-third, and a provision made that the lieutenant-colonels and majors of the department of supplies shall be paymasters ex officio.

“\* \* \* An opportunity will be afforded to test the practicability of officers of the department of supplies performing the duties of paymasters.”

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Hon. William W. Belknap, Secretary of War; during the civil war was colonel Fifteenth Iowa Volunteers, brigadier-general of volunteers, and brevet major-general.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 212.) “The present division of staff departments seems to be the most natural one to secure a proper division of labor and accounta-

bility. It is natural that provision for troops and provision for horses should be separated. The appropriations are separate, the returns are different, the method of their purchase, care, preservation, and distribution is different, and although a lieutenant is usually detailed at small posts to perform both the duties of quartermaster and commissary, yet he is obliged to employ two persons, either soldiers or civilians, one to take charge of the quartermaster matters, and one to take charge of commissary matters, the officer overseeing both.

\* \* \* \* \*

“But when it comes to large posts and depots, it becomes a matter of necessity to have two officers to perform the duties, the labor and responsibility being very great and the accounts very numerous. Now, it is obvious that whether these officers are called, respectively, commissary and quartermaster, or whether they are called officers of the ‘supply department,’ it does not diminish the necessity for them; it does not diminish their number, or the number of their accounts, or their responsibility.

\* \* \* “It seems to me that if company and detachment commanders should have money placed in their charge, and be required to keep it constantly on hand, in a common safe, for the payment of their men, the danger of loss from the exposed positions in which such money would be placed would be infinitely increased.” \* \* \*

(Page 213.) “Why the ordnance corps should be consolidated with the artillery any more than with the cavalry or infantry, I am at a loss to understand.

\* \* \* \* \*

“A consolidation of the Adjutant-General’s and Inspection departments could not well be effected, for the reason that the duties of assistant adjutant-generals require them to be almost constantly in their offices, and those of inspector-generals require them to be constantly on the move.”

\* \* \* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1873.

Gen. William T. Sherman, U. S. A., Commanding General of the Army from March 8, 1869, to November 1, 1883. Received the thanks of Congress by name for Chattanooga, the Atlanta campaign, and the march to the sea:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 272.) “We may change the names of men, but the same duties will have to be performed by somebody, and I doubt very much whether we will gain anything in quality or efficiency by dropping the titles ‘quartermaster and commissary,’ and calling the same an ‘officer of the control department,’ as they do now in England. In every army, whether large or small, there must be some person to look to the horses, means of transportation, and to the supply of the necessary fuel, forage, clothing, etc., and it seems to me it is a matter of very little difference whether we call him a quartermaster or an officer of the control department. If he attends to his business properly he will generally have as much as one man can or ought to do. The same remark will apply to the commissary. The feeding of an army is so important, as we all remember in the civil war, that there must be with every detach-

ment, however large or small, some one man qualified and charged by law or by general regulation with the feeding of that command there on the spot.

“Q. Is there, under the present system, any conflict between officers of the Commissary and Quartermaster’s departments that would be avoided by a consolidation?—A. None.

“Q. Does not one operate as a check on the other in the matter of accounts?—A. I rather think they do have that effect, although in case of a small detachment, below a regiment, say of four or less companies, one officer has done, and can well do, both duties. In fact, the bulk of duties of the Quartermaster’s and the Commissary departments to-day is done by young lieutenants, detailed as acting quartermasters and acting commissaries, both offices generally united in one. \* \* \*

“We have an Adjutant-General’s Department and an Inspector-General’s Department. Their duties are distinct, and it would be very confusing in its results if they were to be merged in the same person, for no one knows better than you, gentlemen, that we must have complete records of all parts of the Army, systematized, and the knowledge at hand, for on them are based claims for bounties, pensions, etc., which follow for years, sometimes for almost 100 years after the disbandments of any part of the Regular or Volunteer Army. This is a very important duty imposed on the Adjutant-General’s Department, and I do not think you can separate the two departments from their respective offices. I do not think you could send your Adjutant-General to make inspections as a general rule. He should be at his office or in presence of his immediate commander charged with collection of the necessary returns, muster rolls, and reports, and with seeing that they reach a safe place of deposit for future reference. \* \* \*

“The Inspector-General has charge, usually in time of peace or war, of making the inspection of troops, of posts, and of the staff officers charged with disbursements, and doing the very duty which the commanding general should do in person if able or if he had sufficient time. He should be, as it were, the eyes of the commanding general. \* \* \*

“The Quartermaster’s Department is very important, and I doubt the wisdom of any change.

“The Subsistence Department is all-important and I doubt the wisdom of any change, save that I think there ought not to be an increase in the number of officers allowed under the existing law, but rather that the number should be permitted to run down without discharging any officers to a standard which will enable the Commissary-General here in Washington to retain two or three assistants, or whatever number may be necessary, and to allow one to each of the great headquarters, say ten or twelve in number, leaving to the regimental quartermasters, and regimental commissaries, and acting assistant quartermasters, and acting assistant commissaries at posts, to fulfill the duties, which they can do perfectly well, and which they actually do with great advantage to themselves by acquiring experience in transacting business, which will be of great service to them afterwards. We all know that General Grant acquired his first lessons in business as a regimental quartermaster. The same is true of Sheridan. The same is true of most of the other successful military commanders, and I have to confess to the same experience myself. Every general officer

acknowledges the great advantage of the experience gained by him in early life in these positions, enabling him to study the system of accountability in business matters, which was of infinite advantage to him in after life.

“The Medical Department, of course, is professional, and it is one which I, perhaps, ought not to touch, but my experience, as I stated in the early part of my examination, is that there should be a regimental surgeon and two assistant surgeons for each regiment, just as we had at the close of the late war. The regimental surgeon and the assistant surgeons should follow the regiment and be with it at all times. They should be as much a part of it as the regimental colors. That, however, will not obviate the necessity of another large number of staff surgeons and assistant surgeons such as we now have.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 274.) “The Pay Department has kept the payment of the troops up well, and it is all-important. They have accounted for the money well. They are appointed from civil life or military life at the option of the President, and I doubt whether you will gain anything, either in economy or efficiency, by requiring payment to be made the troops as in Europe—by the captains of companies or by pay sergeants.

\* \* \*

“Q. There has been some complaint in relation to the infrequency of payment. Is there any real fault connected with that?—A. I think not. The European troops are paid very little. In Russia only three or four dollars a year; in England at the rate of a shilling a day, with some little additions from indirect sources. They get their pay daily, but they have to buy their own rations out of it. We supply our soldiers in kind with rations, clothing, and really all the necessities of life. Our soldiers do not enlist as a life business. \* \* \* Our soldiers have therefore really no need of money, and I think the payment of them every muster day, or every two months, is sufficiently frequent.”

\* \* \*

(Page 275.) “Q. Can you see any economy in a diminution of officers by a consolidation of the Quartermaster’s with the Commissary Department, and either of them with the Pay Department, or both with that department?—A. No, sir; I see no economy either in the number or in the amount of pay involved. It simply changes the name of the officers, as has been done in England; and there was a unanimous conclusion there, as I was informed, on the part of the line officers, that the change works badly.”

\* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1874.

General Sherman:

(Page 29.) “Q. Why can not the Paymaster’s Department of the Army be transferred to the Quartermaster’s Department?—A. The Quartermaster’s Department could make the payments to the troops, but the experience of the last twenty years has been so favorable to the Pay Department that I would not like to suggest such a change. \* \* \*

“The Paymaster’s Department has paid the troops well and has accounted for the money well, and I am told that it has done it cheaply, viz., at a very small percentage on the aggregate disbursement. To change a well-established system for another system is always of doubtful wisdom.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Q. In detached posts why not make the commanding officer of the post pay the troops under his command? \* \* \* —A. I would not like to see a commanding officer of a post hampered with any disbursement of money, for which he would have to account to the Paymaster’s Department or even to the Treasury Department. This would tie him down when he should be on the wing. He is responsible for the safety of his post and of the neighborhood, and should not be a disbursing officer. \* \* \*

“Q. Could the Quartermaster’s Department and the Commissary Department be consolidated?—A. The general view is, if consolidation must be, that the Inspector-General’s Department and Adjutant-General’s Department might be united; and the Paymaster’s, Quartermaster’s, and Subsistence departments might be united, as they are in England, under the name of ‘Control;’ and the Ordnance and the Artillery. The duty of the Signal Department might be imposed on the adjutants of regiments and the noncommissioned staff.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

General Sherman:

(Page 7.) “Q. Would it not be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments into one corps?—A. Yes.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Lieut. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. A., commanding general of the Army from November 1, 1883, to August 5, 1888; general United States Army, June 1, 1888; received the thanks of Congress by name for gallantry displayed in battles in Shenandoah Valley, and especially at Cedar Run.

(Page 19.) “Of course they can be consolidated (the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments), but I doubt whether you will get as good a result as you have now. I do not believe in tearing things down, especially when they have done well. They have certainly done well as they are, and I do not know that any great saving is to be made by consolidation. I am not prepared to recommend anything of the kind. \* \* \*

(Page 21.) “I think probably I might select something else on which to economize. I would stop the fortifications.”

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, late of United States Army, commanding general of the Army from November 1, 1861, to March 11, 1862.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 207.) “I do not think that any of the staff departments can be consolidated advantageously, for the reason that their duties are quite distinct, requiring special experience and training. Our present system is the slow growth of nearly sixty years, embodying the results of the experience of peace and war.

“\* \* \* I have no reason to believe that the number of officers in the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments is now in

excess of the demands of the service, nor do I believe that a consolidation would decrease the number; and, in this connection, I may be permitted to say that the number of staff officers in peace should be kept as large as possible, in order to provide for the contingency of a sudden increase in the event of war; the difficulty in efficiently organizing a new army is more in the special and staff corps than in the line.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I can see a great many serious and fatal objections to the proposition of causing the company and department commanders to pay their commands, and no advantage commensurate with the evils involved.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I can see no possible reason for consolidating the Adjutant and Inspector General's departments, and very many reasons against it. There is no similarity in the duties of the two corps, and entirely different qualifications are needed for them. I should regard such a consolidation as very unwise."

\* \* \* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; commanded Army of the Potomac; received the thanks of Congress by name for Gettysburg.

(Page 15.) "The subject of the consolidation of the staff of the Army into fewer branches has been for several years the subject of discussion, and on a previous occasion of Congressional investigation. I can not say that after reading all that has been written and said I am prepared to advocate consolidation. I have had a fair opportunity to observe the workings of the present system, both in time of war and peace. *It has always worked well.* I doubt if any army is better supplied or has its wants more promptly attended to than ours; and when consideration is given to this fact, it would seem to me the part of prudence is to let well enough alone and not hazard experiments which, even if successful, could attain no better result than all admit is now attained. Besides, the present system is the result of years of experience and the work of able minds. John C. Calhoun, in 1820, and Joel R. Poinsett, in 1838, are the creators of the present organization, based on the experience and judgment of the officers of their days. The distribution of labor to distinct departments, the characteristic of the system, was adopted from the very fact of the previous systems not working well. The adoption has been found to work admirably; it may, and undoubtedly is, open to some improvements, but they are secondary and insignificant to the main principle involved, viz., the distribution of labor. The only advantage to be gained, as far as I can learn from the advocates of consolidation, is their belief that it will require fewer agents, and hence less cost; but in this I fear they will be mistaken. All departments of the staff, it is admitted, have now as much as they can attend to; each year the annual reports of the heads of their departments complain of having more work than they can properly attend to, and ask for an increase of their corps. I speak now principally of the consolidation of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments. Now, if each of these departments are fully worked when divided, is it reasonable to suppose the same amount

of work can be done when they are united by fewer persons? If not, the result of consolidation will simply be a change of name, and the consolidated departments will require as many officers as the three had before consolidation; the only gain will be the dispensing with the heads of bureaus and their attendant machinery. The fact that European armies are differently organized is sometimes quoted by the advocates of change, but we should be careful before drawing any conclusion to be satisfied that these European armies are more efficiently supplied than ours. So far as I have been able to learn, such is not the case. During the war I had at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac visits from numerous foreign officers, and I do not remember a single instance where fault was found with our system. Among these was a colonel of the French artillery, who was permitted to remain several months at my headquarters, and who very thoroughly studied our whole system of administration, and who considered our system of distribution of labor in our supply departments as greatly superior to the system in use in the French army, where all supplies are furnished by one department—that of the intendance. Again, in making comparison with foreign armies the totally different conditions of the problem should be considered; and to illustrate this, one has only to glance at the map of Prussia or France and then at the United States to see that a system working well in one case would not necessarily do so in the other.”

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; division, corps, and army commander; commanded Army of the Cumberland; received the thanks of Congress by name for defeating General Hood.

(Page 113.) “Q. State what your opinion is of the propriety and feasibility of uniting the Commissary and Quartermaster departments into one department of supplies, and the Pay Department also.—A. I do not think it would be advisable to unite them, either one with the other, or to unite the whole three together. Their duties are separate, and I think they are very wisely divided as they are. \* \* \* The duties of the quartermaster and commissary at the same post should be performed by the same officer. \* \* \* They ought to be divided as soon as the duties have to be performed by an officer in either capacity away from a post, except in time of war the regimental quartermaster should be the regimental commissary.”

(Page 114.) “Q. Please give the committee your judgment on the propriety of consolidating the ordnance corps with the artillery.—A. I should prefer it as it is, because the furnishing of ammunition, preparing of ammunition, and storing of ammunition are all special services; and it is not natural to suppose that an officer detailed temporarily to do such duty would take so much interest in it as one who had been appointed to the position on account of his scientific attainments. The latter would take special pains not only to keep himself up to the mark, but would endeavor as far as possible to improve. A person only engaged temporarily in a thing will not take so much interest in it as one who is engaged in it permanently. \* \* \*

“I know no reason whatever why the duties of the Coast Survey Department might not be done by the Engineer Department of the Army. They are both scientific, and similar in their nature. \* \* \* The only difficulty in the way (consolidating the Navy and Army Ordnance Department) seems to me to be the fixing of the responsibility of that Bureau, i. e., who should control it; whether it should be under the control of the Army or Navy, or whether it would be better to make it a separate bureau, being independent of both the Army and Navy, being under the President, as a matter of course.”

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; commanded Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, fifth military district, and military division of the Atlantic; received the thanks of Congress by name for Gettysburg.

(Page 89.) “It has frequently been suggested that it (Inspector-General’s Department) might be made a part of the Adjutant-General’s Department. \* \* \* I think that the Inspector’s Department should have a recognized separate head. \* \* \* I am not clear about it (concerning the propriety of consolidating the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments). \* \* \* If they were consolidated I think the result would be that, instead of three separate departments, with distinct heads, it would be necessary to have in the new department a bureau representing each of the existing departments. \* \* \* But it is a difficult question. I think the consolidation might be made, and especially of the Quartermaster’s and Commissary departments, but it would have to be made with great care, and I have not studied the subject enough to be able to say anything more about it than to simply express my belief that it might be accomplished. \* \* \* In the field with armies I think it much better to have officers pay the troops, who have no other duty. \* \* \* I believe that a wise combination might be made of the artillery officers and those necessary to select for ordnance duty. \* \* \* If the Ordnance Department were to cease the fabrication of arms it would remove one serious cause of hostility to the service, from sources outside of it. \* \* \*

“Q. Is the character of the Engineer Corps such as to make it feasible for them to perform the duties now performed by the Coast Survey?—A. I see no reason why they should not; indeed, it is legitimately a part of their business. \* \* \* Whether it would be wise to make the change is another matter. \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

General Hancock:

(Page 25.) “It would be *practicable* to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments into one corps, but the operation would be difficult and attended with no great advantage or economy. All or most of the persons who now constitute the separate corps would appear in the consolidated corps, and they certainly would not act any more efficiently or economically on account of the consolidation.

Maish report, 1878.

General Hancock:

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

(Page 8.) "To the men who make the arms, etc., is intrusted the solution of all questions in relation to them, the men who use them being excluded from these deliberations. The oft-repeated effort to consolidate the ordnance and artillery are attributable mainly to the practice just mentioned. The consolidation is not necessary, and probably if made would not remove the difficulty felt by the artillery. Under existing laws the Government can keep just as much artillery as it chooses in the constant practice of its profession. It could not do more after consolidation. Nor is it artillery experience alone which should be injected into the manufacture of arms. The cavalry and infantry should be brought to bear on the subject, not as an interference with the ordnance in the pursuit of its specialty, but to add to its stock of information. No consolidation is required to effect the object here suggested. It is only necessary that the isolation and independence of this department, in whose labors all of the Army is specially interested, shall cease, and that it be brought under the control of the general in chief."

\* \* \* \* \*

Burnside report, 1878.

General Hancock:

\* \* \* \* \*

"THE QUARTERMASTER'S, SUBSISTENCE, AND PAY DEPARTMENTS.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 431.) "It would be 'practicable' to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay Departments into one corps, but the operation would be difficult and attended with no great advantage or economy.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I adhere to that opinion. The subject is one that has been pretty fully discussed, through inquiries made of the most prominent officers of the Army by committees of Congress. In 1869, 4 officers or ex-officers expressed themselves in favor of it. In 1874, 15 were in favor of it and 34 against it. In 1876, 20 were in favor of it and 35 against it. (In all cases, as the matter was presented to me, but especially in the last case, the form of inquiry was as to the *practicability* rather than advisability of the consolidation.) Of the number mentioned as in favor, a part merely answered the question of *practicability*. Officers of rank, distinction, and acknowledged ability are found on both sides in the opinions given in the years above named. A careful examination of all the views expressed will not only show that the weight of evidence has been against consolidation of these corps, but that the opposition to it has decidedly increased, and that while some who at first favored it now either oppose or do not support it, there are no changes of opinion in the other direction.

"It is generally, if not universally, admitted that these corps with their present distinct organizations have worked well in both war and

peace. No great failure, perhaps no important shortcoming even, was charged to them during all the trials and difficulties of our last great war. A proposition to consolidate them must, therefore, appear in the light of an attempt to improve by legislation—which is not easily changed, even if it works badly—what is unquestionably good; rather a dangerous and unnecessary experiment. The consolidation would, it seems to me, be practically substituting a foreign *theory* for our own *experience*. When we observe how lamentably some of these foreign theories fail even in the nations to which they are supposed to be specially applicable, and how suddenly and totally they are discarded when they break down in practice, we should certainly esteem the more highly systems which are the growth of our own experience and necessities, which work admirably in time of peace, and which have stood the test of as hard actual service as we are likely to encounter. I understand that the supply branches of the British army have recently undergone consolidation of some kind, but the experiment has been but partially tested in peace, and has not yet been subjected to that trial in a great war which would enable us to judge of its success.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### “THE BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE CORPS OF JUDGE-ADVOCATES.

“\* \* \* In my judgment it would be better to have a single corps, termed ‘*Judge-Advocate’s Department*,’ as we have one called a Quartermaster’s Department, and another a Subsistence Department—the duties remaining as at present. I regard it as a grave defect in the present laws not to authorize in this corps the grades of colonel and lieutenant-colonel. As the matter now stands, promotion is ended forever with a major and judge-advocate. If anything can destroy the proper pride and ambition, the zeal, industry, and usefulness of an officer of the Army, it is to find all prospect of promotion *cut off by law* while he is yet laboring faithfully and honorably in the lower grades of the profession. \* \* \* The duties of judge-advocate are inseparable from the military system. They can only be fully and properly performed by men who make a specialty of them. If the regular corps be abolished or crippled, the duty must be indifferently done, wholly or partly, by officers taken for the time from their proper positions: \* \* \*

“\* \* \* Without going into the details of the various duties required of them, I will say that I consider them absolutely necessary. But the necessity for maintaining these officers does not rest alone on the importance of their current duties. A thorough knowledge of military law in its higher principles, as well as the intricacies of its details, is particularly necessary in new armies. Its prompt and correct application is one of the principal proceedings in the establishment of discipline and order in the armies which we rely upon creating in time of need. This can only be accomplished through a corps prepared beforehand. Ours is peculiarly a government of law, in the Army as well as out of it.

\* \* \* \* \*

“INSPECTOR-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT.

“This is one of the most important branches of the staff. Unlike most others, its officers can not simply make a specialty of some one subject, but they should be well acquainted with every arm and department of the service. They must examine and report whether proper and thorough instruction is given, whether discipline is maintained, whether administration is honestly and efficiently conducted, whether arms and equipment are suitable and sufficient, whether accounts are properly kept and rendered, whether punishments are conformable to law, and, in general, whether laws, regulations, and orders are impartially and rigidly enforced throughout the military service. To pass properly upon all these questions they must *understand* the subjects. This requires a high and peculiar order of ability, great industry, large experience, and matured judgment. I have adverted only to the *general* duties of this department. In addition to them, its officers have a variety of special duties of great significance which I need not mention in detail.

\* \* \* \* \*

“THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT.

“Our Regular Army is composed of three parts—the general officers, the general staff, and the line. As we use the term staff it comprises some thirteen distinct legal organizations, with specific duties allotted to each. Although we have found it best not to consolidate these organizations, yet by the nature of their duties some of them are naturally grouped together, and thus we have the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay Departments, constituting the supply staff; the Adjutant-General’s Department, the Inspector-General’s Department, aids-de-camp, etc., constituting the military staff; while others, such as the engineers, ordnance, etc., are special corps.

“Staff duties have their origin in the fact that it is beyond human capacity for a commander to attend in person to all of those details of service which are unavoidable in large military commands, and which have increased with the progress of military science. The staff officer—speaking in general terms—is one who aids the commander in the labors which belong directly to his office.

“In this view of the subject, the Adjutant-General’s Department is essentially *the* staff corps of the Army. Every other branch of the staff (except perhaps the Inspector-General’s Department) aids the commander, as a general thing, only in the direction of the specialty intrusted to it. But the duties of an adjutant-general—as essential on the battlefield as in the bureau—extend not only to all arms of the line, but to all branches of the staff. In addition to certain office duties which belong to him under the routine of his bureau, he is practically the *principal assistant* to the commander.

“He, of necessity, exercises vast power. Although he acts invariably in the name of the commander, and not as the Secretary of War does, in his own name, yet the relations between an adjutant-general and his commander are, *in principle*, the same as those between the Secretary of War and the President.

“It is always assumed, even when not stated, that the Secretary of War acts by order of the President, there being no other person by

whose authority he can act. But an adjutant-general may, under his assignment from time to time to the staff of different officers, act by the order of any one of them, and regulations and custom require that he shall state, in every instance, by whose order he acts. Upon a question which arose in 1827, as to the validity of a staff officer's action, the Duke of Wellington, while general-in-chief of the British army, said in a general order: 'Every staff officer must be considered as acting under the direct orders and superintendence of the superior officer for whose assistance he is employed, and he must be considered responsible for his acts. To consider the relative situation of general officer and staff in any other light would tend to alter the nature of the service, and, in fact, to give the command of the troops to the subaltern staff officer instead of to the general officer.'

•• Of daily importance to the peace establishment, there is no other corps or department in the military service on which the prompt and effective organization of a war establishment so largely depends as on the Adjutant-General's Department, which furnishes an additional and potent reason for preserving the strength and efficiency of the corps. It is charged with the preservation and care of records of great public and personal interest, but this is a minor duty of the corps which might be sufficiently well performed by faithful and intelligent clerks.

•• In fact this duty must, and ought to be, left mainly to that class of employees, in order that the officers of the corps may be able to concern themselves with the living, active affairs of the profession. It is a serious defect in our system that the officers of the corps, by their limited numbers, and the constant and pressing routine duties of their offices, are prevented from acquainting themselves as thoroughly as they otherwise might with the details of the various arms of our own service, as well as with those of foreign services. It has even been suggested that this defect is so grave that the corps should be abolished, and its duties performed by officers detailed at will from the line of the Army. The officer detailed would, however, rarely be as well qualified in all respects *for staff duty* as the Adjutant-General, supposed to have been selected originally for aptitude in that branch, and who had received the benefit of long study and practice in it; and the detailed officer being taken from either the artillery, cavalry, or infantry, would, from his training and interest in a particular arm, probably be more of a specialist than an adjutant-general is now. The wiser course, it seems to me, is to enable this valuable corps to acquire the additional information and experience which it may be thought to need. The officers of this department are ex-officio inspectors-general, and from time to time, for short periods, should be placed on duty as inspectors-general, to enable them to become acquainted with the localities at which the troops are stationed throughout the country, or throughout the geographical command to which they are assigned; to learn the routes for transportation of supplies; to become acquainted with the personnel of the officers of the Army, and to observe the discipline of the service. With the information thus obtained, they would necessarily be able more intelligently to perform their duties as adjutants-general. At present, owing to the small numbers of the Adjutant-General's Department, all its officers are confined to their offices, and rarely leave them for the purposes of instruction referred to.

•• I learn that the Prussian staff, which we hear so highly com-

mended in late years, is, like our Adjutant-General's Department, a permanent corps, with regular promotions; but special and prolonged study and preparation, involving actual service with the different arms, is necessary for *admission* to it. There are no *transfers* between officers of the line and officers fully admitted to the Prussian staff, but as a necessary part of the continued education of the officers in the latter, they are, until they reach the grade of colonel, detailed according to their rank for short periods of duty as line officers.

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### Garfield report, 1869.

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, United States Army, Secretary of War; major-general of volunteers; commanded Army of the Ohio and Twenty-third Army Corps; Commanding General of the Army from August 14, 1888. to September 29, 1895; afterwards Lieutenant-General, United States Army.

(Page 123). "I have no doubt of the practicability of consolidating these three departments (Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay), and I think it would promote efficiency of administration. How much it would conduce to economy is a matter which could hardly be decided except by actual experiment. \* \* \* The consolidation of the two departments would not necessarily result in a very great diminution of the officers employed. If the officers now employed in the Quartermaster's Department and Commissary Department have all the business that they can attend to, so far as the personnel is concerned, the same number of officers will be retained. \* \* \*

"My theory of administration is much more expanded. \* \* \* For the purpose of illustration, more than anything else, I would say that I would consolidate the War and Navy departments. I think there is nothing that could be proposed that would more promote the efficiency of the service than such a consolidation. The one holding the position of Secretary would have charge of the administrative part of the duties, leaving the general in command of the Army and the admiral in command of the Navy. \* \* \*

"Q. Do you know of any reason why officers appointed as disbursing officers can not pay the Army as well as paymasters?—A. I do not; coupled, however, I would suggest, with the same plan I have mentioned in relation to the Quartermasters' and Commissaries' department—that is, to detail minor officers of the Army and make them bonded officers. \* \* \*

"Q. What would you say as to the safety of disbursing money in that way?—A. It would not be as safe as it is now. \* \* \*

"Q. If they were all bonded officers would there still be danger?—A. Yes, probably; I do not think bonds are always a safeguard. I think the advantage of bonds is rather in their moral effect than otherwise.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Q. State your opinion as to the propriety of consolidating the Inspector's and Adjutant-General's Department.—A. I do not think there are very strong reasons for or against it. The duties of the two departments are quite separate and distinct. No officer could at the same time perform both. \* \* \*

“As an original proposition in the organization of the Army, I would not hesitate to say that the ordnance and artillery should be one corps, because their duties are so intimately connected. \* \* \*

“Q. Would there be any expense saved to the Government by such consolidation?—A. I should think not—very little at all events. Something might be gained in the way of efficiency, but not to a very great extent.

#### Banning report, 1876.

General Schofield:

(Page 28). “As an original proposition, it is my opinion that the duties now performed by our Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Pay departments could be better and more economically performed under one organization. But the remodeling of an old system is by no means the same thing as the organization of a new one. The immediate effect of such reorganization and consolidation of the three departments named would be considerable confusion and disorder without corresponding economical or other benefit. The ultimate result, after some years of experience, would, in my opinion, be increased efficiency, and some, though not great, economy.

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; commanded Army of the Potomac and Army of the Rappahannock—division, corps, and department commander.

(Page 100.) “I am of the opinion that the Quartermaster’s and Subsistence departments should not be distinct, but that they should be merged into a single department. \* \* \* I am not so entirely clear upon the question of amalgamating the Pay Department with the two supply departments. \* \* \* I do not think that the Quartermaster’s Department would be the right department to supply these articles (medical stores). \* \* \* I think the Inspector-General’s Department and the Adjutant-General’s Department in our service should be merged into one. \* \* \* I believe good would come by having a general officer assigned from time to time to act as Adjutant-General. \* \* \* I am in favor of consolidating the Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments, and have two officers on the staff—one to communicate orders and the other to see that they are obeyed—the officers to alternate in the discharge of these duties.

\* \* \* The artillery men mostly desire it, but the ordnance corps oppose the consolidation. If you had asked the question as to whether the corps could not have been constituted that would do these two services better than the present two organizations, I should say yes. You get considerable advantage in keeping a man on some special subject. But as the *making of ordnance* is not the end, but the means, and as the *effective use* of what is prepared requires now, more than ever, as much ability as the preparation, I think the artillery should be raised to as high a degree of excellence as the ordnance. \* \* \* I have no doubt that it would be advantageous to consolidate the Engineer Department and the Coast Survey.”

**Banning report, 1876.**

General McDowell:

(Page 32.) "This subject (consolidation of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments) was taken up by the Military Committee in January, 1869, and on the 27th and 28th of that month I was fully examined by it, and beg to refer the present committee to the record for the statements I then made, which are too extended to be conveniently reproduced in this letter. The subject since that time has been a good deal discussed, and much opposed by many of our best officers, and, in fact, I know of but few who are favorably impressed with the idea of a single department of supply. But I still adhere to the views given to the Military Committee in 1869, and I do so not from anything drawn from other services, as much as from the experience of many years in our own."

**Burnside report, 1878.**

General McDowell:

(Page 256.) "I have proposed to consolidate the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments, and have provided a sufficient number of officers for the consolidated department for the duty at the War Department, the headquarters of the Army, and two to each division and department. This is in pursuance of a plan once adopted in the service. The advantages claimed are that officers will not, as now, either be chained to their desks as assistant adjutant-generals, or, like the inspectors, be always on the move; but that the officer who issues the orders of his commander may have the advantage of going periodically to all parts of the command, and thus come to know in person the service and troops concerning which he is called on to act. I have, as an assistant adjutant-general, had to do the two duties, and act from my own experience in suggesting the consolidation."

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**Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. A., Major-General of Volunteers; commanded Eleventh Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, and Fourth Corps, Army of the Cumberland; the Army of the Tennessee; received the thanks of Congress by name for services at Gettysburg; afterwards major-general, U. S. A.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 148.) "I was at first inclined to believe that such consolidation would tend to economy, but after mature deliberation I can see that the actual reduction of employees would be very small, and that the gain by this reduction in the point of economy would be more than counterbalanced by loss in efficiency. It might seem to a mind trained to business that in time of peace a single system of supply under the control of a single mind might serve to cover all the wants of the Army, and that the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay departments could therefore be consolidated into one. But careful inquiry will, I am confident, discover grave difficulties in the way of such consolidation. \* \* \* No one officer at the head of such a triform department could keep up an efficiency equal to that with which the three departments are now worked. Again, an entire army would require

to be educated to a new system and the process would show that either of the foreign methods of supply to which reference is made has incident to it all the ordinary mistakes and difficulties; and I believe that experience would soon turn us back to the old methods which have come to us as an outgrowth of actual service. \* \* \*

“The duties required by the ordnance and artillery would, of course, be unchanged. I see no economy possible in the consolidation; for if the artillery should absorb the duties of the ordnance corps it would require to be enlarged by at least all the skilled labor and clerical force that are now needed at the different armories and arsenals. The ordnance officers might gain efficiency in artillery service and the artillery officers in ordnance service by the union of the two branches. But the efficiency of the general service will be increased in case of war by having the ordnance attend to its present specialty of supply; and I judge the artillery officers have at present all they can do to render the artillery what it ought to be and employ it effectively. Thus the general service would lose rather than gain in point of efficiency by the union of these two departments.”

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#### Banning report, 1876.

General Howard:

(Page 39.) “I think the Subsistence and Pay and Quartermaster’s departments could be combined if great care were exercised in the work of organization, and I say this not to reflect in any way upon the great diligence and efficiency of the quartermaster, commissary, and pay officers on duty here.”

#### Maish report, 1878.

General Howard:

(Page 36.) “I hesitate to recommend the breaking down of a good system, which has grown up by practice and the requirements of necessity, and therefore will only suggest as a substitute for the present independent staff departments—

“That the Pay, Quartermaster, and Commissary Departments *might* be consolidated under one chief with three assistants, one at the head of each department; the other places to be filled by details from the line, made in rotation and for a fixed period.

“The business to be transacted as much as possible by mercantile channels—moneys forwarded and received by checks; drafts and cash, by express.

“The Judge-Advocate’s department might be merged in that of the Adjutant-General, with a claim on the Attorney-General for advisory assistance.

“The ordnance and artillery *might*, of course, be consolidated, and the whole made a scientific and practical corps.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, division and corps commander. Received the thanks of Congress by name for capture of Fort Fisher; afterwards major-general, U. S. A.:

(Page 37.) “I think that to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments into one corps would be to disregard a

principle which underlies all modern progress, the principle that the best results are obtained by the division of labor; that the best work is done by specialists—a principle that is of quite as much importance in military organization as in civil life. The Quartermaster's Department is already loaded down by the multiplicity of subjects over which it has control; to add to its duties would, I think, impair its efficiency. I think that the change suggested would be merely nominal; that it would lead to no economy."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Brig. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers. Served in the Florida war, Mexican war, and the war of the rebellion; division, corps, and department commander; afterwards major-general, United States Army:

\* . \* \* \* \*

(Page 71.) "The staff corps and officers administering the principal duties pertaining thereto are called on and do pass upon the accounts and manner of expending funds and property of general officers commanding departments; the pay of the last-named officers is frequently stopped at the suggestion of quartermaster, commissary, and other staff officers on duty at Washington, perhaps with reason, yet the different sorts of duty performed by the officer of the bureau and the officer in the field, the fact that the former is called on to hold back funds, supplies, or material which the latter may think indispensable, or to recommend stoppages of his pay, is likely to beget rather a want of good will than an affection between them; and, under the circumstances, I am not quite sure that an opinion of mine upon the subject of consolidation of the several staff corps into one or more would be free from prejudice; and, if it is not deemed imperative, I would prefer to remain silent upon that subject.

\* \* \* \* \*

"In answer to the question as to the benefit that would accrue from a union of artillery and ordnance, I think it is doubtful if there would be any. We would have more officers in the consolidated corps to compete for assignment to duty at comfortable arsenals in the East, but the artillery, which should take its share of service on the plains, gives the young officers a chance to command men in action, and learn their wants and habits in camp and on the march. And this I regard as of as much importance as learning to pack or test ammunition and arms."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

General Ord:

(Page 46.) "It would be practicable (to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments). In time of peace we might get along, for the same officer frequently does quartermaster and commissary duties now, but if we keep the Army on a basis ready for war, and the staff on the basis to serve for the purpose for a large army of from one to two hundred thousand troops, I think the present system is as good a one as we can have. I know no better. It has stood the test of experience very well."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Augur, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; commanded a division in the Fifth Army Corps, the Department of Washington, and Twenty-second Army Corps:

(Page 131.) "State whether, in your opinion, any departments of the staff of the Army can, advantageously to the service and the country, be consolidated; if so, what departments, and for what reasons.

"3. Would it be better to have a single department of supply, whose duty it should be to discharge the functions of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay Departments? If so, give your reasons.

"4. Would such a consolidation reduce the number of officers engaged in these duties? If so, in what proportion?

"I answer, in my opinion, no."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Augur:

(Page 48.) "Practicable, undoubtedly (to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay Departments), but, in my opinion, not advisable. Experience has shown that our staff organization is efficient for field service on the largest scale. It should be preserved, but reduced or extended to meet the requirements of the service."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. George Crook, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, division commander; in command of cavalry, Army of the Potomac; afterwards major-general, U. S. A.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 151.) "I think the Pay Department could be advantageously consolidated with the Quartermaster's Department. Our present pay system is expensive, unwieldy, and unsatisfactory. \* \* \*

"With the exception of the Quartermaster's Department having too many officers of high, and not enough of the lower, grades in it, I think our present system for the Subsistence and Quartermaster's Departments is good."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Crook:

(Page 49.) "I think it would be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay Departments."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of volunteers. Served in the Florida war, Mexican war, and war of the rebellion; commanded Third and Fourth Corps, Army of the Potomac."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 70.) “Whether the ordnance and artillery corps can be advantageously consolidated, I am not sufficiently familiar with the details to express an opinion, but I have no doubt it would be advantageous to make details for the lowest grades, and then, from those who show most aptness, industry, and ability, fill the higher grades.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The duties of the Inspector-General are of so confidential and delicate a nature that the corps should be a permanent one, and I do not believe it advisable to consolidate it with any other corps.”

\* \* \* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of volunteers, division and corps commander. Commanded Army of the Potomac and Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, Army of the Cumberland. Received the thanks of Congress by name for protecting Washington and Baltimore from General Lee:

(Page 98.) “I much prefer a supply department to the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay Departments, for the reason it reduces the staff numerically, and the duties would not be burdensome, as all our commands in time of peace are small.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I would have in the ordnance corps officers enough to take care of the armories and arsenals, and all other officers on ordnance duty to be detailed from the artillery, and the details be changed every two years. This will diffuse information throughout the artillery corps, and in my judgment the corps will become much more efficient in consequence.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 99.) “The Adjutant and Inspector-General’s Departments can be consolidated advantageously. The former, in my judgment, should only consist of the number necessary to discharge the duties at the headquarters of the Army. Division and department commanders should have authority to appoint their own staff officers.”

\* \* \* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. V., colonel and assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A. Served in the Florida war and Mexican war. During the civil war commanded Department and Army of the Ohio.

(Page 58.) “A general outline for staff organization:

“First. General officers to command.

“Second. An adjutant-general’s department as a medium of command. In it may be included the duties of recruitment.

“Third. Judge-Advocate’s Department.

“Fourth. A corps for engineering and ordnance.

“Fifth. Medical and veterinary departments.

“Sixth. A department of supply, or corps of intendants for the performance of those administrative duties which in our service are distributed among the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, Pay, and Ordnance Departments.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Reasons: General similarity of duties, unity of action, some reduction in the aggregate number of officers, more uniform promotion, greater room for economy in the distribution of officers to particular bureaus or branches of duty according to their fitness, and a larger field from which to select officers for important administrative positions in times of emergency. \* \* \* I do not think that a consolidation of the Ordnance Department and artillery is desirable, though such a system prevails to a considerable extent in foreign countries. It would be no more efficient in any sense than the present arrangement. It will be less so if the assignments to ordnance duty are temporary, because it will lose the advantage to be derived from long and uninterrupted habits of study and experiment.”

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. V., colonel, Twelfth Infantry. Served in the Mexican war and civil war; brigade, division, and corps commander. Commanded Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac. Resigned from the Army March, 1866.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 76.) “It is not my opinion that any departments of the staff of the Army can, advantageously to the service and the country, be consolidated.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Such a consolidation ought not, in my opinion, to materially reduce the number of officers engaged in those duties.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I believe that the effect of adopting a system whereby company and detachment commanders should pay their own commands, would, with the Army at its actual size, and in time of peace, be economical, but not so much so as at first sight appears. There is no doubt that company officers could soon make themselves well enough acquainted with the laws governing the pay of the Army to make the ordinary muster payments once in two months. But with the Army at its present size 6,000 men are discharged every year. Every man of these 6,000 must have his final papers made out, the distance from his place of discharge to his place of enlistment must be accurately determined, and if his captain is to pay him he must either receive the money from him or be paid by check. In the first case the man would probably either lose his money or be robbed before he reached his home, and in the second case hundreds of new accounts would have to be opened with the Treasury, for each captain would have to keep money in a depository to meet such payments. It does not follow either that a man may not be a very good company officer, and yet a poor disbursing officer. Every captain, however, would under this system necessarily become a disbursing officer, and upon many officers the feeling of moneyed responsibility would weigh more heavily than all of their military duties, taking off their time and attention from the duties that now legally belong to them.

\* \* \* \* \*

“In time of war the result of the change would be that large amounts of money would have to be carried with the armies, or the men could

not be paid until after the completion of a campaign, an arrangement which would entail great hardship upon the troops. During a campaign, too, a company officer who does his duty has as much as he can do in attending to it as it is now defined by law and regulation.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I know no reason why the ordnance and artillery corps should be consolidated, unless it is that as the artillery regiments are very heavily officered, and are in times of peace stationed where they generally have merely garrison duty to perform, some of these officers could be detailed to do ordnance duty, and thus the ordnance corps might be abolished. But I believe that it would be more economical and for the good of the service to discharge the supernumerary lieutenants than to abolish the ordnance corps. The duties of that corps are more special and technical than are those of any other corps. A long time is required to learn them. The officers of ordnance must be familiar with the manufacture and care not only of cannon and ammunition for the artillery, but of small arms, cartridges, sabers, and horse equipments, for the other arms of service. Artillery officers are not likely to learn these duties more easily than are officers of other corps. It would only be good policy in the War Department to keep an officer who is detailed for such service, and who has been found efficient, constantly in it, and there would therefore grow up a body of detailed officers, who would only differ from the ordnance corps in not being secure in their positions, and therefore not as interested in learning their duties. Neither would they have the esprit de corps which experience has shown to be valuable in a corps organization. Another objection is, that as the ordnance officers necessarily have pleasant and quiet posts in time of peace, political influence would soon be felt in the details, which would be made without reference to the fitness of the officer for the duty.

\* \* \* \* \*

“There is, in my opinion, nothing objectionable to the consolidation of the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments, provided the inspections are rigidly kept up. The danger is that the whole corps would, in case of consolidation, become an adjutant-general's corps instead of the combined corps, because the duties of an inspector-general are much more disagreeable than those of an adjutant-general. Nothing is more conducive to the discipline of the Army than a system of inspection which shall be frequent and searching and rigid. An inspector should belong to each department staff, and make his reports not only to the department commander, but to the chief of his corps in Washington, and he should be obliged to make his tours a specified number of times each year. Inspectors should also be sent on tours from Washington (unaccompanied by their commanding officers), under direct orders from the Secretary of War or the General of the Army, and should inspect everything from department headquarters down.”

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gen. James B. Ricketts, U. S. A. (retired), brigadier-general of volunteers. Served in the Mexican war and war of the rebellion; division and corps commander, Army of the Potomac.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 160.) “The staff departments of the Army, as now organized, are the result of long experience, and the recent severe test of their usefulness is convincing that no change of organization can be advantageously made.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 161.) “What would be the effect of adopting a system whereby company and detachment commanders should pay their commands?

“It would involve the duty of procuring, guarding, and disbursing, and might diffuse through the Army the temptation to speculate, or the improper use of public money. It is also objectionable by additional accounts at the Treasury, thereby enlarging the Auditor's department.”

\* \* \* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, U. S. A. (retired), major-general of volunteers. Served in the Mexican war and war of the rebellion; division and corps commander, Army of the Ohio and Army of the Cumberland.

(Page 8.) “I am of the opinion that it would be better to have but a single department of supply to perform all the duties now performed by the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay Departments. \* \* \* The nature of the duties now performed by these separate departments is not so separate and distinct that all of them could not be readily merged in one department. \* \* \* Consolidation would simplify organization, as well as make responsibility more direct; \* \* \* would considerably reduce the number of officers; \* \* \* would be most beneficial (to authorize company and detachment commanders to pay their commands). \* \* \*

“The proposition to consolidate the ordnance and artillery corps is not a new one. It underwent a very thorough discussion in the decade between 1850 and 1860, the officers of the artillery urging the consolidation, and the ordnance officers opposing it. I was satisfied the ordnance officers had much the best of the discussion. The ordnance service is of such peculiar nature as to require a trained body of experts. Every argument for the consolidation of the artillery arm and ordnance corps applies with reduplicated force to a proposition to consolidate the ordnance corps with the infantry or cavalry. \* \* \* The true solution is to have a separate ordnance corps to supply the arms and ammunition.

“The Adjutant and Inspector-General's Departments could be advantageously consolidated. Their duties are cognate; \* \* \* would do away with circumlocution; give more directness in making reports, and lessen number of officers, especially those of high rank.”

### Coburn report, 1873.

Gen. James Longstreet, surveyor of customs at New Orleans; lieutenant-general in the Confederate service; served in the infantry in the Mexican war:

(Page 34.) “Do not think that the interests of the military will be advanced by consolidating the departments of supply and pay. The departments as organized at present have been efficient and economical,

and can always be kept well in hand by efficient chiefs. Under the present organization an inefficient chief would only impair the efficiency of one department. Consolidated, the evil attending such consequence would extend throughout the departments, and the probability of such contingency is just as great under consolidation as in any one of the departments. The pay and quartermaster's duties were united in the same department in the Confederate service. It was not a success.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The duties and disbursements of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, Pay, and Medical Departments are sufficiently burdensome and complicated when kept as separate departments. Consolidated, an officer of higher grade would be the chief, while the organizations would virtually remain as before. The only good reason that I can find in favor of consolidation is that a place may be made for some distinguished and meritorious officer.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Consolidation does not necessarily reduce the number of officers, for the same amount of duty and service will be needed, and experience the world over teaches us that more can be accomplished by a proper subdivision of and organization of labor than where one machine is required to manufacture everything. Consolidation, to be as efficient as the service now is, should require an additional officer as its chief.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Commanders of troops should not be their paymasters or their medical advisers.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The ordnance and artillery are most excellent corps as they are organized at present, and may be improved under the present system. The officers of all corps should be of the highest order of intellect, application, and energy. But the officer who attempts to handle chemicals and machinery one year and men the next is not likely to excel at either. The one may require the same intellectual characteristics as the other, but to handle men upon the field successfully one should have good judgment of men, great resolution, nerve, moral and physical courage, combativeness; and he should be somewhat aggressive. The ordnance officer may understand the philosophy of forces and apply it with great skill and success in his machinery and chemicals without possessing some of the most essential characteristics for a field-marshal, and if placed suddenly in the field, in high position, he might be as much out of place as Bonaparte would have been in the laboratory. Either branch of the service for successful practice requires the useful application of all the strong qualities with which men are endowed; to attempt to force them into one brain would be likely to impair the efficiency of both branches."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Brig. Gen. Edward D. Townsend, Adjutant-General U. S. A., brevet major-general. Prior to appointment in Adjutant-General's Department, served in the artillery in the Florida war and in the Cherokee Nation.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 94.) "To consolidate the three departments—Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Pay—in one supply department would practically

work as follows: The head of the supply department could not possibly attend personally to the entire business. He would, therefore, assign a junior to the charge of each of the three branches in his own office, and would become acquainted with operations of his entire department through the medium of the head of each branch. While, therefore, the present system would actually not be changed, there would be a loss of responsibility. \* \* \*

“Such consolidation would not reduce the number of officers engaged in those duties.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 95.) “The only argument, to my knowledge, yet advanced in favor of consolidating the ordnance and artillery is that men who use the arms and ammunition should have something to do with their selection and manufacture. This certainly applies equally to the cavalry and infantry. Why not, then, include them in the consolidation? Prior to the organization of the Ordnance Department officers of artillery were detailed on ordnance duties for two years and then relieved by others. Those were the days of flintlocks and smoothbores. To pursue that plan now would result in one of two things—either there would be an utter loss of progressive knowledge and discovery in the science of arms and projectiles, because the officers charged with their preparation, etc., would be changed so often that no one would have time or feel interest enough to make that science a special duty, or else the officers most adapted to that service would be constantly kept upon it. \* \* \*

“The duties of officers of the Adjutant-General’s Department and of inspectors-general are entirely different, and nothing could be gained by consolidating them. There is no need whatever of a head to the Inspector’s Department. The proper theory of inspections is this: A division or department commander should have inspections made within his command to inform him of matters needing correction. Reports of such inspections should not go beyond the commander for whom they are made, for he does not wish unnecessarily to expose to higher authority defects in his own jurisdiction which he can remedy. The ranking inspectors should be sent by the President, Secretary of War, or Commanding General of the Army to make confidential inspections of staff or other operations, quite independent of the division or department commanders who may be affected by such inspection. \* \* \* Both duties can not be done at one time by the same officer, because inspecting involves traveling away from the headquarters, where adjutant-general’s duties must be done. \* \* \*

### Banning report, 1876.

General Townsend:

(Page 125.) “I decidedly think it would be impracticable to consolidate any of the staff departments.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 129.) “In 1837–38 the present staff system was established, and, in two great wars which have occurred since, the manner in which our armies have been clothed, transported, and fed, paid, and provided with medical attendance has attracted the admiration of the military world.”

**Maish report, 1878.**

General Townsend:

(Page 37.) "The staff organization has practically demonstrated its efficiency in war and peace. I have had the opportunity of seeing the working of the military establishment with and without it."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 39.) "I beg leave to add one remark upon the plan of consolidating any of the supply departments under one head. Each head of a staff bureau has now as much as he can well attend to. Should two or more departments be consolidated under one head, the result must be that he would be forced to place an officer over each branch under him to manage the separate business of the separate branches. The responsibility, then, instead of resting upon the one head, as now, must be divided between him and his next subordinate, at the same time that, practically, the business of each branch will be performed as now by the officer at the head of that branch."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A. Served in the artillery before appointment in Adjutant-General's Department in 1861. Served in the Mexican war; in the civil war was chief of staff to Generals McDowell and Buell; and provost-marshal-general with rank of brigadier-general; afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 162.) "In my opinion there are no staff departments in the Army the consolidation of which would result advantageously to the service and country. To 'consolidate' would be to take a step backward, only sooner or later to retrace it. The division of labor and pursuit of specialties are in conformity with a natural law, the growing operation of which marks this as an age of improvement. Proof of the force of this law is to be found in the history of the progress made of late years in every branch of science and business, and in every profession and trade. The present staff organization of the Army is the result of the operation of this law in our military system."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Lieut. Col. John C. Kelton, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., colonel Ninth Missouri Volunteers, brevet brigadier-general. Served in infantry before the civil war; during the war was assistant adjutant-general on the staff of General Halleck; afterwards Adjutant-General with the rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 131.) "The advantages from the union of the corps (Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay) will be found in undivided responsibility at the great centers of supply and distribution; in diminishing the number of officers required there; by having one less accounting bureau in Washington; by diminishing the number of and simplifying accounts and returns, and thereby diminishing stationery and postage

accounts very considerably in the aggregate. There are but seven purchasing commissaries. It surely can not be contended that these officers can not perform this duty as well after consolidation as now. All other officers of the department are in charge of stores and supervising their general distribution at department and division headquarters and at important military posts."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. William D. Whipple, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers. Served in the infantry before appointment in the Adjutant-General's Department in 1861; was chief of staff to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas; afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A.

(Page 28.) "I do not think that any of the staff departments can be consolidated, for the reason that, as at present organized, the duties devolving upon them are widely different, and, if properly attended to, require the whole time of the officers assigned to them. \* \* \*

"If the artillery school at Fortress Monroe is necessary to the instruction of artillery officers in the use of ordnance after it is fabricated, what additional amount of study would not be necessary to acquire a thorough knowledge of its fabrication?"

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Thomas M. Vincent, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general. Served in the artillery before appointment in the Adjutant-General's Department in 1861. Served in Florida hostilities and in the field during the civil war until August, 1861, then in charge of organization and muster out of volunteer armies; afterwards colonel and assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 180.) "In my opinion, no department of the staff can, advantageously to the service and the country, be consolidated.

\* \* \* \* \*

"At times, from 1775 to 1821, the offices of Adjutant-General and Inspector-General were consolidated, and in 1821 the ordnance, previously a distinct department, was merged into the artillery. But war and peace experience developed the defects of consolidation, and pointed clearly to the necessity of *division*, based upon the theory that our staff ought not to be considered merely the staff of the Regular Army, but as the *national military staff*, applicable alike to the regular, volunteer, and militia forces, when called into the service of the United States."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 182.) "A system whereby company and detachment commanders would have to pay their commands could not be applied, practically, in our service without confusion or loss, not to mention the injury resulting to the service from the time of the commanders being taxed with duties not appropriate to their important positions.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The ordnance and artillery can not be advantageously consolidated.

“‘The Ordnance Department should be so organized as to require no augmentation in war; *its most important labors are performed in peace.* It is then that arms must be fabricated and every munition prepared, and that depots should be established on all the great avenues leading to the frontiers. The operations of this department were paralyzed by the act of 1821, which merged the corps in the artillery.’”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 203.) “We could do without any staff at all and without any army at all in time of peace; but a wise government is supposed in time of peace to make some preparations for the contingency of war. We expend freely millions for fortifications, for the construction of arms, accouterments, ordnance stores, etc., and shall we grudge the expense of maintaining a corps which is indispensably necessary to give these preparations proper effect?

\* \* \* \* \*

“Shall we not repent that forgetfulness, and, adding its sad experience to that of the great rebellion, be taught by the lesson and the fact that, had we in 1861 possessed a proper staff organization and an expansive system for our Army, such as would have carried (*without the addition of a single commissioned officer*) its strength to 80,000, the war would not have attained magnitude; the billions of debt now causing the country to groan would have been saved, and lives, numbering hundreds of thousands, would have been spared the ‘*bivouac of the dead*’ ‘*on fame’s eternal camping ground.*’”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

General Vincent:

(Page 136.) “It would not be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments into one corps. \* \* \*

(Page 137.) “*Consolidation* marked the *embryo* of our *supply* system. But war and peace experience developed the defects of consolidation, and pointed clearly to the necessity of *division*.

#### Banning report, 1876.

Maj. Samuel Breck, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A.; brevet brigadier-general; served in artillery before the war, in the field during the war until July, 1862; afterwards adjutant-general with rank of brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 140.) “The consolidation of the three departments, Pay, Subsistence, and Quartermaster’s, is not believed to be wise practically, whatever may be the theoretical grounds in its favor. \* \* \* The present organization certainly produced wonderful results during the war, and it is hard to conceive a more severe test of its merits.”

#### Banning report, 1876.

Maj. Louis H. Pelouze, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A.; brevet brigadier-general; served in artillery and infantry before appointment in Adjutant-General’s Department; in the field during the civil war until August, 1863.

(Page 142.) "It would be an experiment (to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments), in my opinion, not worth the trial. It seems to me that the present division of duties would have to be kept up, and the present chiefs of these departments have now as much as they can attend to. To consolidate these departments an officer would have to supervise the duties now required of the three departments, and the result would be to remove these departments one step farther from access to the Secretary of War."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Randolph B. Marey, inspector-general, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; chief of staff to Major-General McClellan in the Army of West Virginia and in the Army of the Potomac; afterwards inspector-general, U. S. A., with the rank of brigadier-general.

(Page 23.) "No departments of the staff can with advantage to the service and to the country be consolidated.

"The officers of the Quartermaster's Department have all they can possibly attend to in performing the multifarious and responsible duties already required of them.

"The Subsistence Department, as all must admit, is well organized at present, and has never failed to supply the Army bountifully whenever it was possible to do so.

"The Pay Department as now organized has worked well for many years and its operations have been conducted much more economically and honestly than under the previous system of regimental and battalion paymasters. \* \* \* It would be difficult to find men anywhere who would disburse as large amounts of money as those involved in the payments of the Army during the past fifty years with as little loss to the Government as has resulted under the present system. The following facts, obtained from the records of the War Department, fully attest this: From 1808 to 1811, under the old system of regimental and battalion paymasters, and which was somewhat analogous to that proposed by the advocates of consolidation, the average annual loss by defalcation amounted to 1.58 per cent on the amount disbursed, and the annual average expenses of paying the Army for that period was 3.10 per cent. During the war of 1812-1815, under the same system, these averages were: Defalcations 2.98 per cent and the expenses 4.36. From the reorganization of the Pay Department in 1821 upon the existing basis to 1839 there was not one dollar lost to the Government on account of defalcations, and the total average of expenses from 1825 to 1839 was reduced to only  $1\frac{1}{3}$  per cent upon disbursements. During the Mexican war \$24,000,000 were disbursed by the Pay Department, mostly in an enemy's country, in small amounts, and not one dollar was lost by defalcations. Finally, during the entire period of the rebellion the reports of the Paymaster-General show that of the immense disbursements of this Department the total losses and expenses of every kind, including captures, accidents, the salaries and expenses of paymasters and their clerks, fell short of three-fourths of 1 per cent on the amount disbursed. \* \* \* Economy, integrity, and accountability are under the present system as well secured as they can be by any other; and it seems to me hazardous to attempt by experiments of doubtful expediency to improve upon organizations which exhibit results of such satisfactory character. \* \* \* The

consolidation indicated would not, therefore, reduce the number of officers, but would add to the present organization another officer of high rank and pay, while it would weaken and impair the responsibility and efficiency of the organization. \* \* \* I do not think the ordnance and artillery corps could be advantageously consolidated. \* \* \*

“The duties of the adjutants-general and the inspectors-general are so entirely different and disconnected I am unable to perceive that anything would be gained by consolidating the two.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

General Marcy:

(Page 144.) “For the reason that each of the departments named (Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay) has all the work it can efficiently perform now, and as the chiefs of these departments have abundant occupation in properly administering the affairs of their separate departments, I think the consolidation indicated would diminish their efficiency and add to the expense the pay and allowances of another officer of high rank, who could know but little about the numerous details of every department.”

#### **Garfield report, 1869.**

Col. Edmund Schriver, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brevet major-general; colonel and acting aid-de-camp in the volunteer service; served in the artillery, the infantry, and the Adjutant-General’s Department before appointment as Inspector-General; served in the Florida war; in the civil war was chief of staff, First and Second Army corps, and inspector-general, Army of the Potomac.

(Page 74.) “In general terms, very great objections (to merging the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Paymaster departments, two or all of them, into one corps). No one man is capable of supervising and administering satisfactorily a department to the extent which would be produced by merging these three branches of the service, all different in their nature. \* \* \* I have no hesitation in saying that that system is the best which provides for a subdivision of the various branches of the service to an extent which will enable one officer to superintend personally and well the particular branch intrusted to himself. Even if the merging proposed were practicable in time of peace, it would be utterly impossible for one officer to properly administer more than one of the existing bureaus in time of war, and the organization of a military establishment in this respect should always be with a view to the latter condition of affairs. \* \* \* If more duty, especially of a diversified character, be imposed upon a man than he can perform, he will either do it imperfectly or depute another to do it, and the moment the latter is done you practically divide the two branches.”

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

General Schriver:

(Page 82.) “I think that none of the existing staff departments of the Army can advantageously to the service be consolidated. On the

contrary, there are grave objections to the merging system urged or favored by some, for no one man is capable of supervising and administering satisfactorily an extensive department the several branches of which are different in their nature. There should be distinct bureaus of a number sufficient to enable the head of each to keep himself personally well acquainted with all the workings and details thereof. This would be physically impossible were two or three branches different in character merged in one department. The officer in charge of this monster organization finding himself overwhelmed and overburdened with work would seek relief by subdividing duties and deputing their performance to others, and thus what is proposed to effect by consolidation would not practically be realized. As officers in charge of these subdivisions and all the usual business appliances would have to be maintained, it is doubtful whether an economy at all commensurate with the disadvantages certain to attend the merging project would be effected. The same remarks apply in a greater or less degree to the functions of the inferior officers.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The same shortsightedness which urges consolidation of staff departments would, if consistent, recommend the abolition of field officers and regimental organization in time of peace, on the theory that the same were unnecessary and unsuitable for our widely scattered military stations, garrisoned on the basis of company unit, a theory which all must acknowledge to be an entire fallacy.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 84.) “The duties being decidedly distinct, I can see no advantage in merging them. Before the organization of the Ordnance Department in 1832, and when details for ordnance duty were made from the artillery, the want of a permanent personnel by which officers could be constantly engaged in their specialty was sorely felt, and I can imagine that no greater evil could befall this branch of the military service than by having its important duties performed by officers occasionally detailed or selected, even if regard were always had to special fitness, which every experienced officer knows has not and will not be done. Personal preferences and political partiality would prevent this. Witness the way appointments have been made and brevets been conferred.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Col. James A. Hardie, Inspector-General, U. S. A., brevet major-general. Prior to appointment as Inspector-General served in the artillery. During the civil war was aid-de-camp on the staffs of Generals McClellan and Burnside.

(Page 53.) “Q. What, in your judgment, would be the advantages and disadvantages of more completely uniting the two services of Adjutant-General and Inspector-General?—A. I see no advantage to be gained at all. If you were to have the officers of such a combined organization detailed for inspection services and for the duties of the Adjutant-General's Department, the result would be the same, as far as the necessity for employing the same number of officers, and perhaps the same individuals, is concerned. At no department head-

quarters can one officer perform the duties of adjutant-general and inspector-general, for the reason that the adjutant-general must be habitually at headquarters, and the inspector-general must be habitually absent. \* \* \* The existing institutions in the Army have brought us through a long war without failure, and I think it would be rash to undertake in the reconstruction any radical change."

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Lieut. Col. Roger Jones, assistant inspector-general, U. S. A. Served in the Mounted Rifles before the war. During the war was captain and assistant quartermaster until November, 1861, when appointed in the Inspector-General's Department; afterwards Inspector-General, United States Army, with rank of brigadier-general.

(Page 223.) \* \* \* "The present system is not the growth of a day or of a year, but the result of an experience of over half a century, and has been thoroughly tested in domestic and foreign wars. \* \* \* We need an organization suitable not simply to times of peace, but to a state of war. Such an organization, as a disinterested observer who has had unusual facilities for observing the management and workings of the two Departments, I have no hesitation in declaring we now have."

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Absalom Baird, assistant inspector-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; chief of staff, Fourth Army Corps; brigade and division commander; commanded division in Fourteenth Corps, Army of the Cumberland; afterwards Inspector-General, U. S. A., with rank of brigadier-general:

(Page 41.) "I regard the staff establishment of the Army as it now exists as the outgrowth of the necessities of our service, inspired by the general character and habits of our people, the physical characteristics of the face of our country, and the nature of our sources of supply, as well as of the manner in which our soldiers require that supplies should be delivered to them.

"Our methods might not work well with a different race of people or on a different theater of war, but I have never seen an occasion when military operations could not be successfully carried on with our present system of administration and supply.

"I have known embarrassments to arise, but they resulted from having had men in positions they were unfit for, and were not faults of the system. Much is said of late days respecting French methods and German methods, but I doubt whether we have much to learn in the art of making war from the older nations. I am quite sure that we could conduct a campaign in Europe in our own way, and I am equally sure that no continental power could successfully make one here after their fashion of doing things.

"I do not believe that Europe has ever seen a better army than the Army of the Cumberland, as I knew it.

"In our short experience as a nation, almost every conceivable method of staff organization has in some of its parts, been experimented on, arriving at length at what we now have; and with this we

have gone through two wars, one a very great one, with success. I think, therefore, it would be very hazardous to give up or materially modify that which we know will work for something new and untried, unless sure that we will gain by the exchange.

“Nevertheless, while I regard our staff organization, taken as a whole, as satisfactory, there are some changes and consolidations which, in view of greater economy and efficiency and for the general good of the service, ought, I think, to be made.” \* \* \*

(Page 42.) “I think that, notwithstanding all the difficulties, the Subsistence, Pay, and Quartermaster’s Departments might be united into a single corps, upon such conditions as would be just to all, and ought to be satisfactory. \* \* \*

“A commissary-general of all army supplies could not, of course, give as much attention to the minute details of all of the departments as the present chiefs do, and he would probably find it to be wise to keep many officers at their present posts of duty. Men who have acquired skill and experience in the purchase of provisions would probably be kept chiefly on that duty, and all ought to be employed at that for which they are best fitted; but any could be removed or transferred when the interests of the service make it desirable. I think that the union of the three supply departments ought to be a measure of considerable economy; but I have no figures to offer, and, possibly, it might not be very much so.” \* \* \*

(Page 43.) “The Inspector-General’s Department, the Adjutant-General’s Department, the Bureau of (Military) Justice, and a few officers outside of these, all perform duties which are sometimes called administrative, to distinguish them from the duties of the supply departments, from which they differ widely. All of the officers thus employed ought to be united in a single corps, with a single chief or head.” \* \* \*

(Page 44.) “The Signal Service of the Army ought properly to be performed by or under the direction of the Adjutant-General’s Department, and I recommend that it be transferred accordingly, and that an officer of the Department be detailed to take charge of it.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The Ordnance Department has at all times since its organization been one of the most useful and valuable corps of the Army; \* \* \* but to combine this corps with a larger arm of the service, like the artillery, all of whose officers are not capable, or inclined to studious investigation (although they might be distinguished in the field), would be to destroy a valuable establishment for no good purpose.

Our artillery, likewise, has always been a most distinguished arm of the service, and a large proportion of the most prominent soldiers we have produced had their training in it. But artillery officers have never been happy or contented. They have at all times yearned for an employment that would confine them more closely to the special duties of their own arm, so that they might make a degree of professional progress, precluded by the ordinary routine of infantry garrison duty, to which they have been mostly confined. They have imagined they would find this in a union with the Ordnance Department, but I think it would prove a mistake. A few cunning artillery officers, perhaps a score, would procure permanent details on ordnance duty, and the remainder would see no more of scientific gunnery

than they now do, while the Ordnance Department would be seriously damaged." \* \* \*

(Page 46.) \* \* \* "While I have no doubt that the staff would be improved by being reduced to three main divisions—the administrative, the medical, and of disbursements and supply—I fear very much that the formation of the supply department at the present time would work unfairly toward many valuable officers."

#### **Coburn report, 1874.**

General Baird:

(Page 181.) "Q. Are there any branches of the staff which may be be diminished in number or consolidated with others?—A. In the testimony which I gave to the Military Committee last year, I favored the consolidation of the supply departments into one department, and also of the Adjutant-General's Department, the Inspector-General's Department, the Signal Service, and others into another department. I was in favor of that, but there is a great diversity of opinion on the subject in the Army."

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Brig. Gen. Joseph Holt, Judge-Advocate-General; was formerly Postmaster-General and Secretary of War.

(Page 206.) "That in the performance of its already enumerated duties the bureau has earned the approval and confidence of a large majority of the officers of the Army, may be safely asserted. But while this is true, it can scarcely be doubted that it has given offense to a small class of officers who, unwisely impatient of the restraints of law in military affairs, are, of course, impatient of the scrutiny to which their conduct has been or is liable to be subjected by this bureau as the law adviser of the War Department. That such officers should seek to depreciate the bureau, and be willing for it to disappear from the military organization, will not excite surprise.

"In conclusion, I have but to add that, in my opinion, the present Bureau of Military Justice, with the small corps of judge-advocates of the Army acting under its general direction, is not only an important but an essential part of the existing Army staff. Some such an establishment is certainly necessary in every civilized country that proposes to submit its military administration to the guidance and limitations of law, and which, while subjecting the officers and soldiers of its army to a strict and judicious discipline, seeks at the same time to protect them from oppressive treatment, and to secure to them the enjoyment of all the rights which remain to the citizen after he has entered the military service, thus counteracting that tendency to arbitrary action which, as its history shows, has characterized the profession of arms, in varying degrees, under all forms of government."

#### **Garfield report, 1869.**

Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, U. S. A., brevet major-general; served in artillery, engineers, and infantry; was Quartermaster-General during the civil war.

(Page 19.) "The first time I heard of such a proposition (the consolidation of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments) was from General Halleck, who, several times in the course of the war,

after he came here as General in Chief, told me that he was of opinion that there ought to be only one supply department, and that the Quartermaster's Department and the Commissary Department (I do not think he spoke of the Pay Department) should be conducted by the same person, so as to have a unity of supply. My reply to him then was that I had enough to do. \* \* \* I do not see that there would be any specific advantage in making such a change. There is one head man to all branches or departments of supply—the Secretary of War. You must have officers enough to do the duty in any case, and to put an officer as a head to the whole removes the work one degree further from the actual head—the Secretary of War." \* \* \*

(Page 20.) "The increase and multiplication of departments and division of responsibility which now exists are things that grew up in practice from the necessities of the case—I will not say from the necessities of the case, but from some advantage which is found in it.

\* \* \* The commissary desires to make his expenses as low as possible, and so prefers to throw on the Quartermaster's Department the cost of transportation. But ordinarily in cases of that kind, involving matters of consequence, we consult and come to an understanding. I never object to any legitimate expenditure being thrown on my department if thereby the aggregate cost of material and transportation will be less to the Government than it would be by a contrary arrangement. And so with the Commissary-General.

"In some European countries there is only one supply department, but without any very accurate knowledge on the subject my impression is that their organizations for that purpose are very imperfect. I have talked with old soldiers of Napoleon who said they were half the time starved. \* \* \* Within our own memories is the Crimean campaign, where the French and English supply departments broke down utterly, and where an army situated only 8 miles from a seaport filled with supplies had to undergo, for weeks, the utmost suffering from want of food and clothing and other necessary supplies. We know more of the English army during that time than we do of the French, because they admitted their newspaper correspondents, Russell and others, and the whole matter was published in their newspapers and we read it here. They are as fond of criticising their officers as we are in this country, but the French don't allow that."

### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Robert Allen, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the artillery before appointment in Quartermaster's Department in 1846; served in the Florida war, the Mexican war, and the war of the rebellion.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 153.) "I do not deem it necessary to go into an elaborate defense of the present organization, or trace the effect, immediate or remote, of compounding the staff departments. The old maxim, 'Let well enough alone,' is replete with wisdom in its application to the proposed changes. The existing organization has been tried by the severest of all tests and proven its perfect adaptation to the demands of the service. It has carried us triumphantly through a war of gigantic proportions, never failing, never faltering, answering every want, meeting promptly every requisition."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Allen:

(Page 163.) "I answer most emphatically, no. The quartermasters have always been overburdened with work, and consolidation (of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments) is only a change of form. No saving would be effected."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Daniel H. Rucker, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the dragoons until appointed in Quartermaster's Department in 1849; served in the Mexican war and civil war; afterwards Quartermaster-General. U. S. A., with rank of brigadier-general.

(Page 163.) "I do not consider such a consolidation (of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments) practicable, in the interest of the service; but, on the contrary, I am satisfied that it would be injurious. These departments are much more efficient as they now are."

**Garfield report, 1869.**

Col. Rufus Ingalls, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war and civil war; was chief quartermaster, Army of the Potomac, succeeding General Van Vliet; afterwards Quartermaster-General with rank of brigadier-general.

(Page 117.) "I have always been of the opinion that the Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments at least could be merged, with a less number of officers than are now in the two departments; and I have been of the opinion that the Pay Department could be merged also in the other two, calling it, for instance, the bureau of disbursements and supplies. \* \* \* The Quartermaster's Department is charged with the purchase and transportation of all supplies not particularly designated as subsistence supplies. \* \* \* There are comparatively very few articles of supplies that are purchased by the Commissary Department, but when these articles are purchased in large quantities at the principal markets they are then turned over, generally in bulk, to the Quartermaster's Department. We have to perform all the transportation."

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Ingalls:

(Page 161.) "If the Army were to be organized *de novo*, I should regard the proposition of the consolidation of the duties of the present Pay, Commissary, and Quartermaster's departments with favor. I was in favor of consolidating these departments some time ago, and so testified before the honorable House Committee on Military Affairs. But I am now rather of the opinion that it would be as well, and perhaps best, to let these departments remain separate. They have been so almost since the organization of the Government, and have answered their purposes well."

**Maish report, 1878.**

General Ingalls:

(Page 55.) "I do not think there should be any consolidation of the staff departments unless the entire military organization is to be changed radically. The Army is satisfied with and used to the present system, and in time of war the increased force at once falls in with it, as was witnessed between 1861-1865. The conditions of our country preclude a successful remodeling of our Army after any European system. Were an army to be organized *de novo*, a consolidated staff department of supply and disbursement, embracing the duties now performed in our Army by the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments, might be established, and I have been of opinion it would work with increased efficiency in the supply and payment of troops, but I am far from recommending a trial of it now." \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Stewart Van Vliet, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the artillery before the civil war; was chief quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.

(Page 63.) "3. Would it be better to have a single department of supply, whose duty it should be to discharge the functions of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments? If so, give your reasons.

"To this question I would answer most emphatically, no. The duties pertaining to the Quartermaster's and Pay departments are entirely dissimilar, and if a quartermaster was obliged to go to the different posts to pay the troops he would have to neglect his legitimate duties at his proper station.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I do not think, if a consolidation took place, that it would reduce the number of officers to any appreciable extent.

\* \* \* \* \*

"In answer to this question as to the consolidation of the ordnance and artillery corps, I would state that, in my opinion, they could not be united without injury to both corps. The manufacture of arms and ammunition requires a vast deal of study and experiment to keep pace with the improvements of the age, and to detail an officer for a year or two on ordnance duty with the expectation that he would keep up to those improvements would be simply unwise."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 64.) "The Adjutant and Inspector-General's departments might be consolidated, but the number of officers could not be reduced, for a certain number of the officers of the consolidated corps would have to be kept constantly on inspection duty. An adjutant-general could not leave the headquarters of his division, department, etc., to make an inspection without having another detailed to perform his duties during his absence.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Our staff has been assailed for many years. Persons, either through envy or a desire to obtain advanced positions, have from time to time

submitted plans for reorganizing the staff, but I have never seen one yet that was any improvement on the present organization. A good staff officer must not only understand the workings of his own department, but he must understand, to a great extent, the duties of all other departments, and the organization of armies, and it appears to me idle to suppose that an officer can become a good staff officer unless he devotes years to the constant discharge of the duties of his department."

(Page 65.) "To detail officers from the line to serve in the staff for a short period would certainly make bad staff officers, and not improve them as line officers." \* \* \*

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

General Van Vliet:

(Page 164.) "It is easy to tear down, but very difficult to rebuild. The present organization of the staff corps is the work of years of experience and labor. That it is a good one and has worked admirably, it is only necessary to refer to the late war. When large armies were suddenly called into the field, the staff corps supplied their wants promptly and efficiently; while almost everything was changed during the war, the organization of the staff remained the same. They were expanded, but never changed. It is a well-known fact that the best results are only obtained in almost all departments of life by division of labor."

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Rufus Saxton, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers, served in artillery until 1861; on the staff of General McClellan, and military governor, Department of the South, during the civil war; afterwards colonel and assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A.:

(Page 32.) "I can see no good reason why the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments should not remain as they now are, separate and distinct. The records of the late war show that the Quartermaster's Department was efficient, and did its duty well, and although now scarcely large enough to meet the requirements of the Army in time of peace, can readily be enlarged to meet the requirements of the largest armies. \* \* \* A good commissariat is so important to the well-being of an army that its duties should be made a specialty.

\* \* \* The service rendered by the Commissary Department in the late war was most creditable to its efficiency; never was so large an army so well cared for in the way of food. The corps is now so small that its officers can only be stationed at the supply depots.

\* \* \* All experience has shown that the honesty of the most trusted of human agents is not always proof against temptation, and it is desirable to diminish as much as possible the opportunities for fraud; to this end the Government will be the gainer in the long run, if it keeps a quartermaster and commissary (both bonded officers) at every depot of supply, thus dividing the patronage and responsibility, and lessening the opportunities for dishonest practices. \* \* \* The presence of the quartermaster is required constantly at the depot of supplies, where there is usually a large amount of public property

for which he is responsible, and he can not well be spared from that charge to travel to the distant posts, paying the troops. \* \* \* The experiment (of company and detachment commanders paying their commands) was tried in the early days of our Army, and signally failed. There are very many good company officers who are very poor accountants and who could not with safety be relied upon to keep the soldiers' accounts, never keeping their own; besides there is apt to be established a very unfortunate relation between the soldier and his commanding officer very detrimental to the service. The soldier would charge every fine and every stoppage of pay to his officer, and would believe that he had taken it to serve his own purposes. An experience of eleven years in the line of the Army has shown me that money relations between a soldier and his company commander should be avoided. With the paymaster the case is different; the soldier is generally satisfied that his pay is all right when he receives it from a paymaster. \* \* \*

"I am of the opinion that the ordnance corps and the artillery should be consolidated. The knowledge \* \* \* would be of very great service to the artillery officer. It would also widen the field for the selection of officers to perform special duties requiring peculiar skill and aptitude in the various departments of the manufacture and use of arms."

(Page 33.) "Q. Could the Adjutant and Inspector-General's departments be consolidated advantageously?"

"A. They could not; their duties being entirely different. The Adjutant-General's Department has charge of all the records of the Army, is its historian, who records the history of every officer and soldier and communicates all official orders to the Army. The duties of the Adjutant-General require that he should always be found at headquarters. The Inspector-General should always be traveling from post to post."

### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Judson D. Bingham, quartermaster, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general. Served in the artillery before the civil war; was chief quartermaster, Seventeenth Army Corps, and of the Army of the Tennessee; afterwards colonel and assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A.:

(Page 61.) "In my opinion, no departments of the staff of the Army can, advantageously to the service and the country, be consolidated, for these reasons: As at present organized, they have proved their efficiency during the war of the rebellion, which is probably the severest test that they will ever be subjected to. In the Quartermaster's Department, with the duties of which I am more familiar than of other departments, it was found necessary during the last war to organize several subdivisions, showing that it is now in too consolidated a shape for a great war. Any addition to the present duties of the Quartermaster's Department will be detrimental to the service."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 62.) "The effect of adopting a system whereby company and detachment commanders should pay their commands would be to largely increase a kind of accountability which is now great enough.

They are now accountable for the clothing, camp and garrison equipage, equipments, and ordance stores of their commands. The addition of accountability for paying troops would impair their efficiency as company commanders."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

General Bingham:

(Page 166.) "It would not be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's with any other department."

#### Maish report, 1878.

Maj. J. M. Moore, quartermaster, U. S. A., brevet lieutenant-colonel; served in the Nineteenth and Ninetieth Pennsylvania Volunteers during the civil war until appointed in the Quartermaster's Department in 1863; now colonel and Assistant Quartermaster-General, U. S. A.

(Page 56.) "The consolidation of the Subsistence and Quartermaster's departments (as proposed by H. R. bill 2865) will totally destroy the efficiency of the officers composing the proposed organization.

"It is hardly possible for any one man to be thoroughly proficient in either department; that is, a thorough judge of all the supplies he is compelled to purchase for army use. Now, add the duties of the Commissary to that of the Quartermaster's Department and you overburden an officer and make him dependent upon the judgment of hired help instead of having him rely upon his own judgment. \* \* \*

"How many quartermasters know anything about sugar, tea, rice, beans, etc.? How many commissaries know anything about mules, grain, iron, steel, hardware, blacksmiths' and wheelwrights' tools, and the ten thousand articles purchased by the Quartermaster's Department? How many complaints would be made of the inferior quality of stores received at posts; what an expense it would be to the Government to transport worthless stores purchased by officers of the supply department, and how unjust to impose the task upon them of supplying the Army with stores of which they admit they are not competent to judge of their quality? Yet it is expected that every officer assigned to duty as purchasing officer is an expert in the selection of the stores he is ordered to furnish, and he is held to a rigid accountability for the quality of those supplies by the bureau in which he serves.

"Officers at small posts do and can perform the duties of post quartermaster and commissary when there are no purchases to make in either department. When the posts are large, two officers are detailed to perform the duty. The quartermaster is required to look after his animals, wagons, forage, grain, wood, etc., and if on a march, to look after his transportation. On the other hand, the commissary is needed at his warehouse, and could not give that attention to the issuing of stores if compelled to attend to matters requiring his presence out of doors, now performed by the quartermaster.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Our present staff administration is founded upon the wise principle of proper division of labor, which the world teaches is necessary

to insure success in operations of any magnitude. During the rebellion it was found necessary to divide the duties of the quartermasters and make specialties of wagon transportation, purchase of horses, hay, grain, etc., to insure proficiency and thoroughness in the officers charged with these several branches of the Quartermaster's Department.

"It has stood the test during the various Indian wars, the war with Mexico, and the late civil war. It successfully performed such peculiar labors without causing the delay or failure of a single campaign, and can not be pronounced a failure, while the consolidation of the Commissary and Quartermaster's departments as it existed during the war of 1812 was utterly inadequate to the discharge of its duties, so much so as to require a division of the supply department as exists at the present time."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 58.) "As our people are opposed to maintaining a large standing army in time of peace, commensurate with our necessities in time of war, the staff organization must have reference especially to a rapid increase of our Army, and while the Army itself is small, the staff corps must be larger in proportion, and so flexible that, when occasion demands, it may be ready to meet any emergency, and at the same time serve as a nucleus of educated and expert officers, around whom the volunteers can gather, be divided, and take part in such staff duties as they may be called upon to perform. The adaptability of the present organization to such a demand was clearly manifested in the late civil war, and since the return of the volunteer staff to civil life it is now only commensurate with the requirements of the service." \* \* \*

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Brig. Gen. Amos B. Eaton, Commissary-General of Subsistence, U. S. A., brevet major-general; served in the infantry until appointed in Subsistence Department in 1838; in the Florida war, Mexican war, and civil war; was chief commissary to General Taylor in Mexican war.

(Page 9.) "It is my opinion that no system can be devised, by the union of the Quartermaster's Department and the Subsistence Department under one departmental head, that will not introduce confusion, uncertainty, and failure into the service." \* \* \*

(Page 10.) "The Quartermaster's Department has many important and some minor functions attached to it, but its first great office and that by which it is principally connected with the Subsistence Department, as also with the Ordnance and Medical departments, is its function as the common carrier of the Army." \* \* \*

(Page 11.) "The first and most important interest of the Subsistence Department, as it is the first aim of its officers, is to supply the troops with good stores, possessing the requisite keeping and other necessary qualities; second, so to purchase and supply the stores that they may be delivered at the several final points of consumption at as low a total cost to the Government as possible." \* \* \*

"I am not aware of any deficiency of a just and proper cooperative interchange of views and measures between the bureaus of the two departments." \* \* \*

(Page 12.) "I do not doubt that it is practicable to devise some system of consolidation of those departments, with perhaps the addition

also of the Pay Department, by which all these interests may be placed under one common head or chief, and I do not doubt that now and then a man of such unusual grasp of mind, of such wisdom, experience, sagacity, and skill in devising and managing judicious systems of business, of such untiring industry and unfailing health, that he might fill the place reasonably well, provided the consolidated department should be by law subdivided into divisions and subdivisions or subbureaus, having somewhat separate and independent subchiefs, placed in control of the details of the several branches into which such a consolidated department would necessarily have to be arranged. It is my opinion, however, that the past experience and results in the working of the present system, both in peace and in war for many years, have been so favorable as not to call for such a change." \* \* \*

(Page 13.) "During the recent war I was for most of the time stationed in New York City, where I was fully occupied. It would then and there have been utterly impossible for any one man—I care not how able he might be—to have performed successfully the duty of the Quartermaster's Department and also of the Subsistence Department in that city."

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Col. Alexander E. Shiras, assistant commissary-general, U. S. A., brevet major-general; service in artillery before appointment in Subsistence Department in 1847; was in the Florida war, Mexican war, and civil war; afterwards Commissary-General of Subsistence, U. S. A., with rank of brigadier-general:

(Page 19.) "Q. From your experience in the two branches of the service (quartermaster and commissary), if you were called upon to manage all the duties of the two departments, and that, too, for a long period of time, and you yourself were to be made responsible for everything, would you keep up two separate organizations or make the two into one?"

"A. I would make several more separate ones, each with its distinct head, and have a general superintendence. \* \* \* I have frequently acted as Commissary-General, and I know he has ample to do to perform that duty perfectly. I regard the Quartermaster's Department as an overworked department, and the consequence is that an officer of that department on duty according to his rank has to intrust much of his duties to others, having merely a supervision over his agents."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

General Shiras:

(Page 54.) "No advantage is presented to my mind as likely to arise from having a single department of supply to discharge the functions of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments. \* \* \*

"Such a consolidation, if it should lessen the number of officers, must be followed by increasing the number of citizens employed to fulfill the duties now performed by officers." \* \* \*

"The effect of adopting a system whereby company or detachment commanders should pay their commands would be the loss of large sums to the Treasury." \* \* \*

"The consolidation of the artillery and ordnance could produce no beneficial effect, but might produce much harm in rendering the offi-

cers now in the ordnance corps less interested in the study of their profession, while the artillery officer, detailed temporarily for duty as an ordnance officer, would take but little interest in his temporary duty; such at least was the case before the act of 1832, establishing an ordnance corps." \* \* \*

"The Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments could not be advantageously consolidated. The Inspector-General's Department should be entirely detached from any other, that its officers may fully and fearlessly perform their duties to all branches of the Army without partiality." \* \* \*

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Brig. Gen. Robert Macfeely, Commissary-General of Subsistence, U. S. A. Served in infantry before appointment in Subsistence Department in 1861; was chief commissary, Army of the Ohio, Fifteenth Army Corps, and Army of the Tennessee:

(Page 167.) "It would not, without impairing the efficiency of each department (be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments). The experience of the past fifty years and the late war proved that each department, as now organized, had as much as it could do to perform its appropriate and legitimate duties, and the manner in which these duties were performed and the immense armies supplied proved the efficiency and wisdom of the separate organizations. Any consolidation that might be made would result in a division of duties practically, as under separate organizations, and would not be advantageous or economical."

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Capt. John P. Hawkins, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, during the civil war, was chief commissary, Thirteenth Army Corps and Army of the Tennessee, also brigade and division commander; afterward Commissary-General of Subsistence, with rank of brigadier-general:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 65.) "I do not think it would be better to have a single department of supply, to discharge the present duties of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments. So far as the organization of these departments is concerned, and their relationship to each other, I think that their operation during the late war showed their efficiency; and probably the only thing that might have been noticed as objectionable was that the Quartermaster's Department was very heavily weighted, and in order to be managed had to be divided into different branches, with a head to each branch. By this plan responsibility must have been very much divided.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 66.) "I do not think it would be advantageous to consolidate the ordnance and artillery corps, but I think it would be well if the Ordnance Department were organized as to have no lieutenants belonging to it; the lowest rank being that of captain, any vacant captaincies to be filled from the first lieutenants of the Army; the fitness of the

applicants being determined by competitive examination. The lieutenants of artillery would generally procure the appointments, as they have opportunities for study not in the reach of other lieutenants of the line; still it would be advisable to have competition open to all the first lieutenants of the Army. It would prevent a certain amount of grumbling, and that is a desirable thing to attain to.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I do not see any advantage to result, in time of peace, from consolidating the Adjutant and Inspector General’s departments. In time of war the Adjutant-General’s Department is overworked, and the Inspector-General’s Department is then of such very great importance that it should have a separate head for it.

“During the late war it was only after a thorough organization of the inspector’s department in army corps and divisions that the troops became disciplined and efficient.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Maish report, 1878.**

Maj. Michael P. Small, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general. Served in the artillery until appointed in subsistence department in 1861; was chief commissary of the Thirteenth Army Corps of the departments of Virginia and North Carolina and of the Army of the James; afterwards lieutenant-colonel and assistant commissary-general of subsistence:

(Page 66.) “Ask any of the distinguished officers of the late Confederate service about the efficiency of their staff departments, which was in part a consolidated one, and the reply will be, ‘a failure,’ and that our splendid system of supply by the staff departments, as at present constituted, was their constant admiration.

“Surely it is not wise to neglect such experiences as above, and throw away the results gathered during many years of laborious and successful service, and break down a system so adapted to the wants of our country, and which took so many years in building up.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Brig. Gen. Joseph K. Barnes, Surgeon-General, U. S. A., brevet major-general. Entered the service in 1840; surgeon and Surgeon-General during the civil war:

(Page 168.) “The experience of the war would appear to have proven the impracticability of such consolidation (of the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments).”

#### **Garfield report, 1869.**

Brig. Gen. Benjamin W. Brice, Paymaster-General, U. S. A. Entered the service in the infantry in 1829; served in the Mexican war and civil war in the Pay Department.

(Page 46.) “Q. What would be your answer in regard to using the Quartermaster’s Department as the channel through which to pay

the troops?—A. In the first place, there would be an insuperable objection to placing large deposits at these smaller and more exposed stations; and, in the second place, so far as I am advised, I don't believe any officer could perform the duties and make all the proper returns now required by both departments and do it satisfactorily and promptly. It would produce a confusion in the disbursements and confusion in the train of thought of an officer charged with the double duties under widely different systems. It would not be homogeneous, as it is now, and it would tend inevitably to inaccuracy, as past experience demonstrated before the organization of the present system."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Benjamin Alvord, paymaster, U. S. A., acting paymaster-general, afterwards Paymaster-General with rank of brigadier-general. Brigadier-general of volunteers; served in infantry until appointed in Pay Department in 1854; served in Florida war, the Mexican war, and in the civil war commanded District of Oregon.

(Page 17.) "My judgment is opposed to any of the proposed schemes of consolidation, but I will here especially present my objections to the consolidation of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay Departments. \* \* \*

"The present system has shown efficiency in war and in peace, and there are no failures to correct. By subdivision of labor it has elements of perfection and thoroughness. Consolidation would cause overcrowding and neglect. \* \* \* The present subdivision has the merit of simplicity, unity, and efficiency. \* \* \* It is proposed to interpose between each and the Secretary of War a chief of supply. \* \* \* It would only make another remove, another link, in the chain. \* \* \* As the new chief could not master all three of the branches thoroughly, he would be apt to degenerate into a mere automaton, to sign his name without sufficient investigation. \* \* \* He could not attend to the duties of all three branches in time of peace; much less could he do so in time of war.

"To authorize company and detachment commanders to pay their commands would endanger the public funds. \* \* \* Could company officers of volunteers pay their commands, when they have enough to do to learn their military duties, and on final muster out could not, of course, make final payment? Or shall one system prevail for the regulars and another for the volunteer forces? Which would never be a judicious arrangement. \* \* \* The consolidation of ordnance and artillery would be unwise. \* \* \* The consolidation of that department (Inspector-General's Department) with the Adjutant-General's Department would only divert officers from duties and studies in which they are accomplished, without any benefit to the public service."

#### Maish report, 1878.

General Alvord:

(Page 68.) "In reenforcement of what I have before said repeatedly in various reports against the consolidation of the staff, I will quote the language recently seen in the new and valuable 'Military Dictionary,' by General Voyle of the British army, London, 1876, page 91, under article 'Control Department:'

“‘It is unadvisable to mix up, in one department, supply, store, passage, transport, and half a dozen other things, each of which should be a department of itself. To crowd department upon department under one head, and to expect efficiency, is simply courting failure.’

“To this we will add that the British Government, dissatisfied with its six years’ experiment of consolidation, did, by a royal warrant of January 1, 1876, abolish the ‘department of control.’ We should be pardoned for glorifying our own institutions. It may be a national failing, but there is in our past history and military successes as much just cause for pride in our Army and in its staff as in any other American product.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Maj. George P. Ihrie, paymaster, U. S. A.; entered the service as second lieutenant, Third Artillery, June 18, 1855; colonel and acting aid-de-camp of volunteers; brevet brigadier-general; was colonel and acting inspector-general of the staff of General Grant.

(Page 120.) “I have the past twenty years held that these three departments (Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay) should be consolidated, but if, in the wisdom of Congress, only the Quartermaster’s and Commissary Departments should be consolidated, it is my judgment the Pay Department should be abolished as unnecessary. \* \* \* I have always argued that one officer could perform the duties of the three departments. \* \* \* The commanding officer of a company who is not able to make out the roll of his company and pay it at the end of each month is not, in my judgment, qualified to hold his position.”

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war and war of the rebellion; division and corps commander; chief of staff to General Meade.

(Page 59.) “I should be inclined to think that the duties we are now engaged upon, which are various and extensive, are quite as much as the Corps of Engineers should have devolved upon it. There is a very marked line between the duties of fabrication and supply of heavy ordnance, field artillery, and heavy guns, and all their appurtenances, equipments, accouterments, and ammunition, and the duties of the Corps of Engineers.”

#### Banning report, 1876.

Col. Zealous B. Tower, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; in the civil war; served in the Army of the Potomac as chief engineer, defenses of Nashville, and as chief engineer, Military Division of the Tennessee.

(Page 184.) “The impression of my early service in the Army still remains with me, that the Commissary and Pay Departments are

models of economical administration, and I do not think that anything would be gained by uniting them with the Quartermaster's Department, already overburdened with its various duties and responsibilities."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Horatio G. Wright, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, brigade, division, corps, and department commander; commanded Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A., Chief of Engineers.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 129.) "In my opinion none of the departments of the staff of the Army can, advantageously to the service of the country, be consolidated. The present division of the staff into its several branches is the result of experience, extending from the first formation of our Government to 1838, when the present organization, substantially, was adopted, and has since been continued, having, in the meantime, been thoroughly tested in the Mexican war and the war of the rebellion. The results in both have fully vindicated the wisdom of the advocates of the existing plan of staff subdivision. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

" \* \* \* The Subsistence Department is limited in its duties, mainly to the supply of subsistence to the Army—that is, in providing for the *daily* wants of the soldier in the way of food; and, as the worst results would follow from a failure in supplying this even for a single day, this important service is wisely assigned to a special organization of the staff." \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. John Newton, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, brigade, division, and corps commander; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A., Chief of Engineers.

(Page 89.) "I know of no departments of the staff which, in my opinion, should be consolidated.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 90.) "The advantage of consolidating the Quartermaster's Commissary, and Pay departments into a single department of supply is not clear to my mind. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

"In my opinion the ordnance could never be consolidated with the artillery in such a sense as to have the offices interchangeable. The ordnance service requires a number of officers skilled by practical familiarity with the fabrication, etc., of arms and munitions of war, which is acquired only by special attention to these matters. .

\* \* \* \* \*

"The principle duties of the Adjutant-General's Department are the preservation of the records, and a system of returns of the Army, and the issuing of orders—duties of importance, involving much labor and care.

“There is no analogy whatever between these functions and those of an inspector-general, and hence officers of different qualifications are required in these departments.”

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. John G. Foster, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, served in the Mexican war; in the civil war was brigade, corps, and department commander.

(Page 26.) “I do not think there are any departments of the staff of our Army that can be consolidated with advantage to the service.

“These departments have from time to time been created, increased, and modified to meet the requirements of the service. \* \* \*

“The idea seems to have prevailed to secure the most efficient service with the greatest economy. To secure both objects as far as practicable the different divisions of the staff were organized upon the principle of ‘division of labor.’ By this each division of the staff was enabled to perform its duties efficiently and with great perfection of detail; at the same time great economy in the disbursement of the public money was secured. \* \* \* I believe in ‘specialties’ to secure the greatest perfection in the details of staff service, as much as I do in its necessity in the ordinary avocations of life, in which each branch of business is a specialty.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I do not think that a consolidation would reduce the number of officers that would be required to perform the same amount of duty.”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Quincy A. Gillmore, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, division, corps, and department commander; afterward colonel Corps of Engineers.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 165.) “I can not see that any advantage can reasonably be expected to result from a consolidation of any of the present staff corps and departments of the Army. My knowledge of the practical operations and routine duties of other corps than my own has been derived principally from my experience as a commander in time of war. I am clear in my convictions that we need no better organization than we now possess to meet all the contingencies of a war of great magnitude, and that for a peace establishment any saving in the salaries of officers that might possibly be achieved by forced and unnatural consolidation would be wholly swallowed up by numerous small losses resulting from impaired efficiency, supplemented by a large class of minor evils for which there would be no compensation, even in theory.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 166.) “In my judgment, the number of officers required for duty can not be reduced by consolidation, except at the expense of efficiency.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I think the ordnance and artillery corps should be kept distinct as they are at the present time. \* \* \* The duties confided to ordnance officers are sufficiently important to justify the maintenance of a distinct organization and line of promotion. In my opinion efficiency can not be secured in any other way. \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. John D. Parke, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers, corps commander; afterwards colonel, Corps of Engineers.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 74.) "In my opinion, it would not be advantageous to the service nor to the country to consolidate any departments of the staff of the Army. This opinion is based upon an experience of several years on the frontier, and from my observation while in command of troops during the war. \* \* \*

(Page 74.) "The effect in time of war of adopting a system whereby company and detachment commanders should pay their commands would be to impair the efficiency of the commanders and to reduce the effective fighting force. The former would be anxious about the money box and vouchers, and the latter would be weakened by just the number of men required as guards. The system might answer in peace times, but even then I think it would be of very doubtful propriety."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Gouverneur K. Warren, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers, brigade, corps, and department commander; chief engineer, Army of the Potomac; commanded Fifth Army Corps, Army of the Potomac; afterwards lieutenant-colonel of engineers.

(Page 48.) "Do not think any of the staff departments of the Army can, advantageously to the service and the country, be consolidated with another, except the Inspector-General's, which should be under the Adjutant-General. Do not think this would make material difference as to the number of officers required, but would make the inspector's work more direct in its effect upon the Army, and be more convenient for the use of commanding officers in all grades. \* \* \*

(Page 49.) "Think that the Commissary and Pay departments should be kept separate from the Quartermaster's. The latter have too much to do now. Think that all matters of transportation of commissary supplies should be taken from the Quartermaster's Department and given to the Commissary Department. \* \* \*

"Think such consolidation could not reduce the number of officers required if duty be done equally well. \* \* \*

"Think the ordnance and artillery corps should not be combined. See no reason for a change in the ordnance corps, but believe the artillery should be made into a corps instead of having its present organization." \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Maj. Godfrey Weitzel, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers, division and corps commander; afterwards lieutenant-colonel of engineers.

(Page 185.) "I do not think that any corps should be consolidated. It will prove poor economy when the Army is needed. It cost our

Government over two billion dollars to get good officers, staff and line, during the first two years of the war."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. William E. Merrill, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.; colonel, U. S. Volunteer Engineers; assistant engineer, Army of the Potomac; chief engineer, Army of Kentucky and Army of the Cumberland; afterwards lieutenant-colonel of engineers.

(Page 79.) \* \* \* "Were an officer to be employed at one time in building barracks, at another in buying horses and means of transportation, and then be suddenly ordered to purchase an army's supplies of bacon, bread, flour, coffee, tea, pepper, salt, soap, etc., the result would probably be that the Government would be badly swindled and the Army would suffer from lack of wholesome food.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I do not think that there could be any appreciable reduction in the number of officers were the Quartermaster and Commissary departments combined.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 80.) \* \* \* "I think that a special ordnance corps is a necessity to the efficiency of the service. Modern warfare, with its collateral arts and sciences, has become so scientific and the successful manufacture and invention of its ever-varying weapons requires so much special knowledge and practice that it is unreasonable to expect such knowledge from those who have not made it a specialty. At the same time ordnance and artillery duties are so interwoven that an ordnance officer should have practical artillery experience, and an efficient artillery officer should be well posted in theory and on the manufacture, the preservation, and the repair of his guns and equipments, besides knowing how to make and take care of powder and other explosives. \* \* \* The duties now performed by the lieutenants of ordnance should be performed by detailed lieutenants from the artillery, the length and mode of detail being similar to that now prescribed for service with the light batteries." \* \* \*

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Brig. Gen. Alexander B. Dyer, Chief of Ordnance, U. S. A., brevet major-general. Served in the artillery before appointment in Ordnance Department in 1838. Served in the Florida, Mexican, and civil wars.

(Page 66.) "I know so little about the duties performed by the Navy Bureau of Ordnance that I can not form a proper judgment in regard to the matter (why there should be two ordnance bureaus in the Government). \* \* \* It is a delicate thing for an officer at the head of one corps or department to answer a question which assumes that he is perfectly acquainted with all the duties and details of another branch of the service. \* \* \* We could supply guns, small arms, and ammunition. The Ordnance Department is now manufacturing 1,000,000 cartridges for the Navy for their breech-loading carbines."

Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. Stephen Benét, Ordnance Department, U. S. A; served during the civil war as captain of ordnance; afterwards brigadier-general and Chief of Ordnance.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 102.) "In all the occupations of life, whether professional, scientific, commercial, or mechanical, through all their various ramifications, the doctrine of specialties is well established. Division of labor and personal accountability within prescribed limits of duty are absolutely essential to the execution of schemes of any magnitude. The nearer and more direct the individual is brought to specific objects or duties the more satisfactorily, economically, and intelligently will those objects be attained or those duties performed. The application of the doctrine to the execution of so vast a scheme as that of the military state is a matter of absolute necessity; its application in time of peace is a question of degree only. It is exemplified in the present organization of the staff corps and departments, in each of which the principles of the divisions of labor, positive responsibility, and intelligent accomplishment are recognized and applied." \* \* \*

(Page 103.) "It is an undoubted fact that these divisions were not considered too many during the rebellion, and that no complaint was ever made that the subdivision of the War Department into bureaus had been carried too far. On the contrary, the experience of that, the greatest war of modern times, proved that the system worked admirably and the execution of its enormous duties a marvelous success.

"As the organization of an army is intended for war purposes, its success in war is the sole test of its excellence. Temporary expedients, on economical grounds, during peace, with the undefined intention of a change in time of war, must of necessity lead to disaster. The system must be perfected in time of peace, so that without changing or modifying the principle of its organization each branch of the system can be at once expanded to meet the sudden necessities of war of greater or lesser magnitude. It would be unwise to ignore the lessons of the rebellion and in a spirit of wantonness destroy a system that has been the work of half a century and has by its labors and its successes wrested from military history the highest approval.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The original establishment of the Ordnance Department as a separate corps dates back to the act of May 14, 1812, when its organization and the duties which it was to perform were accurately defined; and by the act of March 3, 1813, 'for the better organization of the general staff of the Army of the United States,' the Secretary of War was empowered to prepare general regulations for its government.

"At the close of the war of 1812-1814 a reorganization of the Ordnance Department was directed by the act of February 8, 1815, when its *status* and duties were again defined. This act is esteemed the *organic law*, notwithstanding the department was subsequently merged in the artillery for a time.

"On the 11th of May, 1820, the House of Representatives by a resolution called upon the Secretary of War (Mr. Calhoun) for a comprehensive scheme for the reduction of the Army at that time to 6,000 men, and on the 12th of December following Mr. Calhoun sub-

mitted his plan, the main features of which were embodied in the 'Act to reduce and fix the military peace establishment of the United States,' approved March 2, 1821. This act effectuated the mergence of the Ordnance Department in the artillery, and the duties of the department were from 1821 to 1832, *a period of eleven years*, performed under the direction of Col. George Bomford, the various ordnance posts and establishments being placed under the command of artillery officers, in pursuance of the fourth section of the act.

"After five years' trial of this system (1826) the officer on ordnance duty in charge of the department (Colonel Bomford) felt it his duty to invite the attention of the Secretary of War to the defects of the plan, and avowedly confessed that it had not answered the expectations which had been entertained for it.

\* \* \* \* \*

"A bill was accordingly introduced in the House of Representatives in 1827 for reestablishing the Ordnance Corps as a separate organization, when the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs (Mr. Vance) stated that 'the plan which had been tried of appointing only four supernumerary captains as permanent officers in the ordnance service was no more than an experiment, and had been found not to be attended with beneficial consequences.' \* \* \*

"The bill did not become a law at this session.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 104.) " \* \* \* The annual report of Colonel Bomford for 1831 was transmitted to Congress November 21, 1831, by the Secretary of War, and the latter, alluding to the condition of the Ordnance Department, says:

" \* \* \* Unless our arms are well fabricated and preserved and in sufficient abundance and unless we keep pace with the improvements which modern science and ingenuity are making, the consequences may hereafter prove disastrous. The necessary provision for these objects can not be made without much time and experience, and that they may be ready for war they must be procured in peace. A stable and efficient organization is therefore essential to the Ordnance Corps, and in the report of the officer at the head of it will be found his views of its present condition. I recommend the subject to your favorable notice.' \* \* \*

"A bill was therefore introduced in the Senate early in the session (first session, Twenty-second Congress) providing for the reorganization of the Ordnance Department, which, by a subsequent debate in the House on the same bill we are informed, was passed by a unanimous vote of the Senate. \* \* \* At the conclusion of the discussion in the House the vote was taken on the bill—yeas 101, nays 66—and the bill was duly approved and became a law on April 5, 1832.

"Such is the history of the Ordnance Department from 1821 (when it was merged in the artillery) to 1832, when, the merging having proved by its results an utter failure, it resumed its previously distinct organization and entered upon its career as a staff corps of the Army. The experiment of a mixed or merged organization had been tried and experience, the only infallible test of excellence, had brought conviction of its want of efficiency to the minds of the colonel on ordnance duty, the Secretary of War, and finally to Congress. The records of the times are replete with confessions of inefficiency and

confusion, and so far as the improvement of the *material* of the Ordnance Department was concerned the merged period may be considered one of utter stagnation. That system and uniformity of manufacture which have characterized the labors of the Ordnance Department since its resuscitation found no place in the merged organization. Nor can this be wondered at, since the report of Colonel Bomford in 1830 says that "during the eight years that the system had been in operation one hundred and fifty different officers had been detached and engaged in the performance of ordnance duties." Such a constant change in details must prevent officers from taking more than a casual interest in their new but temporary duties, even at large stations where important duties are performed. Officers undergoing such a routine instead of being bettered by it would become poor officers in their own special branch and much worse ordnance."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

General Benét:

(Page 186.) "Without reference to the doctrine of specialties, which is so well established, especially in the execution of labor of any extent, it is sufficient to say that the experience of the war found no fault in the organization of the Army in its general features. All army organization is for war purposes, and while a consolidation of these three departments (Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay) might possibly be an economical measure in time of peace—of which I can not judge—it might be at the expense of efficiency, and in the event of war might lead to ultimate disaster. Our whole staff organization is intended for expansion in time of war, and this consolidation would not unlikely end in an unwieldy department, with possibly not even economy to recommend it."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. A. (retired), late of the Ordnance Corps; brevet brigadier-general; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was chief ordnance officer, Department of the Ohio and Army of the Potomac.

(Page 36.) "The most important principle to be observed in a military organization is simplicity of administration by making the number of bureaus or chiefs of administration a minimum. \* \* \* A single department of supply made up of the most experienced officers of the present divers departments might efficiently perform all the duties now belonging to the Subsistence, Quartermaster's, and Ordnance departments. \* \* \*

(Page 37.) "If the Ordnance Corps is to be continued with the several grades now recognized by law, all future vacancies below the grade of major should be filled by selection, from the cavalry, artillery, and infantry, of officers who have served at least five years, and these selections should not be permanent until after a certain term of service in the corps had developed in the officer a proper aptitude and fitness for its peculiar duties. \* \* \* In 1821 the Ordnance Corps was merged in the artillery, but the result was not such as had been antici-

pated or predicted. That there are some plausible reasons now for repeating the experiment can not be denied, but it is believed that the substantial benefits of such a combination can be secured, and what is most worthy of preservation in the present organization be retained, without the radical change involved in an affirmative answer to the question. To abolish the corps absolutely is to sacrifice the most valuable element it possesses in the catalogue of professional qualifications, for, whatever may be his material ability or strictly scientific attainments, it is the experience of a staff officer, the wisdom gathered and compacted from the study and observation of years, that is worth most to the country. \* \* \* In my judgment, there should be no Adjutant-General's Department; but for the regulation of details and the preservation and classification of the records of the Army, and for the ready availability of these records in military administration, there should be an officer—call him adjutant-general if you please—permanently in charge of the Bureau, with one assistant, of a grade next below his own, and who should succeed to the higher place in case of vacancy.”

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Albert J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general; entered the service in 1854 as assistant surgeon; afterwards Chief Signal Officer with rank of brigadier-general.

(Page 156.) “The consolidation would be an experiment. The Commissary, Quartermaster's, and Pay Departments successfully discharged their duties, which were very extensive, during the late war under their present organization.”

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Cuvier Grover, First Cavalry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, served in the Army of the Potomac, commanded a division in the Nineteenth Corps of the Department of the Gulf, and in the Shenandoah campaign.

(Page 50.) “I do not think it would be advisable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay departments in one.”

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Innis N. Palmer, Second Cavalry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, served in the Mexican war, and in the civil war was brigade, division, and corps commander.

(Page 51.) “It is a matter of great doubt with me whether it would not therefore be for the interest of the service to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments.”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Joseph J. Reynolds, Third Cavalry, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, chief of staff, Army of the Cumberland; corps and department commander.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 209.) “Q. State whether, in your opinion, any departments of the staff of the Army can, advantageously to the service and the

country, be consolidated; if so, what departments, and for what reason?—A. Would not advise such consolidation; would reduce the number of officers in these branches of the service so as to retain only a number sufficient to supply one officer of each branch to all military division and department headquarters, in addition to the number required in the city of Washington. Abolish the heads of all these departments, and detail an officer of the Department to act as such during his tour in Washington. Prohibit by law any officer of these staff corps from service in Washington for a longer period than four consecutive years. Major should be the highest grade permanently on duty in these branches of the staff, and better to have no lower grade.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Q. Could the ordnance and artillery corps be advantageously consolidated, and what would be the effect in point of economy and efficiency? State your reasons for your views upon the subject.—A. Would advise this consolidation or regulate the service so that artillery officers could have tours of duty at arsenals of construction, for improvement. A better plan would be to abolish the Ordnance Department, as a separate organization, and merge it into the artillery. A certain number of officers must be on ordnance duty; would supply them by detail, as a rule, from officers of artillery, or abolish the lower grades in the Ordnance Department and have no officer of less rank than major. Would assign no officer to this department on graduation from the Military Academy.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

General Reynolds.

(Page 54.) “Yes, I think it practicable (to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments).

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Benjamin S. Roberts, U. S. A. (retired), late of Third Cavalry, brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was chief of cavalry, Department of the Gulf, and commanded cavalry division, District of West Tennessee.

(Pages 4–6.) “The Subsistence and Pay departments can be consolidated ‘advantageously’ into the Quartermaster's Department. \* \* \* It would insure more prompt settlement of all accounts for purchase, supply, and pay of the Army \* \* \* and simplify systems of auditing. \* \* \* One great supplying and pay department could be made efficient and far more economical.

\* \* \* “The ordnance and artillery could be consolidated to advantage, promoting efficiency, and with great economy. \* \* \* Ordnance is only one branch of artillery, and can never be carried to any high degree of perfection, independent of practical experience both in the field, in garrison, forts, and fortifications. Ordnance officers \* \* \* do not become practical artillerists, and practical artillerists can never become eminent and carry artillery to its highest perfection, without experience in the fabrication of artillery.

Q. “Could the Adjutant and Inspector-General's departments be consolidated?—A. “I think not. The Adjutant-General's Department

as an independent permanent organization should be abolished, and a system of detail by selection from the line of the Army substituted.

(7). "The Inspector-General's Department should not be consolidated. \* \* \* Permanence and independence of detail in such a department is an exacting necessity to its efficiency and usefulness. Resentments, revenge, and retaliation would pursue the most zealous and faithful officers under any plan of detail that could be devised."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Capt. Guy V. Henry, Third Cavalry, U. S. A., colonel Fortieth Massachusetts Volunteers; served on the staff of General McDowell; battery, battalion, regimental, and brigade commander, afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 190.) "I think if consolidation is necessary, the only two departments that could be advantageously consolidated would be the Quartermaster's and the Commissary. \* \* \* I think, therefore, it would not be well to consolidate the pay corps with the other two; but, if necessary, the Quartermaster's and Commissary departments might be consolidated."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, brigadier-general of volunteers; assistant engineer, Ninth Army Corps; regimental, brigade, and division commander; commanded cavalry division, Army of the James; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 57.) "Of the consolidation of the artillery and ordnance I have no very special opinion. It would, probably, be a benefit to the artillery, and not good for either the cavalry or infantry, also armed by the ordnance. \* \* \* I do not believe that either the Adjutant-General's or the Inspector-General's Department should be decreased. I believe that they should be consolidated, and that there should be a careful revision and alteration of the laws regulating and governing these departments; \* \* \* that it would be better were no positions made permanent in the joined department, at least in the lower grades, and that, in the higher, transfers for very considerable periods of time to service with troops would be a benefit. \* \* \*

(Page 58.) "I believe that it would be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay departments, and to largely decrease the total number of officers, to improve their administration, and to lessen expenses, both in personnel, and more yet by improved administration."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. James Oakes, Sixth Cavalry, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general; served in the Mexican war; in the civil war served in the Army of the Ohio, Army of the Mississippi, and after 1863 on recruiting and mustering duty.

(Page 61.) "I think it would be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments into one corps. \* \* \* In my opinion the interests of the staff and line have become too distinct; they should be one and the same, and all under control of the General of the Army."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Samuel D. Sturgis, Seventh Cavalry, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war and in the civil war; was chief of staff to General Hunter; served in the army of the Potomac, and was chief of cavalry, army of the Ohio.

(Page 62.) “Yes, not only practicable but advisable (to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments).”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Edward Hatch, Ninth U. S. Cavalry; brigadier-general of volunteers; brigade and division commander; commanded cavalry division, army of the Tennessee.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 100.) “Quartermaster’s and Commissary departments can be consolidated; also artillery and ordnance, as a matter of economy and effectiveness.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 101.) “The ordnance and artillery could be consolidated advantageously. There would be economy in it, since the artillery during peace could guard the arsenals and do nearly all the duties of the ordnance corps. \* \* \*

“The Adjutant-General’s and Inspector-General’s departments could not, in my opinion, be consolidated with propriety.” \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Hatch:

(Page 63.) “It would (be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments).”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Wesley Merritt, Ninth Cavalry, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; commanded cavalry brigade and division, Army of the Potomac, and in the Shenandoah and Richmond campaigns; afterwards major-general, U. S. A.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 156.) “In my opinion it would be advantageous to the service to consolidate the Quartermaster and Pay departments; that is, require the quartermasters in addition to their other duties to make all payments to the Army.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I do not think it would be better to have a single department of supply, nor to effect a greater consolidation than that mentioned above.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Such consolidation would not in my opinion reduce the number of officers required to efficiently perform the duties of the supply department as it now exists or when consolidated.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The effect of adopting a system whereby company and detachment commanders should pay their commands would, I think, be

disastrous. Apart from the liability to produce fraud and embezzlement on the part of those officers whose responsibilities might not be commensurate with the sums which would pass through their hands, it would diminish the respect of the enlisted men for officers thus brought in the relation to them of an overseer or boss workman.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I see no reasons why the artillery should be rendered different from the other arms of the service by a consolidation with the ordnance. The duties of the officers of the ordnance and artillery are as distinct as the duties of the cavalry from either of them. A consolidation could not decrease the aggregate number of officers, if efficiency is regarded, and would tend to favoritism and exclusiveness.

“I do not think that the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s departments could be consolidated to advantage, either for efficiency or economy. The Inspector-General’s Department I consider fully as important as that of the Adjutant-General, if not more so, on account of the personal supervision necessary for the perfect efficiency of the Army on the part of the former department. A consolidation could accomplish nothing toward reducing the number of officers in these departments, if their efficient organization be kept in view. I know of no reasons why the grade of *captain* would not be useful as well as economical in both these departments.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Benjamin H. Grierson, Tenth Cavalry, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; commanded cavalry brigade, division, and corps; brevetted major-general for gallant services in raid through Mississippi; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 150.) “Yes. I think that the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments could be advantageously placed under one supply department, for the reason that such consolidation would facilitate business generally, and especially in the delivery of stores and the prompt payment of troops. Such consolidation would reduce the number of staff officers at least one-third. The work could be done by the addition of one clerk in each department to the officer now charged with a single supply department at posts.

\* \* \* \* \*

“It is not advantageous to consolidate the Ordnance Department with any arm of the service, as it is a supply department and does not assimilate with the artillery any more than with the cavalry and infantry; it might, however, be advantageously consolidated with the Subsistence, Quartermaster’s, and Pay departments, as it is essentially and only a supply department. As at present organized, it is too independent of control; it should be like all other departments, subject to the control of division, corps, and department commanders.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I think the Inspector-General’s Department should not be consolidated with any other, but that it should be abolished. Department commanders should be held responsible for the performance of military duty in their departments, inspecting them personally; or this could be done by inspecting officers, temporarily detailed by them for that

duty. In case any *department* required special inspection, it could be done by the General of the Army, division commander, or by any officer ordered by them on this special duty.

“The law for the regulation of the Army already provides that inspections of posts be made by post commanders, and they are in fact more competent to discharge this duty than any other officer who might visit a post temporarily for duty. The Adjutant-General’s Department could also be abolished, and for this duty officers could be supplied by detail from the line of the Army.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

General Grierson:

(Page 64.) “The Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, Ordnance, and Pay departments should be consolidated into one corps or supply department, and such consolidation would facilitate business and greatly reduce expenses.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Israel Vogdes, First Artillery, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in Florida hostilities, and at beginning of civil war commanded Fort Pickens; served on staff of General Reynolds; commanded Morris and Fo ly islands, South Carolina:

(Page 66.) “Yes, I think all the administrative departments should be united under one head, with the rank of brigadier-general.”

#### **Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Emory Upton, First Artillery, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; commanded artillery brigade, Sixth Army Corps; brigade and division commander; afterwards colonel Fourth Artillery.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 138.) “The effect of adopting a system whereby company and detachment commanders should pay their commands would unquestionably be detrimental to the public interests, and especially in time of war. Each company would require its money chest. These, on the march, would be distributed through all the wagon trains of the Army. at all times liable to robbery and capture, and constantly demanding the protection of strong guards. Again, the principle of the Government requiring disbursing officers to give sufficient bonds would have to be violated, as the responsibility for the funds might shift with every casualty in the regiment, making it impracticable to procure bonds. Another strong objection naturally arises on account of the uncertain character of officers who might enter the service temporarily in case of emergency.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 139.) “The union of the ordnance with artillery, and the transfer of its officers to serve temporarily in the artillery, which is a prominent feature in the German staff system, would keep them in sympathy with the Army and make them alive to every requirement of the service, while the careful selection of the captains of ordnance

from a class of young officers, who, by apprenticeship and examination, had demonstrated their fitness for promotion, could not fail to restore the scientific character of the corps and increase its efficiency.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The Adjutant and Inspector-General’s departments could, in my opinion, be consolidated advantageously.

\* \* \* \* \*

“The duty of an inspector requires great firmness and fearlessness, and to be properly discharged the officer should not only have rank but he should be made thoroughly independent in his action by having a permanent position in the Army. \* \* \*

“It is, further, very important that a knowledge of the responsible duties of these officers should not be confined to the few officers in that department, but should likewise be extended through the troops of the line, which can easily be accomplished by permitting first lieutenants of artillery, infantry, and cavalry to serve as adjutant and inspector generals, not exceeding four years at a time. By this method, in case of sudden war, accomplished adjutant and inspector generals could instantly be selected for every brigade, division, and corps in the new army. By consolidating the two departments as they now stand, stopping the promotion till the number of officers in each grade is reduced to the number proposed, five officers only would have to be absorbed to reach the new basis.”

\* \* \* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1873.

Maj. John M. Brannan, First Artillery, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was division commander in the Army of the Cumberland; afterwards colonel Fourth Artillery:

(Page 46.) “One department of supply could discharge the duties of three departments—Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay. The same reason that applies to the duty of a post quartermaster and commissary will apply to the purchasing and transporting department of the Government. The Pay Department could be added without requiring too much labor from the same officer. I don’t believe *every* officer is adapted for the duties of a supply officer, particularly a quartermaster and commissary. It requires a peculiar knowledge for these departments so that the Government would not be swindled by shoddy articles. He should be what is usually understood as a *shrewd business* man, with great energy and industry and practical common sense. Honesty is, of course, the first requisite.” \* \* \*

(Page 47.) “I believe it would be of great advantage to the service and country to consolidate the Ordnance Department and artillery regiments into one *corps*; abolish the regimental organization of artillery, as it is in all European armies; have a chief of ordnance and artillery; \* \* \* require the chief of ordnance and artillery to detail a sufficient number of officers of the corps for service at the arsenals, armories, and foundries for the period of *two* or *three* years. When an officer is discovered to have a peculiar and unusual talent for invention or improvements in ordnance generally, let him remain per-

manently at the arsenal or foundry so that the country could have the benefit of his superior ability in that specialty. \* \* \*

“I don’t think it would be any advantage to consolidate the Adjutant and Inspector General’s departments. An inspector-general *should know everything* about an army; be posted as to accounts, so as to detect immediately anything wrong or irregular in the duties of a disbursing officer; understand everything relative to the interior discipline, economy, and police of a post, battery, troop, or company; be perfectly acquainted with all kinds of drill of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, and their armaments, so that the commanding general can understand in a minute by the written or verbal report the precise condition and state of his command.” \* \* \*

#### Maish report, 1878.

Maj. John Mendenhall, First Artillery, U. S. A., brevet colonel; served during the civil war as battery commander, Army of the Ohio; judge-advocate, Fourth Army Corps; chief of artillery, Twenty-first Army Corps; assistant chief of artillery, Army of the Cumberland; afterwards colonel, Second Artillery.

(Page 161.) “I would have two staff departments only, besides the Medical, Engineer, and Ordnance corps—an executive (or adjutant-general’s) department and a supply department. The officers to be detailed; the chief of each to be selected from the general officers, and the other officers from the line.

“Of the present staff departments I would consolidate the Quartermaster’s Department, the Subsistence and Pay departments into the supply department; the Adjutant-General’s, Inspector-General’s, and the Judge-Advocate-General’s departments into the executive or Adjutant-General’s Department.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. William F. Barry, Second Artillery, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; was chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, and military division of the Mississippi during the civil war.

(Page 2.) “The Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments of the Army can and ought to be consolidated in one department. \* \* \* It would be more economical, because the business would be transacted with much greater simplicity and celerity, because the accountability would be more direct and simple. \* \* \* Such a consolidation would not reduce the number of officers engaged in those duties, but would reduce the number who are specially so engaged. \* \* \* The Ordnance and artillery could be most advantageously consolidated into one ‘corps of artillery.’ The effect in point of economy would be considerable, and in point of efficiency would be almost incalculable, \* \* \* because fewer officers would be required and because the field of selection for assignment would be greatly enlarged. \* \* \*

"I do not think the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments could be consolidated without great injury to the efficiency of the last named. Both might and ought to be reorganized, \* \* \* or might be abolished, and the officers who are to perform the duties might be made a matter of detail, but all appointees or detailed officers, as inspectors, should be special for the three arms—i. e., there should be inspectors of artillery, of cavalry, and of infantry."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. William H. French, Second U. S. Artillery, major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida and Mexican wars; corps commander during the civil war, afterwards colonel Fourth Artillery.

(Page 52). "It is my opinion that the executive duties of the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay departments can be performed by the same officer; that the administrative duties of heads of bureaus should remain distinct, as at present—a field officer of each branch at division and department headquarters. Reasons: Personal experience in active service, where it has actually and successfully been put in practice." \* \* \*

"It would not be better to have a single department of supply. The three bureaus should remain. The executive duties should be consolidated." \* \* \*

(Page 53.) "The effect of making company and detachment commanders disbursing officers for their commands would be injurious to young and inexperienced officers, exposing them to temptation and the liability to loss by carelessness, want of aptitude, or theft. Post and regimental quartermasters could perform the duty. \* \* \*

"It would not be advantageous to again merge the ordnance with the artillery, as was done in the reorganization of the Army in 1821. The experience of eleven years separated them again in 1832, and my experience as an artillery officer in the Florida, Mexican, and other wars since that time, commanding light and heavy artillery, is that the present is the most economical and efficient system, both for ordnance and artillery. The ordnance department has always proved equal to the emergency, and in my opinion is beyond the necessity of going back to the acknowledged failure of 1821–1832. Officers of artillery who mind their legitimate business on this coast find abundance to do. \* \* \*

"The duties of an adjutant-general and an inspector-general are so distinct that I can not assimilate them. An efficient army must have both." \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

Col. George W. Getty, Third Artillery, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers, served in the Mexican war, and during the civil war in the Army of the Potomac and the Shenandoah campaign; was for a time acting inspector general, Army of the Potomac.

(Page 67.) "It would be practicable; but to consolidate the three corps (quartermaster's, commissary, and pay) into one would not in my opinion be for the best interests of the service."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Horace Brooks, Fourth Artillery, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general, served in the Florida and Mexican wars; during the civil war, regimental commander and on recruiting and mustering duty.

(Page 51.) “I think the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments could be advantageously consolidated, and that those duties could be performed by one staff corps with a less number of officers than now required in the three separate departments. \* \* \*

“If the ordnance and artillery had never been separated, and thus created the chasm which now exists between them, I think a united corps would have continued efficient, but under existing circumstances it would take years to make it so.

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Brooks:

(Page 68.) “Yes (practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments).”

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Henry J. Hunt, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, succeeding General Barry.

(Page 73). “Practicable, but perhaps not advisable (to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments).”

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Maj. Truman Seymour, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A.; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was brigade and division commander; brigadier-general of volunteers.

(Page 55.) “The Quartermaster’s and Subsistence departments could be consolidated, and without diminishing the efficiency of their service during war as well as in peace. \* \* \*

“The payment of troops, however, involves wide knowledge upon points and decisions not assimilated to that required in other supply departments, and the duties and responsibilities of paying large numbers of men in time of war are so greatly increased that the interests of the service would probably best be promoted by preserving this as a separate organization. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

“The ordnance and artillery can not be consolidated without impairing the efficiency of each or both.”

**Banning report, 1876.**

Capt. Robert E. Johnston, First Infantry, U. S. A.; major, Eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and lieutenant-colonel, Veteran Reserve Corps; served in the Army of the Potomac; regimental commander; three brevets.

(Page 200.) “I do not think anything will be gained by it (the consolidation of the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments),

except probably making an additional major-general. The same duties exactly will be performed by the same officers. If consolidated into one corps, the head of the corps would evidently want additional rank and you would be required to have the same officers you have now."

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Samuel W. Crawford, Second Infantry, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; division commander at Antietam and Gettysburg; brevet major-general.

(Page 85.) "That there are certain departments of the staff which, if united, would prove more advantageous to the service in point of economy and efficiency there is no doubt, in my judgment, but such union should be so effected as to be susceptible of expansion in case of any increase in the numerical force of the Army.

\* \* \* "In my judgment, such consolidation can be advantageously attained; and, first, by a consolidation of the Commissary with the Quartermaster's Department; second, an interchange of duty of the ordnance and artillery, and, third, a consolidation of the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 87.) "Pay Department: But in regard to the consolidation of the Pay Department, it is very questionable whether that important department could, with advantage, be merged in any other. Its duties are specific, and require experience and separate and distinct individual responsibility and accountability. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 88.) \* \* \* "The officers of the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's Department are nearer to the line of the Army than any other of the staff. Their duties concern the *personnel* of the Army, and they come directly in contact with the machinery of the service in all of its workings, and upon the agency of these two departments largely depends the efficiency of the Army.

"The officers of these departments embrace many of the best of their grades in the Army, and if now consolidated into one department and increased, a larger influence would be exerted for good to the Army.

\* \* \* "Then, if the consolidated corps was increased by addition from the line, and the officers after a specific term of service were subject to a return to their regiments, it would send back to the line from time to time men instructed in these important staff duties. It would give us in time of war a class of officers to draw from for the service generally whose value could not well be overrated."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Maish report, 1878.

Col. De Lancey Floyd-Jones, Third Infantry, U. S. A.; served in the Mexican war and civil war; regimental commander, Army of the Potomac.

(Page 121.) "I think the present organization of the staff department very good. I have no changes to suggest.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I do not favor any such 'changes or reductions,' 'by consolidation or otherwise.'"

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Silas Casey, U. S. A. (retired), late of Fourth U. S. Infantry; major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war, Mexican war, and war of the rebellion.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 92.) "I am of the opinion that the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments of the Army could be advantageously consolidated, for the general reason of greater efficiency.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The chief of the department of supply should be an officer of talent and of good administrative ability, and should have the rank of a major-general, to be selected from the Army. The department should be so constituted as to admit of a sudden expansion to meet every emergency.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I am of the opinion that the ordnance and artillery corps could not be advantageously united, and principally for the following reasons:

"The duties are not sufficiently homogeneous. It is the duty of the Ordnance Department not only to manufacture the cannon for the artillery corps, but the muskets, rifles, pistols, and swords for the cavalry and infantry; also the horse equipments for all.

"An accomplished ordnance officer should be a good metallurgist, and should also be acquainted with the different fulminates. He should know the methods of fulminating the various articles used in his department, and be able to judge of their quality."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Franklin F. Flint, Fourth Infantry, U. S. A.; served in the Florida war and civil war; acting inspector-general, Department of the Ohio; chief commissary of musters, Departments of the Ohio and Kentucky.

(Page 80.) "I think not (practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments), having a due regard for the true interests of the service."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Nelson A. Miles, Fifth Infantry, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander, Second Army Corps, Army of the Potomac; in command of the Army since October 2, 1895; now Lieutenant-General, U. S. A.

(Page 81.) "They could be consolidated, the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. William B. Hazen, Sixth Infantry, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers, brigade, division, and corps commander; afterwards Chief Signal Officer, U. S. A., with the rank of brigadier-general.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 169). “I think the duties of the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments could be advantageously performed by one department, to be known as the administrative branch of the Army, or as the department of supply.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 170.) “I think the ordnance and artillery could be advantageously consolidated, for the reason that the Ordnance Department as now constituted, is not a corps of soldiers, but of special master mechanics, separated from the Army, both in fact and from their associations, in sympathy. \* \* \*

“I do not believe the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s departments could be combined with advantage, for the following reasons: Except in the case of the supply department, I do not believe it is ever advantageous, but always pernicious to permanently separate officers into corps apart from the troops. \* \* \* The duties of adjutant-generals and inspectors should be performed by officers who form a part of the line of the Army, and who shall from time to time command troops and perform duty with them. In no other way can there be an army with that harmony of sympathy and interest so essential to its efficiency.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

General Hazen:

(Page 83.) “Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments could be consolidated in a corps of one-third the present number of officers, and a sufficient detail of lieutenants from the cavalry and and infantry. The Medical Department could dispense with one-fourth its officers. \* \* \* The Adjutant’s, Inspector’s, and Judge-Advocate’s departments, should be consolidated and reorganized, to be known as the general staff, and their duties should be largely military, not office. Lieutenants of the line should act as routine office men.”

#### Burnside report, 1878.

General Hazen:

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 453.) “II. In place of the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s departments, I recommend a general staff upon the model now adopted by all European governments, from the most extended experience and careful study; the officers to belong to regiments, taking tours of duty with them. In no other way can a staff always know what is best for an army. It fosters union and sympathy, while these officers are trained in the best possible school for high commands.

“III. In place of the Quartermaster’s and Commissary’s departments, I recommend a bureau of supply.

“IV. In place of Medical and Pay departments, I recommend a medical and pay bureau.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. John Gibbon, Seventh Infantry, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers. Served in the Mexican war. During the civil war was

chief of artillery to General McDowell; brigade, division, and corps commander; commanded Second Corps at Gettysburg; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 146.) “I do not believe that any of the staff departments of the Army can be consolidated with benefit to the service.

\* \* \* \* \*

“I do not believe it would be better to have a single department to discharge the functions of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments.

\* \* \* \* \*

“6. Could the Ordnance and Artillery Corps be advantageously consolidated, and what would be the effect in point of economy and efficiency? State your reasons for your views upon the subject.

“Yes. I think both economy and efficiency would be the result. This is a controversy of long standing in the Army. The consolidation has always been vigorously opposed by the Ordnance Department, principally, I think, from that ‘close corporation’ idea which objects to outsiders reaping any of those advantages which can be confined to a few. The ordnance and artillery duties are closely allied. There is no artillery officer whose efficiency would not be increased by the information and experience to be had in the Ordnance Department, and, vice versa, no ordnance officer who would not be benefited by experience in the artillery arm, in commanding troops and learning the practical use of the arms he is employed in manufacturing.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 147.) “Every one who served in the Army during the late war knows that without our staff we could not have gotten along anything like as easily as we did. Such an expansion would have been much more difficult and inefficient if instead of having each of the supply departments a separate and distinct organization, they had all been consolidated into one; and few, I think, will contend that such a consolidated supply department would work well in time of war.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

General Gibbon:

(Page 88.) “I do not think that consolidation of these departments (Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay) would add to their efficiency or the best interests of the service. It is, of course, practicable, but by no means advisable.

(Page 89.) “It is a matter of very great importance to the service that some system of exchange between the subordinate grades of the Adjutant-General's, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Inspector-General's, and Pay departments, and the similar grades in the line, should be instituted. \* \* \* Such a system, if properly inaugurated and gradually carried out, will not interfere with that permanency in the staff departments by which efficiency is gained in specialties, since the officers of the higher grades would be changed only in case of marked unfitness.”

#### **Banning report, 1876.**

Col. August V. Kautz, Eighth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; served in Mexican war as private, First Ohio Volunteers;

during the civil war served in the Army of the Potomac; commanded cavalry brigade, Army of the Ohio; chief of cavalry, Twenty-third Army Corps; commanded cavalry division, Army of the James, and a division in the Twenty-fifth Army Corps; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 91.) "I believe it would add to the efficiency of the military service if the Pay, Quartermaster's, and Subsistence departments were all united into one corps for supplying the Army, but I have already given the opinion that there is a doubt whether such consolidation would cause any saving in the number of officers."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. John H. King, Ninth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was brigade and division commander.

(Page 93.) "I think not (practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments)."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Henry B. Clitz, Tenth Infantry, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general; served in the Mexican war, and during the civil war in the Army of the Potomac and in South Carolina.

(Page 94.) "I think not (practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments). These departments as organized have worked admirably and satisfactorily through two long wars, and I do not think any change would be for the better, or would save expense."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. William H. Wood, Eleventh Infantry, U. S. A.: served in the Mexican war and civil war; assistant inspector-general on staff of General McDowell; assistant provost-marshal-general, Army of the Potomac.

(Page 95.) "It would not only be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay departments, but, in my opinion, the Government would be better served by so doing. At almost every military post the duties of quartermaster and commissary of subsistence are now both performed by an officer of the line, detailed for that purpose. In addition to these duties the troops could just as well be paid by him, as he is now a disburser of public funds."

**Maish report, 1878.**

Colonel Wood:

(Page 130.) "The number of general and staff officers in the Army, and the number of field, staff, and line officers in each subdivision should, in my opinion, remain as now authorized by law.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The organization of the staff departments should, in my opinion, remain as at present.

“I do not think that the service would be benefited by any change or reduction in the various staff departments, by consolidation or otherwise.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Coburn report, 1873.

Lieut. Col. George P. Buell, Eleventh Infantry, U. S. A., brevet brigadier-general; during the civil war was colonel Fifty-eighth Indiana Volunteers; served in the Army of the Ohio and Army of the Cumberland, brigade commander; afterwards colonel Fifteenth Infantry.

(Page 154.) “In my opinion some of the staff departments could be combined and consolidated advantageously to the country and service—the Adjutant with the Inspector-General and Judge-Advocate departments, the Quartermaster’s and Commissary with the Pay Department. Such an organization could be made so that greater economy, honesty, a higher standard of integrity and honor, more energy, less laziness, drinking, and gambling on the part of the officers of both line and staff, and a much more elevated degree of loyalty, pride of service, rank, and country, on the part of the officers, would be the result, and have a similiar effect on the men. \* \* \*”

(Page 155.) Q. “Could the Ordnance and Artillery Corps be advantageously consolidated, and what would be the effect in point of economy and efficiency?—A. No, sir. Efficiency would be destroyed. A man may be an excellent artillerist but be unable and incompetent to make the necessary theoretical investigations and calculations for the improvement of ordnance. The Engineer and Ordnance departments might be one and the same.”

#### Banning report, 1876.

Col. Orlando B. Willcox, Twelfth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; in the civil war was division and corps commander; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 96.) “I do not think it would be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster’s, Commissary, and Pay departments. It would require a chief of staff at the head of the whole whose importance might interfere with that of the Secretary of War, in whom the control is practically centered already; in which case there would result either a divided responsibility, for one thing, or the chief of the supply department would become a cipher. Besides, although the present staff system has some defects, yet it has proved to be a great improvement on the consolidated system in vogue during and previous to the war of 1812.”

#### Maish report, 1878.

General Willcox:

(Page 132.) “My experience with the staff organization is that it is very good so far as the supply departments are concerned. \* \* \* The supply departments might all be organized under one good head, but suppose it were a poor head, and suppose the poor head had influence? The great change needed is in the method of selections for

the corps. I do not believe in consolidation of departments. Any change of form or name would not do away with the number required to do the work." \* \* \*

### Coburn report, 1873.

Col. Isaac V. D. Reeve, U. S. A. (retired), late of Thirteenth Infantry, U. S. A.; brevet brigadier-general; served in the Florida war, Mexican war, and the civil war; was captured by General Twiggs, and afterwards on mustering duty and in command of draft rendezvous.

(Page 158.) "It is my opinion that the staff departments can not be consolidated with any advantage to the public service and the country. They have grown out of and been organized as necessities of the service, both in peace and war; have been recommended and approved by the best military heads the country has produced, and seem to offer the best organization admitting of ready expansion and contraction to meet the largest and smallest demands of the country as they have been (or may be) made manifest. \* \* \* It is argued that the heads of these departments are very expensive grades to maintain. This is true, but to my mind they are the necessary expenses of efficiency.

"Would it be better to have a single department of supply, whose duty it should be to discharge the functions of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments? If so, give your reasons.

"It would be impossible in time of war, with large armies in the field, for any one officer, as the head of such a department, to perform in an efficient manner the duties now performed by the heads of the three departments named. Consolidation would be only appointing a chief to the three departments, each still having an executive head, such chief performing the administrative duties in a very general way, the final result being heads of an inferior grade and different title from the present incumbents. The duties of these departments must still run independent of each other, for they can not be amalgamated. \* \* \*

"The consolidation would not materially reduce the number of officers engaged in these duties, for the duties must be done, and they are only done now; and it is not just to assume that any of these staff offices are mere sinecures, for it is not true. If, in consolidation, their number should be materially reduced, details from the line of a sufficient number would be added to those of the department of supply to insure the prompt performance of all the duties. Such details would be manifestly injurious to the service, as I have never known an instance where there were *too* many or even enough officers on duty with their regiments, the various causes of their absence even now proving detrimental. It is my opinion that but small reduction would be made in the number of officers engaged in these duties, and then at the expense and injury of other branches of the service."

(Page 159.) "What would be the effect of adopting a system whereby company and detachment commanders should pay their commands? \* \* \* It would be gross injustice, both to the Government and to the officer, to place a large amount of funds in his (the company commander's) hands for custody and disbursement, he perhaps being a young and inexperienced lieutenant (for such do have command of companies), and with very insufficient means of protection; often in camp or on the march, on detached duties away from his post and his funds, and even though protected by an iron safe (which article of furniture would be necessary for every company commander), ever sub-

ject to robbery and perhaps innocent ruin. The present system is more secure, and *can* be so executed that all troops shall be paid according to law." \* \* \*

"6. Could the ordnance and artillery corps be advantageously consolidated, and what would be the effect in point of economy and efficiency? State your reasons for your views upon the subject.

"If the consolidation should be so made as to reduce materially the number of officers, it would be highly detrimental to the service, because the necessary details for ordnance duty would withdraw from the artillery corps so many officers whose presence with their companies is almost indispensable. Besides, at the arsenals of construction and repairs, the duties can be much better done by officers specially instructed and experienced in them, and they are in fact, and must remain, *permanent* duties. I do not think that the economy or efficiency of the Ordnance Department or artillery corps would be enhanced by consolidation."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Banning report, 1876.

Col. Philip R. De Trobriand, Thirteenth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; brigade and division commander, Army of the Potomac:

(Page 99.) "Such a measure (consolidation of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments) may have some objections to contend with and some partial difficulties to overcome, but I consider it altogether as not only practicable but also desirable for the Army."

#### Maish report, 1878.

General De Trobriand:

(Page 135.) "The Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments can and ought to be consolidated into one corps."

#### Banning report, 1876.

Col. John E. Smith, Fourteenth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers; division commander in Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth corps. Army of the Tennessee:

(Page 101.) "The Engineer and Ordnance departments being scientific, require officers constantly practiced in the study, practically and theoretically, of their departments, respectively; it would be doubtful economy to consolidate them. \* \* \*

"I do not think it would be wise to consolidate the Pay Department with the Quartermaster's and Commissary departments. The Pay Department has a large responsibility, which I presume will be very much increased if the Pension Bureau is transferred to the War Department."

#### Banning report, 1876.

Col. Galusha Pennypacker, Sixteenth Infantry, U. S. A. Colonel Ninety-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers and brigadier-general of volunteers. Brigade commander; commanded brigade in expedition against Fort Fisher:

(Page 103.) "I think it would (be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments)."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Thomas L. Crittenden, Seventeenth Infantry, U. S. A. Major-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war as lieutenant-colonel Third Kentucky Infantry; during the civil war was division and corps commander, Army of the Ohio, and corps commander, Army of the Cumberland:

(Page 104.) "I look upon the Ordnance Department of our Army as almost perfect. \* \* \* Of the Subsistence Department I can only say that since I have known anything about it, i. e., since the Mexican war, it has been conducted with eminent efficiency." \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Crittenden:

(Page 104.) "After witnessing the extraordinary ability and efficiency of the Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments during the Mexican war and the late war, and considering their present efficiency, I think any change would be detrimental to the service."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Charles H. Smith, Nineteenth Infantry, U. S. A., colonel First Maine Cavalry; brevet major-general; commanded cavalry brigade in the Army of the Potomac.

(Page 105.) "I believe that the Bureau of Military Justice and the Inspector-General's Department should be consolidated with the Adjutant-General's Department, which should consist of just officers enough, with a brigadier-general for chief, to perform the duties of the Adjutant-General's Office at Washington, and that lieutenant-colonels and majors of the line (lieutenant-colonels for inspectors and majors for adjutant-generals) should be detailed to perform all duties pertaining to those departments, except in Washington. \* \* \*

"I also recommend that all captains detached from their companies be returned to duty with them, and that hereafter no captain shall be detailed or detached from duty with his company. \* \* \* Lieutenant-colonels, majors, first lieutenants, and second lieutenants that have served at least three years with their companies, are the only grades from which details should be made." \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Gen. C. H. Smith:

(Page 105.) "I believe that it is practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's and Commissary departments."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. George Sykes, Twentieth Infantry, U. S. A., major-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war, the Mexican war, and war of the rebellion; commanded Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac:

(Page 106.) "It would not be practicable to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments. Division of labor, if performed by faithful and competent officers, their number not in excess of the present wants of the service, is advantageous in every respect."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Lieut. Col. Alfred Sully, Nineteenth Infantry, U. S. A.; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Florida war and the Mexican war; in the civil war was brigade commander, afterwards colonel Twenty-first Infantry.

(Page 39.) "I think the Adjutant-General's, Inspector-General's, and Judge-Advocate-General's departments could be consolidated. By this means, officers of the Adjutant-General's Department could attend to the duties of inspector and judge-advocate; there are so few officers in these two departments that they can not attend to all of the duties pertaining to them. \* \* \*

"On some accounts, perhaps, it would be well to have one single department of supply. It frequently occurs that one officer could attend to all three of those duties (quartermaster, commissary, and paymaster) at his station, without having too much to do; it would also partly obviate the necessity of putting inexperienced subalterns on duties of much responsibility as the three departments being consolidated, there would necessarily be more officers available for these duties. \* \* \*

"I think the ordnance and artillery could be advantageously consolidated; it would render both the artillery and ordnance corps more efficient.

"Officers placed on ordnance duty should be selected with the greatest care; their natural talent for such duty should be taken into consideration, as well as their capability in other respects. At present officers of the ordnance corps are selected from cadets who graduate near the head of their class. \* \* \*

"I think the Adjutant and Inspector General's departments could be consolidated. We have very few officers in the Inspector-General's Department; no doubt there is a sufficient number for the present strength of the Army, if the Army was concentrated; but scattered as it is all over the country, the number of the inspectors is altogether too small to attend properly to their duties, and in consequence of this officers of little experience are frequently detailed to perform this duty—one of the most important ones in the service. If officers of the Adjutant-General's Department were made to do this duty in connection with their present duties, it would perhaps give the Army the benefit of officers experienced as inspectors."

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Sully:

(Page 109.) "I think in time of peace, with additional clerks, one officer could in many cases attend to all three of these duties (quartermaster, commissary, and paymaster); but in case of war, I do not think it would work well."

**Maish report, 1878.**

General Sully:

(Page 138.) "I am of the opinion that the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments could be consolidated, and that the Adjutant-General's Department could take charge of the Bureau of Justice, but this would make no important decrease in the number of officers."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. David S. Stanley, Twenty-second Infantry, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; division and corps commander; chief of cavalry. Army of the Cumberland; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.

(Page 143.) "A single department of supply, embracing the Quartermaster's and Commissary departments, should work well; as I have written before, the duties are of the same nature. I do not think the Pay Department can be dispensed with. The number of paymasters might be greatly reduced. The absurdity comes in again, of fifty-five paymasters to pay forty regiments. There are now ten military departments in the United States, and twenty paymasters. Two to each department—one to act as banker, the other to rectify and supervise accounts—are all that are necessary. And in point of fact, banking and supervising accounts is all that fifty-five of them do now. For five years I have been in this Upper Missouri country. The payments for half the year (winter) have been made by captains of companies, or the trader, and a part of this time three, and always two, paymasters were stationed in Sioux City."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 144.) "6. Could the ordnance and artillery corps be advantageously consolidated, and what would be the effect in point of economy and efficiency? State your reasons for your views upon the subject.

.. \* \* \* I believe the consolidation would bring more talent and more liberal ideas into the Ordnance Corps, and in time of war we probably would not have so many men killed with our own shells. But would not the command of arsenals become a subject of intrigue and favoritism in time of peace and the resort of skulkers from danger in time of war?"

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

General Stanley:

(Page 110.) "It would be practicable but hardly advisable (to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments)."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Jefferson C. Davis, Twenty-third Infantry; brigadier-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; during the civil war was brigade, division, and corps commander.

(Page 111.) "The Pay and Subsistence departments can and should be united. Their duties are perfectly homogeneous. They should be under one head, that of 'pay and subsistence.' \* \* \*

"Medical Department: The general organization and working of this department is good; it can not be consolidated with any other. \* \* \*

"The Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments can and should be united; \* \* \* their duties are homogeneous, and should be performed by the same officers. \* \* \*

(Page 113.) "I would, as before recommended, unite the Commissary and Pay departments, but the status of the Quartermaster's Department I would not change except to reduce it in number, and

turn over none of its duties to the line officers. It disburses now, I understand, about \$12,000,000 annually; besides, it has large property responsibilities. Disbursements required to be made by the Quartermaster's Department are very varied in kind and sometimes complicated; it is on this account the most difficult department to manage; extravagance in it is more difficult to correct."

**Banning report, 1876.**

Lieut. Col. Richard I. Dodge, Twenty-third Infantry, U. S. A.; during the civil war was lieutenant-colonel and assistant inspector-general. Fourth Army Corps, and on recruiting and mustering duty; afterwards colonel, Eleventh Infantry.

(Page 122.) "I think it would be a very great mistake to consolidate the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments. The duties of these three departments are very dissimilar, and one officer can not possibly attend to the details of all."

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Col. Abner Doubleday, Twenty-fourth Infantry, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers; served in the Mexican war; was brigade, division, and corps commander during the civil war; commanded First Corps at Gettysburg.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 141.) "I think both the Commissary and Pay departments could be advantageously consolidated, in case the present system of making payments is to continue. Neither of these departments have enough to do.

\* \* \* \* \*

"At the close of the Mexican war it was proposed by officers of rank, like Joseph E. Johnston and Robert E. Lee, to divide the Quartermaster's Department into two parts, on account of the overwhelming amount of business which appertained to it.

\* \* \* \* \*

"In my opinion it would be a great benefit both to the Army and to the Treasury to allow company and detachment commanders to pay their commands. Experience shows that when men are paid large amounts at long intervals, drunkenness, dissipation, and gambling ensue. \* \* \*

"The artillery and ordnance corps ought to be consolidated. The intelligence which makes and improves arms, and the intelligence which uses arms, should be united to be efficient.

\* \* \* \* \*

"As an adjutant general holds a very important and confidential relation to his immediate commander, and as the Inspector-General knows everything concerning the different portions of the command, it would be advantageous to unite the two."

\* \* \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. Joseph H. Potter, Twenty-fourth Infantry, U. S. A., brigadier-general of volunteers. Served in the Mexican war; during the civil

war was brigade commander, and chief of staff, Twenty-fourth Army Corps; afterwards brigadier-general, U. S. A.:

(Page 114.) "I think the ordnance and artillery might be consolidated without detriment to the service; \* \* \* that the Pay, Quartermaster's, and Commissary departments should be consolidated into one department; that the Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments should remain as now constituted.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I am of the opinion that the Pay, Commissary, and Quartermaster's departments should be consolidated into one corps; that it is practicable, and that it would be for the best interests of the service."

#### Banning report, 1876.

Col. George L. Andrews, Twenty-fifth Infantry, U. S. A. During the civil war was lieutenant-colonel First Missouri Volunteers, major Seventeenth Infantry, and lieutenant-colonel Thirteenth Infantry, regimental and brigade commander Army of the Potomac:

(Page 116.) "The result of a consolidation (of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay departments) will be very apt to be the same thing under a new name. The Subsistence Department gives general satisfaction. In regard to the Quartermaster's Department, it is a difficult subject to handle."

### RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMMITTEES AND EXTRACTS FROM BILLS REPORTED BY THEM PROVIDING FOR CONSOLIDATION OF AND DETAILS TO STAFF DEPARTMENTS, WITH REVIEW OF LEGISLATION ON ARMY ORGANIZATION BY GENERAL GARFIELD.

#### Garfield report, 1869.

Mr. Garfield, from the Committee on Military Affairs, made the following report:

(Page 1.) "As the committee will not have an opportunity to report any bill to be acted upon before the expiration of the present Congress, they can only present the information they have gathered, and ask that it be printed for the information of all concerned, and for use in the next Congress.

"The committee are convinced from their examination of the subject that a number of modifications in the organization of the Army can be made, which will secure equal or greater efficiency at less expense. A few of the most important of these will be mentioned.

"The staff departments or corps are, in the opinion of the committee, too numerous and too large in proportion to the line of the Army." \* \* \*

(Page 2.) "The inquiries of the committee have satisfied them that the number of separate staff departments can be reduced by consolidation without detriment to the service and with considerable saving of expense."

(NOTE.—For views of committee on staff in time of war, see page 15, ante; on consolidation of staff departments, see page 86, ante.)

**Coburn report, 1873.**

Mr. Coburn, from the Committee on Military Affairs, made the following report:

(NOTE.—For views of the committee on testimony of army officers, see page 10, ante; on an efficient staff, see page 11, ante; on staff in time of war, see page 16, ante; on permanent staff, details, etc., see page 22, ante; and on consolidation, see page 86, ante.) \* \* \*

(Page X.) “The committee \* \* \* deem it advisable to provide that an opportunity shall be afforded for as many officers as possible to be put upon staff duty. To do this, present vacancies should be kept open, and, if possible, others created; this can be done by promotion in the higher grades of the staff, without the creation of additional officers, there being already quite a number of vacancies in the lower grades of the staff.

“In order that these vacancies may be filled by the most capable and meritorious officers, competitive examinations would probably furnish the best method of selection. And in order that as large a number of line officers as possible shall become acquainted with staff duties, a limited period should be fixed for continuance upon them. The Medical Department and the Bureau of Military Justice ought not to be included in these provisions, and the large number of vacancies in the Medical Department, and large number of contract surgeons employed, seem to indicate forcibly the importance of allowing new appointments in that Department.”

(Page XI.) “The importance of having a chief of the various arms of the service has been often suggested, and it is believed that a capable and thoroughly informed officer, whose duty it shall be to look after the interests of each arm, specially, will add greatly to its efficiency.

“The accompanying bill is submitted for consideration as in some measure embodying the foregoing suggestions:

(Page XI.) “A BILL (H. R. 3937) to amend an act entitled ‘An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy, and for other purposes,’ approved March 3, 1869.

“SEC. 2. That whenever there is a vacancy in any department or corps of the staff, except in the Medical Department and Bureau of Military Justice, in any office below the grades hereinafter named, the Secretary of War shall detail an officer of the line to fill the same for a period not to exceed four years. And he shall appoint a board of not less than five officers, three of whom shall be of the line and two of the staff, to conduct competitive examinations of all officers who may be applicants or may be recommended to be detailed to fill such vacancies in any corps or department of the staff. And the Secretary of War shall detail those having the most favorable recommendations of said board to fill all of said vacancies by detail, and not more than five officers from one regiment shall be so detailed at one time. And at the end of four years any officer so detailed may be transferred to other staff duties for another term of four years, at the end of which time he shall be returned to his duties with his regiment. And in the Medical Department new appointments below the grade of major shall be lawful.

“SEC. 3. Hereafter five vacancies in the grade of major shall be filled by detail in the Adjutant-General’s Department; ten vacancies in the grade of captain shall be filled by detail in the Quartermaster’s

Department; six vacancies in the grade of captain shall be filled by detail in the Subsistence Department; ten vacancies shall be filled by detail in the grade of major in the Pay Department; ten vacancies in the grade of first lieutenant and five vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant shall be filled by detail in the Corps of Engineers; five vacancies in the grade of first lieutenant and five vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant shall be filled by detail in the Ordnance Department. And it shall be lawful to fill any such vacancy in the staff by detail from the same or the next lower grade in the line. And no such officer shall be so detailed until he shall have served at least four years with the troops in the field, if above the grade of second lieutenant, and if a second lieutenant, at least two years upon such duty. And nothing herein prescribed shall be construed to prevent regular appointments and promotions in the permanent staff for vacancies not hereby reserved for details.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 5. There shall be detailed by the Secretary of War, from the officers of the line, an officer of artillery, one of cavalry, and one of infantry, not below the grade of major, to be severally the chief of artillery, the chief of cavalry, and the chief of infantry; and it shall be the duty of such chief of artillery, cavalry, and infantry to supervise the arming, the equipment, the clothing, the feeding, the supplies, the drill, the discipline, and the sanitary condition of his special arm of the service, under the direction of the Inspector-General of the Army.”

February 11, 1873: H. R. 3937, introduced by Mr. Coburn, and referred to Committee on Military Affairs.

February 13, 1873: Reported back by Mr. Coburn from the Committee on Military Affairs, with a report of the Committee on Staff Organization of the Army, and recommitted.

#### Coburn report, 1874.

Mr. Coburn, from the Committee on Military Affairs, made the following report:

(NOTE.—For views of the committee on permanent staff and details, see page 23 ante.)

(Page III.) \* \* \* “The committee, therefore, deem it not to be unsafe to reduce the Army, now composed of thirty thousand men, to twenty-five thousand men of all arms. They found it necessary to inquire into the expediency of reducing the number of officers as well as men in the Army. It was found that the annual average decrease in the number of officers was about eighty-three.” \* \* \*

(Page IV.) “It is believed that the number of officers should be reduced with the men; and recommend that five regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery be disbanded after the first of January, 1875, and that the officers be assigned to other duties in other regiments, or to details in the staff corps. Many vacancies will necessarily occur in the official list, both of the staff and line, and it is believed that in a short time the supernumerary force will be all absorbed and put upon regular duties.” \* \* \*

(Page VI.) “These reductions will take place gradually, but the larger part of them will occur within a year and continue until the

whole work is accomplished. The organization of the Army is to be left as complete as before, without any material or radical change; capable of expansion to the largest demands, and ready to meet the gravest emergencies." \* \* \*

(Page VII.) "The committee have prepared the following bill, and recommend its passage:

(Page VII.) "A BILL (H. R. 2546) to provide for the gradual reduction of the Army of the United States."

\* \* \* \* \*

"SEC. 7. That the Adjutant-General's Department of the Army shall hereafter consist of \* \* \*. As vacancies occur in the grade of major, no appointment to fill the same shall be made until the number shall be reduced to four; and thereafter the number of permanent officers in said grade shall continue to conform to said reduced number. And there shall be in addition eight assistant adjutants-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of captains of cavalry, to be detailed from the officers of the line of the Army."

(Page VIII.) "SEC. 8. That the Inspector-General's Department shall consist of \* \* \* ; and the Secretary of War may, in addition, detail officers of the line, not to exceed four, to act as assistant inspectors-general: *Provided*, That officers of the line detailed as acting inspectors-general shall have all the allowances of cavalry officers of their respective grades, and no new appointment shall be made in the Inspector-General's Department until the number of inspectors-general is reduced to five."

SEC. 9. (Provides for the Bureau of Military Justice—no details.)

"SEC. 10. That the Quartermaster's Department of the Army shall hereafter consist of \* \* \*. And there shall be in addition ten assistant quartermasters, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of first lieutenants of cavalry, and no appointments to fill the same permanently shall be made, but the same shall be made by detail from the lieutenants of the line of the Army.

"SEC. 11. That the Subsistence Department of the Army shall hereafter consist of \* \* \*. As vacancies shall occur in the grade of captain, no appointment to fill the same shall be made until the number shall be reduced to eight; and thereafter the number of permanent officers in said grade shall continue to conform to said reduced number; and the remainder, six in number shall be filled by detail."

SECS. 12 and 13. (Provide for the Medical and Pay departments—no details.)

(Page IX.) "SEC. 15. That the Ordnance Department shall consist of \* \* \* and ten second lieutenants, with the same pay and emoluments as now provided by law. And as vacancies occur in the grade of first lieutenant, no appointment to fill the same shall be made until the number shall be reduced to ten; and thereafter the number of permanent officers in said grade shall conform to said reduced number; and the remainder, six in number, shall be filled by detail from the officers of the line of the Army; and as vacancies shall occur in the grade of second lieutenant, no permanent appointment shall be made to fill the same until the number be entirely reduced; and thereafter the same, as far as shall be required by the exigencies of the service, shall be filled by detail from the officers of the line of the Army: *Provided*, That no new appointment of ordnance storekeeper shall be made until otherwise provided by law.

“SEC. 16. That whenever a vacancy shall occur in any department or corps of the staff which is to be filled by detail, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to fill the same from the officers of the line of the Army of the same or the next lower grade, for a period not to exceed four years with the same officer. And he shall appoint a board of not less than five officers, three of whom shall be of the line and two of the staff, to conduct competitive examinations of all officers who may be applicants or may be recommended to be detailed to fill such vacancies. And the Secretary of War shall detail those having the most favorable recommendations of said board, and not more than five officers from one regiment shall be so detailed at one time. And at the end of four years any officer so detailed may be transferred to other staff duties for another term of four years, at the end of which time he shall be returned to his duties with his regiment, unless he shall be appointed permanently to fill a vacancy in the staff. And no officer shall be detailed or appointed to serve in any department or corps of the staff until he shall have served at least four years in the field with the troops, if above the grade of second lieutenant; and, if a second lieutenant, at least two years upon such duty consecutively. And no officer shall serve in any one department or corps of the staff by detail for a longer period than four years consecutively.

“SEC. 17. That no officer now in service shall be reduced in rank or mustered out by reason of any provision of law herein made reducing the number of officers in any department or corps of the staff, or by reason of the consolidation of regiments, as hereinbefore provided.”

\* \* \* \* \*

March 17, 1874: H. R. 2546, reported by Mr. Coburn from the Committee on Military Affairs.

May 28, 1874: Bill considered.

May 29, 1874: Bill passed House of Representatives.

July 23, 1874: “An act reorganizing the several staff corps of the Army,” approved July 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 244), reduced certain of the staff department, but contained no provision as to details, except in the Inspector-General’s Department.

### **Banning report, 1876.**

Mr. Banning, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the following report:

(NOTE.—For views of the committee on Army organization see page 11, ante, and on consolidation see page 88, ante.)

(Page 3.) \* \* \* “The accompanying bill (H. R. 2264) ‘to promote the efficiency of the Army, to provide for its gradual reduction, and to consolidate certain of its staff departments, and for other purposes,’ is submitted for consideration, as embodying the conclusions developed through the labors of the committee.

\* \* \* “The reduction does not muster out or discharge a single worthy or efficient officer, unless the officer may so desire, and, in that event, he will receive a stated amount of pay.” \* \* \*

February 23, 1876: H. R. 2264—“To promote the efficiency of the Army, to provide for its gradual reduction, and to consolidate certain

of its staff departments, and for other purposes," introduced by Mr. Banning, of Ohio, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. (Bill not printed in report of committee.)

March 29, 1876: Reported back by Mr. Banning with a bill (H. R. 2935, same title) as a substitute, and recommitted.

June 1, 1876: Bill considered. The amendment offered by Mr. Hurlbut as a substitute for the bill was read, as follows: "*Be it enacted, etc.*, That the President of the United States be requested and directed to appoint a commission of seven officers of the Army, of distinguished service and knowledge, who shall report through the President, as soon as practicable, their opinions upon the best method of reorganizing the Army of the United States, and especially upon the best method of organizing the staff departments, with a view to economy and efficiency." The yeas and nays were ordered, and the amendment was not agreed to.

June 1, 1876: The bill passed the House of Representatives.

June 2, 1876: Reported to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

July 24, 1876: "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1877, and for other purposes," approved July 24, 1876, provided in section 4 (20 Stat., 101): "That the whole subject-matter of reform and reorganization of the Army of the United States shall be referred to the commission hereinafter provided for, who shall carefully and thoroughly examine into the matter with reference to the demands of the public service, as to the number and pay of men and officers and the proportion of the several arms, and also as to the rank, pay, and duties of the several staff corps, and whether any and what reductions can be made either in the line or staff, in numbers or in pay, by consolidation or otherwise consistently with the public service, having in view a just and reasonable economy in the expenditure of public money, the actual necessities of the military service, and the capacity for rapid and effective increase in time of actual war. The commission hereby created shall consist of two members of the Senate and two members of the House of Representatives, to be appointed by the presiding officer of each House, respectively, of the Secretary of War, and two officers of the Army, one from the line and one from the staff corps, to be selected by the President with special reference to their knowledge of the organization and experience in service. Such commission shall \* \* \* make report to Congress by the first day of the next session through the President of the United States. By joint resolution, approved January 15, 1877, the period fixed by the fourth section of the act of July 24, 1876, for the report of the commission was "extended to the 29th day of January, 1877."

#### Maish report, 1878.

"Mr. Maish, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the following:"

(Page V.) "The subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, who were charged with the collection of information and facts in relation to the organization of the Army, beg leave to submit the

following testimony, reports, letters, and copies of bills agreed to by the committee:

“MR. BANNING’S BILL TO REORGANIZE THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

\* \* \* \* \*

SEC. 7. That hereafter the Adjutant-General’s Department shall consist of \* \* \*. And the President is hereby authorized to detail, from the captains and first lieutenants of the Army, such number, not exceeding ten, as he may deem necessary, to serve as assistant adjutants-general, who shall have, while so serving, the rank and pay of captain of cavalry. Vacancies in the grade of major in said department shall be filled by selection from the officers who shall have been detailed to duty therein pursuant to the provisions of this act.”

(Page VI.) “SEC. 8. That hereafter the Inspector-General’s Department shall consist of \* \* \*. And the President is hereby authorized to detail, from officers of the Army not below the rank of major, such number, not exceeding one for each military geographical division and department, as he may deem necessary, to serve as assistant inspectors-general. Vacancies in the grade of lieutenant-colonel in said department shall be filled by selection from the officers who shall have been detailed to duty therein pursuant to the provisions of this act.

“SEC. 9. That all acts and parts of acts authorizing the appointment of a Judge-Advocate-General, an assistant judge advocate-general, or judge-advocates of the Army, so far as they, or either of them, authorize the appointment of such officer, or either, or any of them, be, and the same are hereby, repealed; and the President is authorized and required, on or before the first day of July next, to honorably discharge from the service of the United States the Judge-Advocate-General and the judge-advocates of the Army: *Provided*, That each of said officers shall receive, in addition to the pay and allowances due him at the date of his discharge, one year’s pay and allowances.

“SEC. 10. That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint, from the officers of the Army not below the rank of captain, a suitable person as judge-advocate for the Army, who shall have the rank and pay of colonel, and shall perform the duties that have heretofore been performed by the Judge-Advocate-General of the Army.

“SEC. 11. That the Quartermaster’s Department and the Subsistence Department, as separate and distinct branches of the Army, are hereby abolished; and the President is hereby authorized and required, on or before the first day of July next, to cause said departments to be consolidated into one organization, which shall hereafter be known as the department of supplies.

“SEC. 12. That the department of supplies of the Army shall consist of one chief of supplies, with the rank of brigadier-general, three colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, ten majors, and thirty-five captains, who shall each have the rank, pay, and allowances of cavalry officers of their respective grades. The chief of supplies shall be selected, length of service, military record, and efficiency considered, from the brigadier-generals of the present Quartermaster’s and Subsistence

departments: *Provided*. That the brigadier-general not selected as chief of supplies shall be assigned as inspector of said department; and upon the occurrence of a vacancy therein, the grade and position shall not be filled: *And provided further*. That on the occurrence of a vacancy in the grade of chief of supplies, the inspector shall be promoted thereto, and when a vacancy shall next occur the President shall appoint one of the colonels of said department as such chief; and thereafter the chief of supplies shall have the rank of colonel."

(Page VII.) "SEC. 13. That the President shall fill the various grades in the department of supplies not expressly provided for in section twelve of this act by the assignment to duty therein of officers of the present Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments; and such officers, when so assigned, shall retain the present relative rank held by them in their respective grades. After all these grades shall have been filled as herein provided, no appointment shall be made to the grade of captain in said department until the number of officers of that grade is reduced below fifteen; and thereafter there shall be but fifteen captains in said department, and the President may, from time to time, detail, from the captains of the line of the Army, officers to serve as assistants in said department, not exceeding twenty at any one time: *Provided*. That the number of captains in said department, together with the captains of the line so detailed as assistants, shall not exceed, in the aggregate, thirty-five: *And provided further*. That nothing in this section contained shall be so construed as to prevent officers in command of troops from making such temporary details of officers for duties pertaining to the department of supplies as they are authorized to make by existing laws and regulations for duties pertaining to the Commissary or Quartermaster's Department. Vacancies in the grade of captain in said department shall be filled by selection from the officers who shall have been detailed to duty therein pursuant to the provisions of this act.

\* \* \* \* \*

"SEC. 15. That until otherwise authorized by law, no new appointments or promotions shall be made in the Medical Department of the Army; and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized and required to report to Congress, on the first day of the session next succeeding the passage of this act, what, if any, reductions can be made in said department without detriment to the service.

"SEC. 16. That hereafter the Pay Department shall consist of \* \* \*. Vacancies in the grade of major in said department shall be filled by appointment from the captains of the line of the Army.

"SEC. 17. That the President is hereby authorized and required, on or before the first day of July next, to constitute a board, to consist of the three major-generals of the Army, whose duty it shall be to examine into and report to the President, on or before the first day of December next, upon the organization, practical working, and efficiency of the Corps of Engineers and the Ordnance Department, and to make such suggestions as, in the judgment of said board, will increase the usefulness and reduce the cost of their maintenance, which report, when so made, shall be submitted to Congress by the President, and, until otherwise authorized by law, no new appointments nor promotions shall be made in the Corps of Engineers or the Ordnance Department."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page IX.) SEC. 23. \* \* \* “*Provided further*, That no officer shall be detailed to any staff appointment or other situation the duties of which will detach him from his company, regiment, or corps, until he has served at least five years with the regiment or corps to which he properly belongs.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 28. That no officer shall be detailed to duty in any staff, corps, or department, or be eligible to appointment or promotion therein until he shall have served at least five years in the line of the Army; and no such detail shall be for a longer term than four years, or for two successive terms in the same corps or department: *Provided*, That the transfer of officers pursuant to the provisions of this act shall be without prejudice to their rank or promotion in the line, according to their said rank and seniority, which promotion shall take place according to law in the same manner as if they had not been so transferred.”

\* \* \* \* \*

January 28, 1878: H. R. 2865. “To reorganize the Army of the United States, to consolidate certain of its staff departments, to reduce the cost of its support, and for other purposes,” introduced by Mr. Banning, of Ohio, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

February 25, 1878: Reported back by Mr. Banning with amendments, and recommitted.

March 25, 1878: H. R. 4032. “To reorganize the Army of the United States,” introduced by Mr. Banning, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

May 6, 1878: Reported back by Mr. Banning with amendments, and recommitted.

June 15, 1878: Conference report on Army appropriation bill (H. R. 4867) agreed to. Mr. Hewitt, of the House conferees, said: “When the conference committee upon this bill met, they found themselves in opposition, in absolute antagonism, upon three points: First, the number of men of which the Army was to be composed; secondly, the question of the immediate reorganization of the Army, and third, the transfer of the Indian Bureau from the Interior to the War Department.

“Now the preponderance of votes in the Senate had been so great upon these three points as to be almost overwhelming, while the majority in the House on these three points was very narrow, running in one case down to four votes. \* \* \* We therefore yielded the number of men, and they stand in the report of the conference committee at 25,000.

“On the question of reorganization we yielded the immediate attempt to reorganize the Army, but we procured in lieu thereof a joint committee of the Senate and the House, to be composed of five members of the House and three of the Senate, thus securing the control of the committee to the House.”

June 18, 1878: H. R. 4867 approved by the President (20 Stat., 145).

### Burnside report, 1878.

Mr. Burnside, from the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Army, submitted the following report to accompany bill S. 1491:

(Page 2.) “It is not deemed necessary to give in this report minute details of the changes made in the laws touching the Army, as the bill

explains itself. Many of the sections of the bill are identical with those now in the Revised Statutes; but as many changes in the present laws have been recommended by the committee, it was deemed wise to make a new arrangement of all the sections to replace all the laws upon the statute books touching the Army except such chapters as the committee recommends to leave unchanged, so that this bill, if adopted, will, with the unchanged chapters referred to, make a condensed and complete military code.

The bill provides \* \* \*.

(Page 3.) "That promotions shall be made by seniority in the different corps and departments, but that appointments to the rank of major (the lowest established grade) in the staff departments (other than in Medical Department) shall be made from the captains and first lieutenants of the line in the order of merit and service in the said departments, but such appointments in the Ordnance Department are to be made only from the artillery.

\* \* \* \* \*

"That the manufacture of ordnance and ordnance stores by the Ordnance Department be prohibited, and that all purchase of arms and ammunition be made in open market or by contract."

\* \* \* \* \*

"A BILL to reduce and reorganize the Army of the United States, and to make rules for its government and regulation.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 2 of part 2.) "SEC. 8. That the General Staff of the Army shall consist of one Adjutant-General, with the rank of brigadier-general, \* \* \* and such captains and first lieutenants of the line as may be deemed necessary by the President, not exceeding sixteen, to be detailed as hereinafter provided; and officers of the General Staff other than aids-de-camp shall, according to the nature of their duties, be known as the adjutant, or the Assistant Adjutant, or as the Inspector or Assistant Inspector, General, to the commands in which they are serving."

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 3.) "SEC. 26. That the Quartermaster's Department of the Army shall consist of one Quartermaster-General with the rank of brigadier-general, \* \* \* and such captains and first lieutenants of the line as may be deemed necessary by the President, not to exceed thirty, to be detailed as hereinafter provided, and to be styled assistant quartermasters.

"SEC. 27. That the Subsistence Department of the Army shall consist of one Commissary-General of Subsistence with the rank of brigadier-general, \* \* \* and such captains and first lieutenants of the line as may be deemed necessary by the President, not to exceed twelve, to be detailed as hereinafter provided, and to be styled assistant commissaries of subsistence; and not exceeding one hundred and fifty commissary-sergeants.

"SEC. 28. That the commanding officer of each military post, or of a detachment in the field of two or more companies, when no officer of the Quartermaster's or Subsistence Department is present for duty, may appoint from among the subalterns one to act both as assistant quartermaster and commissary, who shall be subject to all the rules and regulations for officers of these departments, and shall perform the duties thereof.

“SEC. 29. That the Ordnance Department of the Army shall consist of one Chief of Ordnance with the rank of brigadier-general, \* \* \* and such captains and first lieutenants of the artillery as may be deemed necessary by the President, not exceeding thirty, to be detailed as hereinafter provided.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 34. That the Pay Department of the Army shall consist of one Paymaster-General with the rank of brigadier-general, \* \* \* and such captains and first lieutenants of the line as may be deemed necessary by the President, not exceeding ten, to be detailed as hereinafter provided, and to be styled assistant paymasters.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 4.) “SEC. 36. That when volunteers or militia are called into the service of the United States in such numbers that the officers of the Quartermaster’s, Subsistence, and Pay departments, authorized by law, are not sufficient for their proper maintenance, the President may, with the advice and consent of the Senate, add such number of captains, not exceeding one to each department for each brigade, as the service may require: *Provided*, That the additional quartermasters, commissaries, and paymasters shall be retained in service, as such, only so long as their services shall be necessary to the militia and volunteers.

“SEC. 37. That the Signal Bureau of the Army shall consist of one Chief Signal Officer with the rank of colonel, such captains and first lieutenants as may be deemed necessary by the President, not exceeding six, to be detailed from the line as hereinafter provided, and to be styled signal officers, \* \* \* all of whom may, when necessary, be mounted.

“SEC. 38. That the Bureau of Military Justice shall consist of one Judge-Advocate-General, with the rank of colonel, \* \* \* and such captains and first lieutenants of the line as may be deemed necessary by the President, not exceeding three, to be detailed as hereinafter provided, and to be styled assistant judge-advocates.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 5.) “SEC. 45. That the Military Academy shall be constituted as follows: \* \* \*

“SEC. 46. That the professors shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The superintendent, the commandant of cadets, and the instructors shall be officers of the Army assigned to duty at the Academy by order of the President. All other officers of the Academy shall be officers of the Army assigned to duty there by the Secretary of War.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 8.) “SEC. 77. That the Adjutant-General, the Chief of Engineers, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General of Subsistence, the Chief of Ordnance, the Surgeon-General, the Paymaster-General, the Chief Signal-Officer, and the Judge-Advocate-General shall, for the administrative service of their several departments and bureaus, be chiefs of bureaus in the War Department, and with their assistants shall be stationed at the seat of government.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 10.) “SEC. 96. That the chiefs of the General Staff of the Staff Departments and of the Corps of Engineers shall be selected from the Army; the Chief of Engineers from the field officers of that corps; the Surgeon-General from the surgeons or higher officers of the Medical Department; the Chief of Ordnance from the field officers of ordnance and artillery, and the chiefs of the other branches of the staff from the field officers, either of the bureau or department in which the vacancy occurs or of the line.

“SEC. 97. That appointments into the lowest permanent grades in the several departments and bureaus of the staff shall, except in the Medical Department, be made by selection, upon competitive examination, from such officers as have served not less than two years in that branch of the staff in which the appointment is to be made.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 11.) “SEC. 110. No officer of the Regular Army below the rank of field officer shall be promoted into a higher grade until he shall have passed a like examination before a board of not less than three officers senior to him in rank, appointed as aforesaid, and so constituted, whenever practicable, that a majority of the members shall be officers of the corps or other branch of the service to which the officer belongs.” \* \* \*

(Page 12.) “SEC. 120. The details for duty in the General Staff, other than aids-de-camp, and in the several staff departments and bureaus, except as provided in sections 28 and 46 of this act, shall be made by the President by selections from nominations submitted by the Commanding General of the Army: *Provided*, That except in cases of emergency no officer shall be thus detailed against his will, nor in any case till he has served at least six years with his regiment, and that no such details shall be for a longer period than three years, or, except at the Military Academy, for two successive terms, in the same department of the staff; and that as far as may be these details, except for ordnance duty, shall be equalized between the corps of artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 122. That an officer detailed for duty in the staff shall not thereby forfeit either his lineal position or right to promotion in the line; but when an officer is appointed into a permanent grade of the staff, he shall thereupon vacate his commission in the line. These officers, appointed to the additional offices provided for in section 36 of this act shall, upon discharge therefrom, be entitled to resume their relative positions in their proper corps, as though they had not been thus appointed.”

\* \* \* \* \*

#### “THE GENERAL STAFF.

(Page 15.) “SEC. 153. That the Department of the General Staff shall be charged, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the orders of the Commanding General of the Army and subordinate commanders, with all business connected with the organization of the Army and Militia; and with all the preparation and preservation of such records as will perpetuate the military history of all organizations or individual officers and soldiers while in the service of the

United States, and will insure justice to such officers and soldiers in all matters of rank, pay and allowances, pensions and bounties.

“This department shall also be the medium of communication in reference to all matters of organization, discipline, stations for officers and soldiers, and military operations, between the Commanding General and the Army, and between the several subordinate commanders and the troops under their control. Such general inspections into the discipline and administration of the Army as may be enjoined by law, or may be ordered by competent authority, shall, when other officers are not specifically named for such duties, be made by officers of the General Staff.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 41.) “SEC. 451. That quartermasters and assistant quartermasters, in addition to their own duties as such, shall do duty in the Subsistence Department whenever the convenience of the service requires.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 47.) “SEC. 520. That Commissaries and Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence, in addition to their own duties as such, shall do duty in the Quartermaster’s Department whenever the convenience of the public service so requires.”

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 54.) “SEC. 587. That general denomination ‘ordnance and ordnance stores’ shall include all cannon and artillery, carriages and equipments; all apparatus and machines for the service and maneuver of artillery; all small arms, accouterments, and horse equipments; all ammunition and all tools, machinery, and materials for the ordnance service; horse medicines, materials for shoeing, and all horse equipments and harness for the artillery.

\* \* \* \* \*

“SEC. 589. That ordnance and ordnance stores shall be provided by purchase, by contract, or in open market. Officers of the Ordnance Department shall be charged with making all such purchases, except when otherwise specially directed by the Secretary of War.”

\* \* \* \* \*

December 12, 1878: Mr. Burnside, from the joint committee on the reorganization of the Army, submitted a report accompanied by a bill (S. 1491) to reduce and reorganize the Army of the United States, and to make rules for its government and regulation.

January 30, 1879: Considered, and certain portions of the bill withdrawn by Senator Burnside, by unanimous consent.

December 12, 1878: Mr. Banning, from the joint committee of the two houses upon the subject of the reform and reorganization of the Army, submitted a report accompanied by a bill (H. R. No. 5499) to reduce and reorganize the Army of the United States and to make rules for its government and regulation.

February 1, 1879: The House determined not to proceed to the consideration of the bill for the reorganization of the Army.

February 1, 1879: Mr. Hewitt, of New York. I now move that the rules be suspended and the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union for the purpose of considering the

bill (H. R. No. 6145) making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1880, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. Hewitt, of New York. \* \* \* There were two conflicts in that Congress (Forty-fourth), one of which determined the result of the Presidential election. This House agreed to a method of settlement of the gravest of all political questions which had ever arisen in this country and it was loyal to its engagements. The second question arose on the Army appropriation bill. \* \* \* There was then presented to the majority of this House one of those crucial tests which try the patriotism and statesmanship of Representatives. True to the lessons of the past, they attached to the Army appropriation bill a provision in the exercise of the unquestionable right of Congress directing where, when, and how the Army should be used in the States of South Carolina and Louisiana; that the Army should not be used to maintain certain State governments which had been created and only kept in existence by the exercise of the military power under the orders of the President—I mean by his “military power” his control over the military forces of the country which he exercised under certain statutes passed at the close of the war. The Senate refused to assent to that provision.

Three several conference committees composed of different members met and conferred upon the matter in difference. They failed to come to an agreement and the result was the Forty-fourth Congress adjourned without passing any bill for the support of the Army. \* \* \*

An extra session of Congress was made necessary by the failure of the army bill. \* \* \* I was placed, to my own surprise, in charge of the army bill. \* \* \* I thought it was a mistake even to attempt any reorganization or reduction, and the bill was brought into this House without any reduction. \* \* \* This omission was done purposely and the bill passed. \* \* \* (Act November 21, 1877; 20 Stat., p. 1.)

When the new bill came along—the bill under which the Army is being maintained for the present year—then it seemed to me the question thus passed over ought to be raised anew. And here I want to make my acknowledgments to the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Knott), the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, to whom I applied for help on that occasion, and who, with the skill of a Somers, drew the clause which is now known as the *posse comitatus* clause. \* \* \* It was passed and it went to the Senate where it and the entire reorganization scheme were rejected. Then came the conference committee. \* \* \* We secured more than the *posse comitatus* clause. We secured a clause providing for the reorganization of the Army; that is to say, creating a commission whose business it was made to examine into the whole question and make report by bill or otherwise to this House, and pending such report and action thereon by the House all appointments and promotions were suspended. (Act June 18, 1878; 20 Stat., p. 145.)

That provision will secure a reorganization of the Army, whether in this Congress or in the next I know not. \* \* \*

February 8, 1879: Bill amended by inserting part of the bill (H. R. 5499) to reorganize the Army, and passed.

February 10, 1879: Received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

February 22, 1879: Bill amended by striking out sections 3 to 47, inclusive, relative to reorganization of the Army.

February 24, 1879: Bill passed Senate.

March 3, 1879: Mr. Blaine submitted the following report:

“The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. No. 6145) making appropriation for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1880, and for other purposes, having met, and after full and free conference have been unable to agree.

J. G. BLAINE,  
WM. B. ALLISON,  
WM. A. WALLACE,

*Managers on the part of the Senate.*

ABRAM S. HEWITT,  
WM. A. J. SPARKS,  
CHAS. FOSTER,

*Managers on the part of the House.*

Mr. BLAINE. Now, I move that the Senate simply insist. This is the third conference on the Army bill, and the record of the House last sent is that they have insisted without asking a conference.

The motion was agreed to.

### Burnside report, 1878.

#### REVIEW OF LEGISLATION ON ARMY ORGANIZATION BY GENERAL GARFIELD.

Two numbers of the North American Review, containing articles by General Garfield on the Army of the United States, were submitted to the joint committee, of which Senator Burnside was chairman, by General Sherman July 15, 1878. These articles are published in the report of the committee (see pages 101 to 126). On the subject of legislation, General Garfield in his first article says (page 102): “At every session of Congress, since 1868, the question of the strength, organization, and administration of the Army has been examined and discussed with more or less thoroughness. But legislation on the subject has consisted only of fragmentary acts—temporary makeshifts—in which repeated reductions have been effected in the force of the Army, accompanied with the intimation that the work of reorganization was only postponed. By the act of March 3, 1869, all appointments and promotions in the line and staff of the Army were stopped until further legislation by Congress, and all enlistments were stopped until the number of infantry regiments should be reduced to twenty-five. This act, together with the act of July 15, 1870, effected a reduction in the number of commissioned officers from 3,036 to 2,277; and the number of enlisted men was reduced by two steps: first, from 51,605 to 35,000, and then to 30,000.

“The act of June 16, 1874, reduced the number of commissioned officers to 2,161, and the number of enlisted men to 25,000. By the act of August, 15, 1876, a temporary increase of 2,500 enlisted in the cavalry regiments was authorized to meet the necessities of the Sioux war, but they were to be continued only during the Indian hostilities. And finally a bill is now pending (February, 1878) in the House of Representatives which abolishes several of the staff departments, some by actual muster out and others by consolidation, and musters out 10

regiments of infantry, 4 of cavalry, and 2 of artillery. It reduces the force of enlisted men to 20,000, and requires the mustering out of 835 commissioned officers, with the provision, however, that in case the Indian Bureau shall be transferred to the War Department, the President may retain in the service 198 of the prescribed officers of the lowest rank; but 637 commissioned officers will be peremptorily dismissed if the bill becomes a law.

“Early in the discussion of the subject the difficulties connected with the proper adjustment of the several departments were so great that the expedient was adopted of suspending promotions in the staff altogether until it should be so reduced by the casualties of the service as to make the problem of reorganization more easy of solution. By the act of July 24, 1876, Congress referred the whole subject of reforming and reorganizing the army to a commission, to consist of two members of the Senate, two members of the House of Representatives, and two officers from the Army, one from the line and one from the staff corps. Unfortunately the act required the commission to report to Congress the results of their deliberations by the 1st day of December following. The commission accumulated much valuable material, but their term of service expired before it was possible to reach satisfactory conclusions; and now the whole subject is again pending in Congress as unsettled as ever. In the meantime the efficiency of the Army is seriously impaired by the uncertainty and apprehension which the situation produces; and the continual agitation of the subject by Congress, without reaching any conclusion, is a grievous wrong to the officers. \* \* \* The papers laid before the commission already referred to, but not yet published, are of great value, both on account of the ability with which they were prepared and the high character and varied experience of their authors.” After quoting letters from Generals Sherman and Hancock, he concludes: “Those who are seeking fame by destroying or crippling our Army will do well to withhold the fatal blow until they have disposed of the facts and reasonings of the letters already quoted.”

In his second article General Garfield says (p. 125):

“The House Committee on Military Affairs have reported a bill for a large reduction of the pay of those who may continue in service. \* \* \* Should the bill become a law, it would be better, so far as pay is concerned, to be a doorkeeper in the House of Representatives than a senior captain of infantry; better to be the locksmith of the House than a second lieutenant of the line.”

## PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW AS TO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS AND APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS, AND TRANSFERS THEREIN.

[From Davis's "Military Laws of the United States," third edition, 1898, War Department Document No. 64, and subsequent legislation to the end of the first session, Fifty-sixth Congress.]

### 1. ORGANIZATION OF STAFF DEPARTMENTS.

#### THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

"That the Adjutant-General's Department of the Army shall consist of one Adjutant-General, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of brigadier-general (present incumbent to have rank, pay, and allowances of a major-general—act of June 6, 1900); five assistant adjutants-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of colonel; six assistant adjutants-general, with rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenant-colonel, and five assistant adjutants-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of major: *Provided*, That \* \* \* upon the mustering out of the volunteer forces and the reduction of the Regular Army to a peace basis, no appointments shall be made in the Adjutant-General's Department until the number of officers in each grade in that department shall be reduced to the number authorized by the law in force prior to the passage of this act." Act of May 18, 1898 (30 Stat., 419); also see acts of February 28, 1887 (24 Stat., 424), and August 6, 1894 (29 Stat., 234).

#### THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

"That the Inspector-General's Department of the Army shall hereafter consist of one Inspector-General, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of brigadier-general; three inspectors-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of colonel; three inspectors-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenant-colonel; and three inspectors-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of major: *Provided*, That \* \* \* upon the mustering out of the volunteer forces and the reduction of the Regular Army to a peace basis, no appointments shall be made in the Inspector-General's Department until the number of officers in each grade in that department shall be reduced to the number now authorized by law." Act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat., 720); also see act of February 5, 1885 (23 Stat., 297).

#### THE JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

"That the Bureau of Military Justice and the corps of judge-advocates of the Army be, and the same are hereby, consolidated under the title of Judge-Advocate-General's Department, and shall consist of one Judge-Advocate-General, with the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier-general; one assistant judge-advocate-general, with the rank, pay, and allowances of colonel; three deputy judge-advocates-general, with the rank, pay, and allowances of lieutenant-colonels; and three judge-advocates, with the rank, pay, and allowances of majors: \* \* and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to detail such number

of officers of the line as he may deem necessary to serve as acting judge-advocates of military departments, who shall have while on such duty, the rank, pay, and allowances of captains of cavalry." Act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 113).

#### THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

"That the Quartermaster's Department of the Army shall hereafter consist of one Quartermaster-General, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier-general; four assistant quartermasters-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of colonels of cavalry; eight deputy quartermasters-general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenant-colonels of cavalry; fourteen quartermasters, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of majors of cavalry; and thirty assistant quartermasters, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of captains of cavalry." Sec. 1, act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 339).

#### THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

"The Subsistence Department of the Army shall consist of one Commissary-General of Subsistence, with rank of brigadier-general; two assistant commissaries-general of subsistence, with the rank of colonel of cavalry; three assistant commissaries-general of subsistence, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; eight commissaries of subsistence, with the rank of major of cavalry; and eight commissaries of subsistence, with the rank of captain of cavalry." Acts of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 244), and February 12, 1895 (28 Stat., 656).

#### THE PAY DEPARTMENT.

"The Pay Department of the Army shall consist of one Paymaster-General, with the rank of brigadier-general; two assistant paymasters-general, with the rank of colonel of cavalry; three deputy paymasters-general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel of cavalry; and twenty paymasters, with the rank of major of cavalry." Acts of July 22, 1876 (19 Stat., 95), March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 457), July 5, 1884 (22 Stat., 108), July 16, 1892 (27 Stat., 175), and February 12, 1895 (28 Stat., 655.)

"That the Secretary of War is also authorized to arrange for the payment of the enlisted men serving at posts or places where no paymaster is on duty, by check or by currency, to be sent to them by mail or express, at the expense and risk of the United States." Act of February 27, 1893 (27 Stat., 175).

#### THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

"That the Medical Department of the Army shall hereafter consist of one Surgeon-General, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier-general; six assistant surgeon-generals, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of colonels, and ten deputy surgeon-generals, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenant-colonels, who shall give the same bonds which are or may be required of assistant paymasters-general of like grade, and shall, when not acting as purveyors, be assignable to duty as surgeons by the President; fifty surgeons, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of majors; one hundred and twenty-five

assistant surgeons, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenants of cavalry for the first five years' service, and with the rank, pay, and emoluments of captains of cavalry after five years' service; and all the original vacancies in the grade of assistant surgeons shall be filled by selection by competitive examination. In emergencies the Surgeon-General of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may appoint as many contract surgeons as may be necessary, at a compensation not to exceed one hundred and fifty dollars per month." Acts of June 23, 1874, sec. 4 (18 Stat., 244); June 26, 1876 (19 Stat., 61); July 27, 1892 (27 Stat., 276); August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 403), and May 12, 1898 (30 Stat., 406).

#### THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

"The Corps of Engineers of the Army shall hereafter consist of one Chief of Engineers, with the rank of brigadier-general; seven colonels, fourteen lieutenant-colonels, twenty-eight majors, thirty-five captains, thirty first lieutenants, twelve second lieutenants, and the Battalion of Engineers." Act of July 5, 1898 (30 Stat., 652).

#### THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

"That the Ordnance Department shall consist of one Chief of Ordnance, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier-general; four colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, twelve majors, twenty-four captains, twenty first lieutenants; and all vacancies which may hereafter exist in the grade of first lieutenant in said Department shall be filled by transfer from the line of the Army." Acts of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 245); July 7, 1898 (30 Stat., 720).

"That when a vacancy shall occur through death, retirement, or other separation from active service, in the office of storekeeper in the Quartermaster's Department and Ordnance Department, respectively, now provided for by law, said offices shall cease to exist." Act of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat., 979).

#### THE SIGNAL CORPS.

"The commissioned force of the Signal Corps shall consist of one brigadier-general, who shall be the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, and selected from the corps; one colonel, who shall be assistant chief signal officer, and one lieutenant-colonel, one major, and three captains (mounted), to be appointed from the corps according to seniority, and three first lieutenants (mounted), to be appointed as now provided by law, who shall each receive the pay and allowances of like grades in the Army." Acts of August 6, 1894 (28 Stat., 234); March 2, 1897 (29 Stat., 611), and joint resolution No. 57, July 8, 1898 (30 Stat., 752).

"All vacancies which may hereafter exist in the grade of first lieutenant in the Signal Corps shall be filled by transfer from the line of the Army, after competitive examination and recommendation by a board of officers of the Signal Corps, to be appointed by the Secretary of War." Sec. 7, act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 653).

#### THE RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE.

"The division organized by the Secretary of War in his office for the preservation and custody of the records of the volunteer armies,

under the name of the Record and Pension Division, is hereby established as now organized, and shall hereafter be known as the Record and Pension Office of the War Department; and the President is hereby authorized to select an officer of the Army, whom he may consider to be especially well qualified for the performance of the duties hereinafter specified, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint him in the Army to be chief of said office, who shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel, and shall, under the Secretary of War, have charge of the military and hospital records of the volunteer armies and the pension and other business of the War Department connected therewith; and all laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the terms of this act are hereby repealed." Act of May 9, 1892 (27 Stat., 27).

"That the Chief of the Record and Pension Office of the War Department shall hereinafter have the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier-general, and there shall be an assistant chief of said office, who shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a major, and who may be appointed from civil life: *Provided*, That whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of Chief of the Record and Pension Office, subsequent to the passage of this act, said grade shall cease and determine, and thereafter the chief of said office shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel." Sec. 8, act of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat., 979).

"That the requirements of law relative to the reduction of the Army on July first, nineteen hundred and one, shall not apply to the officers of the Record and Pension Office." Act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1067).

## 2. APPOINTMENTS IN LOWEST GRADES OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN STAFF DEPARTMENTS.

### ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S, INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S, QUARTERMASTER'S, AND SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENTS.

"Hereafter all appointments to fill vacancies in the lowest grade of the Adjutant-General's, Inspector-General's, Quartermaster's, and Subsistence departments, respectively, shall be made from the next lowest grade in the line of the Army." Act of August 6, 1894 (28 Stat., 234).

### MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

"No person shall receive the appointment of assistant surgeon unless he shall have been examined and approved by an army medical board, consisting of not less than three surgeons or assistant surgeons, designated by the Secretary of War." Sec. 1172, Rev. Stat.

### ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

"That the Ordnance Department shall consist of \* \* \*; and all vacancies which may hereafter exist in the grade of first lieutenant in said department shall be filled by transfer from the line of the Army: *Provided*, That no appointment or promotion in said department shall hereafter be made until the officer or person so appointed or promoted shall have passed a satisfactory examination before a board of ordnance officers senior to himself." Act of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 24).

## SIGNAL CORPS.

“All vacancies which may hereafter exist in the grade of first lieutenant in the Signal Corps shall be filled by transfer from the line of the Army, after competitive examination and recommendation by a board of officers of the Signal Corps to be appointed by the Secretary of War.” Sec. 7, act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 653).

## JUDGE-ADVOCATES, PAYMASTERS, AND CHAPLAINS.

“That no person in civil life shall hereafter be appointed a judge-advocate, paymaster, or chaplain until he shall have passed satisfactorily such examination as to his moral, mental, and physical qualifications as may be prescribed by the President; and no such person shall be appointed who is more than forty-four years of age: *Provided further*, That in case of the appointment of an officer who has served in a similar capacity during the war with Spain and has demonstrated his moral, mental, and physical qualifications for the position, then such examination shall not be required.” Act March 2, 1899 (30 Stat., 979).

## 3. APPOINTMENT OF CHIEFS OF STAFF DEPARTMENTS.

“The Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General of Subsistence, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Paymaster-General shall be appointed by selection from the corps to which they belong.” Sec. 1193, Rev. Stat.

The act of February 5, 1885 (23 Stat., 297), provides that the Inspector-General shall be appointed by selection from the officers of the Inspector-General's Department, and the act of August 6, 1894 (28 Stat., 234), provides that the Chief Signal Officer shall be selected from the Signal Corps.

## 4. PROMOTION AND EXAMINATION FOR PROMOTION.

“Hereafter promotion to every grade in the Army below the rank of brigadier-general, throughout each arm, corps, or department of the service, shall, subject to the examination hereafter provided for, be made according to seniority in the next lower grade of that arm, corps, or department.” Act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 562).

“That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to prescribe a system of examination of all officers of the Army below the rank of major to determine their fitness for promotion.” \* \* \* Sec. 3, act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 562).

“That the examination of officers appointed in the Army from civil life, or of officers who were officers of volunteers only, or were officers of the militia of the several States called into the service of the United States, or were enlisted men in the regular or volunteer service, either in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps during the war of the rebellion, shall be conducted by boards composed entirely of officers who were appointed from civil life or of officers who were officers of volunteers only during said war, and such examination shall relate to fitness for practical service and not to technical and scientific knowledge.” \* \* \* Sec. 3, act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 562).

“Officers may by written waiver relinquish such right.” See act of July 27, 1892 (27 Stat., 276).

## IN THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

“No officer of the Corps of Engineers below the rank of field officer shall be promoted to a higher grade until he shall have been examined and approved by a board of three engineers senior to him in rank.” Sec. 1206, Rev. Stat.

“No appointment or promotion in said (Ordnance) Department shall hereafter be made until the officer or person so appointed or promoted shall have passed a satisfactory examination before a board of ordnance officers senior to himself.” Sec. 5, act of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 245).

“That the examination of officers of the Corps of Engineers and Ordnance Department, who were officers or enlisted men in the regular or volunteer service, either in the Army, Navy, or the Marine Corps, during the war of the rebellion, shall be conducted by boards composed in the same manner as for the examination of other officers of their respective corps and departments; and the examination shall embrace the same subjects prescribed for all other officers of similar grades in the Corps of Engineers and Ordnance Department, respectively.” Sec. 2, act of July 27, 1892 (27 Stat., 276).

## IN THE SIGNAL CORPS.

“That all appointments and promotions in the Signal Corps \* \* \* shall be made after examination and approval under sections 1206 and 1207 of the Revised Statutes, which are hereby amended so as to be applicable to and to provide for the promotion of the lieutenants of the Signal Corps in the same manner as they now apply to the Corps of Engineers and the Ordnance Corps.” Sec. 7, act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 653).

## 5. TRANSFERS.

“Officers may be transferred from the line to the staff of the Army without prejudice to their rank or promotion in the line; but no officer shall hold, at the same time, an appointment in the line and an appointment in the staff which confer equal rank in the Army. When an officer so transferred has, in virtue of seniority, obtained, or become entitled to, a grade in his regiment equal to the grade of his commission in the staff, he shall vacate either his commission in the line or his commission in the staff.” Sec. 1205, Rev. Stat.

“Engineers shall not assume nor be ordered on any duty beyond the line of their immediate profession, except by the special order of the President. They may, at the discretion of the President, be transferred from one corps to another, regard being paid to rank.” Sec. 1158, Rev. Stat.

## 6. INSPECTION OF ACCOUNTS.

“That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to cause frequent inquiries to be made as to the necessity, economy, and propriety of all disbursements made by the disbursing officers of the Army, and as to their strict conformity to the law appropriating the money; also to ascertain whether the disbursing officers of the Army comply with the law in keeping their accounts and making their deposits; such inquiries to be made by officers of the inspection department of the Army, or

others detailed for that purpose: *Provided*, That no officer so detailed shall be in any way connected with the department or corps making the disbursement. That the reports of such inspections shall be made out and forwarded to Congress with the annual report of the Secretary of War." Secs. 1 and 2, act of April 20, 1874 (18 Stat., 33).

## WASHINGTON'S VIEWS OF THE NEED OF A STANDING ARMY, FOLLOWED BY GENERAL REMARKS UPON THE SUBJECT.

Burnside report, 1878.

Gen. George Washington:

FROM THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, BY JARED SPARKS—VOLS.  
IV AND VII. SUBMITTED BY GENERAL SHERMAN TO SENATOR BURN-  
SIDE, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE REORGANIZATION  
OF THE ARMY.

[Extract from letter of General Washington to the President of Congress, dated "Heights of Harlem  
24 September, 1776."]

(Page 89.) "A soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in and the inestimable rights he is contending for hears you with patience and acknowledges the truth of your observations, but adds that it is of no more importance to him than to others. The officer makes the same reply, with this further remark, that his pay will not support him, and he can not ruin himself and family to serve his country, when every member of the community is equally interested and benefited by his labors. The few, therefore, who act upon principles of disinterestedness, comparatively speaking, are no more than a drop in the ocean.

"It becomes evident to me then that, as this contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have good officers, there are no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay. \* \* \* They ought to have such allowances as will enable them to live like and support the character of gentlemen, and not be driven by a scanty pittance to the low and dirty arts, which many of them practice, to filch from the public more than the difference of pay would amount to upon an ample allowance. Besides, something is due to the man who puts his life in your hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the sweets of domestic enjoyment." \* \* \*

(Page 90.) "To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with any kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that it not only produces shameful

and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control can not brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of the army, without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year; and, unhappily for us and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been laboring to establish in the army under my immediate command is in a manner done away by having such a mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months.

“Relaxed and unfit as our rules and regulations of war are for the government of an army, the militia (those properly so called, for of these we have two sorts, the six months’ men and those sent in as a temporary aid) do not think themselves subject to them, and therefore take liberties which the soldier is punished for. This creates jealousy, jealousy begets dissatisfaction, and this by degrees ripens into mutiny, keeping the whole Army in a confused and disordered state, rendering the time of those who wish to see regularity and good order prevail more unhappy than words can describe. Besides this, such repeated changes take place that all arrangement is set at naught, and the constant fluctuation of things deranges every plan as fast as it is adopted.

“These, sir, Congress may be assured, are but a small part of the inconveniences which might be enumerated and attributed to militia; but there is one that merits particular attention, and that is the expense.

“Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep fifty or a hundred thousand in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. \* \* \* The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one are remote and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequences of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon to declare under oath whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter. I do not mean by this, however, to arraign the conduct of Congress; in so doing I should equally condemn my own measures if I did not my judgment; but experience, which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, decisively reprobates the practice of trusting to militia that no man who regards order, regularity, and economy, or who has any regard for his own honor, character, or peace of mind, will risk them upon this issue.”

[Extract from letter of General Washington to the President of Congress, dated “Trenton, 5 December, 1776.”]

(Page 94.) \* \* \* “My first wish is that Congress may be convinced \* \* \* of the necessity of raising a larger standing army than what they have voted. The saving in the article of stores, provisions, and in a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with militia unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common course of events, would amply support a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. I am clear in the opinion that if 40,000 men had been kept in constant pay since the first commencement of hostilities, and the militia had been excused from doing duty during that period, the Continent would have saved

money. When I reflect on the losses we have sustained for want of good troops, the certainty of this is placed beyond a doubt in my mind. In such a case the militia, who have been harassed and tired by repeated calls upon them, and farming and manufactures in a manner suspended, would, upon any pressing emergency, have run with alacrity to arms; whereas the cry now is, 'They may be as well ruined in one way as another,' and with difficulty they are obtained. I mention these things to show that, in my opinion, if any dependence is placed in the militia another year, Congress will be deceived. When danger is a little removed from them they will not turn out at all. When it comes home to them the well affected, instead of flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects, while the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission and spread terror and dismay all around to induce others to follow their example. Daily experience and abundant proof warrant this information."

[Extract from letter of General Washington to the President of Congress, dated "Headquarters, 15 September, 1780."]

(Page 97.) "Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well as for defense as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. \* \* \* The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted in any material degree to so precarious a dependence."

[Extract from letter of General Washington to the President of Congress, dated "Headquarters, near Passaic Falls, New Jersey, 11 October, 1780."]

(Page 99.) "It is not easy to be conceived except by those who are witness to what an additional waste and consumption of everything, and consequently what an increase of expense, result from laxity of discipline in the Army; and where the officers think they are doing the public a favor by holding their commissions, and the men are continually fluctuating, it is impossible to maintain discipline. Nothing can be more obvious than that a sound military establishment and the interests of economy are the same. \* \* \* Twenty-two thousand fighting men appear to be necessary on a defensive plan. To have these our total number must be thirty thousand, rank and file. The wagoners, workmen at factories, waiters, men for other extra services, and sick on an average make at least a fourth of the total number, which Congress may see by recurring to the returns of the Army from time to time."

[NOTE.—General Sherman estimates the number absent from all causes at one-third the total number. See page 26, ante.]

(Page 100.) \* \* \* "I sincerely wish Congress had been pleased to make no alternative in the term of service, but had confined it to the war by enlistment, draft, or assessment, as might be found necessary. On the footing on which this requisition now stands we shall be certain of getting few men for the war and must continue to feel all the evils of temporary engagements." \* \* \*

(Page 101.) "I must confess, also, that it would have given me infinite pleasure if Congress had thought proper to take the reduction and

incorporation of the regiments under their own direction. The mode of leaving it to the States is contrary to my sentiments, because it is an adherence to the State system, and because I fear it will be productive of great confusion and discontent."

### **Burnside report, 1878.**

Gen. James A. Garfield:

[Extract from an article in the *North American Review* by General Garfield, submitted to the joint committee of which Senator Burnside was chairman by General Sherman, July 15, 1878.]

(Page 123.) "It is a significant fact that while numberless petitions and remonstrances upon almost all subjects of legislation have been constantly pouring into Congress, yet during the last eight years not one petition has been addressed to either the Senate or the House praying for the decrease of our military establishment. Our people remember with gratitude the great captains who, in the late war, led their soldiers to victory to save the Republic from overthrow. They thoroughly learned the lesson that in times of extreme peril the preservation of liberty and peace depends upon the disciplined valor of the nation, and that the science and art of war can be acquired only by the thorough and patient study and practice of its elements. This work they expect of the Army; and the annual amount which they cheerfully pay for its support is the cost of national insurance against foes from without and anarchy within." \* \* \*

(Page 124.) "The Army should be large enough to preserve inviolate our national boundaries and protect our widely extended frontier settlements against Indian hostilities; to keep the peace and protect the public property in all places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to aid the several States in case of invasion or insurrection too powerful to be controlled by their local authorities. \* \* \* In determining how large an army is needed we must consider the extent of territory for the defense of which it was created." \* \* \*

(Page 126.) "A republic, however free, requires the service of a certain number of men whose ambition is higher than mere private gains, whose lives are inseparable from the life of the nation, and whose labors and emoluments depend absolutely upon the honor and prosperity of the Government, and who can advance themselves only by serving their country."

### **Banning report, 1876.**

Col. N. A. Miles, Fifth Infantry; major-general in volunteer service, now Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army:

(Page 83.) "In organization and administration it is indispensable that the first place be given to the system and method that will make the Army most efficient as a body of fighting men; that the essential functions of supply, equipment, and administration, that require the commercial virtues, honesty, and industry, but not great military capacity, should take their proper place as subordinate members, not usurp those of the directing head of the body, the Army; that the ability to organize, care for, discipline, command, and fight troops be sought for, cultivated, and rewarded.

**Garfield report, 1869.**

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A.; major-general of volunteers, commanded Second Corps at Gettysburg:

(Page. 87.) "I believe, and I presume you know as well as I do (although it is a matter requiring too much time to be gone into fully here), that one of our greatest deficiencies in time of war is the want of a general staff of the Army, as it is called in Continental Europe. The officers are selected from all the branches of the service—engineers, artillery, infantry, and cavalry—tried and talented young men. They are then sent to a school for, I believe, two years, where they learn the matters of administration, etc., so far as it can be taught to them theoretically and practically in that time. They are then sent to serve in each arm of the service, for probably two years, except their own, to familiarize them with the tactics and the practical operation of each arm of the service. This plan forms a large body of men of general information—accomplished men. From that body are taken the chief of staffs of armies, corps, divisions, and sometimes brigades, and also the adjutant-generals of the different commands. Also from that body are taken the aides, and it is quite a useful school for the education of general officers, too. The tendency of the system is, of course, to make of these officers men who know more about the details of all the branches of the service than any other officers, because they serve with all arms of the service. This in our country would be especially important, as we raise large armies from the people." \* \* \*

**Banning report, 1876.**

Col. August V. Kautz, Eighth Infantry, commanding Department of Arizona; brigadier-general in volunteer service, and brevet major-general:

(Page 92.) "With all that the late war has cost the country in life and property it has taught us nothing for the future, and the nation is as destitute of military system to-day as when that war began. Should such a disaster come upon us again to-morrow, I would expect to see again the distressing spectacle of the youth of the land called out for sixty or ninety days and returning at the end of that time with ranks depleted and constitutions broken, not by the foe, but simply because there was not a soldier of experience in the regiment to tell them how to take care of themselves. I should expect to see a cavalry regiment, after six months, training and organizing at the cost of half a million to the country, march to the field twelve hundred strong, fully and completely equipped, and at the end of six months rendered totally unserviceable without having encountered the enemy, requiring to be remounted and refurnished, because the officers in charge had no military knowledge or experience. Regiments of cavalry will require three sets of horses in a single year, and armies in the field will be delayed in their movements waiting for recruits that never arrive, at a cost of millions per day, because they are at the rear making from \$1,000 to \$1,500 each every time they can jump the bounty, and the war that should end in a few months will extend to years, and the cost that should be millions will amount to billions. I shall expect to see gallant men marched like sheep to the slaughter,

the victims of military ignorance, and every other possible profession than the military contending for martial honor at the expense of national life and treasure. With the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 to contrast with our war of the rebellion, the merits of a perfect military system should be understood and appreciated by everyone whose duty it is to look after the nation's safety. \* \* \* If we are to have an army, in order that it may be efficient it should be fixed upon a permanent basis as to organization, pay, and subsistence, and officers and soldiers should feel that there is a career before them in which they may hope to advance, and that, after spending the first and best years of life in the service, when debility or age comes upon them they will be provided for."



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This principle does not apply to the medical, legal, and engineer departments, but does apply to adjutants-general, inspectors, quartermasters, and commissaries.—(Ibid.) .....	23, 24
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To say that a staff should consist of officers temporarily detached from the line and to be interchanged at short intervals does not appear sound.—(Pope) .....	43
I do not consider any proposition to do without a staff and to depend upon details from the line for staff duties at all tenable.—(Pope) ....	43

Details to quartermaster and commissary duty would be at the expense of efficiency of companies, which already suffer by large number of absentee officers, and a loss of efficiency of service rendered, by reason of inexperience—my judgment inclines against the detail and transfer system.—(Howard) .....	44
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It is more than doubtful whether any other system could be substituted for present staff system without injury to the service.—(Terry).....	45
The old Florida war exemplified inefficiency of system of temporary details for staff duty.—(Townsend).....	51
Present system of the staff established in 1837-38.—(Townsend).....	18
What might be good for Germany and France in staff organization not suitable for United States.—(Sheridan) .....	16
Present system resulted so favorably in war, exceedingly unwise to revert to a system tried and condemned long ago.—(McClellan) .....	16
Distribution of labor to distinct departments adopted from the very fact of the previous systems not working well.—(Meade).....	17
Need more first lieutenants because of details.—(Sherman).....	26
Proposed plan of organization provides two first lieutenants and one second lieutenant to every company, to give enough first lieutenants for detail to staff bureaus, limiting details to four years, then to return to company to be replaced by others, thus affording some variety of employment for this most valuable class of officers.—(Sherman) .....	26
On considering any paper organization it is safe to assume that about one-third are usually absent; enumerates causes.—(Sherman) .....	26
Details to the lower grades desirable; should not be longer than four years. To provide this without injury to regimental and company service there should be sufficient number of supernumerary officers.—(McClellan) .....	30
Losses occur from detailing officers who are not bonded officers, and who lack experience.—(Schofield) .....	31
Few men ever do their best in functions of an office not their own.—(Howard) .....	44
Transfer or detail impairs usefulness and weakens knowledge.—(Ricketts) .....	48
Greater freedom of detail and transfer would not be beneficial. Danger of nepotism, political influence, or personal solicitation. The most trifling class of officers in the service is composed of those who are constantly seeking fancy details.—(Wood) .....	49
Had the Executive uncontrolled power to transfer and appoint, there might be a time when, by skillful manipulation, a most dangerous power could be wielded.—(Townsend).....	50
Officers are employed to get work done well, not for the appearance of knowing all possible things. It would be an injury to service to make tenure less secure than now.—(Hawkins) .....	63
Might secure respectable mediocrity among the many at the expense of professional eminence among the few.—(Gillmore) .....	67
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Sherman: Below grade of major .....	26
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Anderson: Apparently.....	81
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Crook .....	84
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Thomas .....	35
Ricketts .....	48
Townsend .....	49
Fry .....	52
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Vincent .....	53
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Shiras .....	61
Hawkins .....	62
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Foster .....	66
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Seymour .....	79
Casey.....	80
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Sully .....	84

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In the several departments:

	Page.	Adjutant-general.	Inspector-general.	Judge-advocate-general.	Quarter-master.	Subsistence.
Reynolds .....	69	Yes .....	Yes .....	No .....	Yes .....	Yes.
Mackenzie .....	71	Yes .....	Yes .....	.....	.....	.....
Upton .....	74	Yes .....	Yes .....	.....	Yes .....	Yes.
Hamilton .....	75	Yes .....	.....	.....	Yes .....	Yes.
King .....	81	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Buell .....	81	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes.
Willcox .....	82	Yes .....	.....	.....	Yes .....	Yes.
Carlin .....	82	Yes .....	Yes .....	.....	Yes .....	Yes.
Sully .....	84	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes.
Doubleday .....	85	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes.
Andrews .....	85	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes.

	Page.	Pay.	Medical.	Engineer.	Ordnance.	Signal.
Reynolds .....	69	Yes .....	No .....	No .....	No .....	Yes.
McKenzie .....	71	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Upton .....	74	Yes .....	No .....	No .....	No .....	.....
Hamilton .....	75	Yes .....	.....	No .....	No .....	.....
King .....	81	Yes .....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Buell .....	81	Yes .....	No .....	No .....	No .....	Yes.
Willcox .....	82	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Carlin .....	82	.....	.....	.....	Yes .....	.....
Sully .....	84	Yes .....	No .....	No .....	Yes .....	Yes.
Doubleday .....	85	Yes .....	No .....	No .....	No .....	Yes.
Andrews .....	85	Yes .....	No .....	Yes .....	Yes .....	Yes.

Adjutant-General:	Page.
In time of war, a general should choose from among his own officers the best man he can find for his adjutant and inspector; in time of peace better the officer should be assigned by the Adjutant-General's Department.—(Sherman) .....	26
Public interests might be promoted in some instances, but the tendency to indulge in friendly and personal considerations would be more likely to detract from than add to the efficiency of the service.—(Meade) .....	35
I am inclined to think that it would be better to select the Adjutant-General from the corps of adjutants-general.—(Thomas) .....	35
It has even been suggested that the corps (adjutant-general's) should be abolished and its duties performed by officers detailed at will from the line of the Army. The officer detailed would, however, rarely be as well qualified in all respects <i>for staff duty</i> as the Adjutant-General.—(Hancock) .....	39
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General Schofield: Below field officer .....	32
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For—	
General McDowell: Below lieutenant-colonel .....	41
General Schofield: Below field officer .....	32
General Hancock: Below lieutenant-colonel .....	40
In Judge-Advocate-General's Department—	
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General Hancock: Below field officer .....	40
In Quartermaster's Department—	
For—	
General Schofield: Below field officer .....	33
In Subsistence Department—	
For—	
General Schofield: Below field officer .....	33
In Pay Department—	
For—	
General Schofield: Below field officer .....	33
General Hancock: Below field officer .....	40

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General Benét: History of Ordnance Department, including the merging of artillery and ordnance.....	137
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In Crimean campaign.....	13
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At Balaklava.....	63
Experiment of consolidation not yet tested in a great war.—(Hancock).....	97
In Crimean campaign.—(Meigs).....	121
Department of control abolished January 1, 1876.—(Alvord).....	132
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Not more efficiently supplied.—(Meade).....	94
Theories fail and break down.—(Hancock).....	97
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McClellan, letter, 1872.....	55
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Florida war:	
Expenses.....	14
The old Florida war is a standing exemplification of the inefficiency of the system of temporary details for staff duty. There were well-grounded complaints of lack of supplies. Large commands were well-nigh losing their scalps in consequence of starvation in beleaguered forts.—(Townsend).....	50
French army:	
Jomini quoted.....	13
Our system of administration superior.—(Meade).....	17
In Crimean campaign.—(Meigs).....	121
General staff:	
The term as used by us means something very different from the same term in France, where it is used to designate the marshals and general officers only.—(Humphreys).....	65
The want of, our greatest deficiency in war.—(Hancock).....	188
The organization of a general staff for the Army I believe to be of very great importance.—(Hazen).....	80
I recommend a general staff upon the model now adopted by all European Governments.—(Hazen).....	152
Legislation suggested by army officers—	
General Sherman: Provides captains in Quartermaster's and Subsistence, captains and first lieutenants in Engineers, and captains, first and second lieutenants in Ordnance departments; Chiefs of Bureaus to be selected from Army at large, except the Inspector-General, the Judge-Advocate-General, and the Chief Signal Officer not mentioned in section 83; transfers from line to staff and from staff to line authorized, also detail of depot or post quartermasters and commissaries.....	27-29
General McClellan: Clause permitting selection of Chiefs of Bureaus from Army at large most objectionable.....	30

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General Schofield: Whatever can possibly be done by Executive action in relation to military matters had better be done in that way than by legislation. It is a pretty difficult thing to command an army by law.....	32
Captains and lieutenants required for service in Adjutant-General's, Inspector-General's, Ordnance, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay departments to be detailed from the line for, say, six years; Chiefs of Bureaus to be selected from Army at large; appointments to grade of major in staff to be made from captains of the line; officers of the line to be so assigned that the junior officers generally shall have experience in administrative duties of staff, and before appointment in staff shall have served not less than six years with troops.....	33-34
General Hancock: As many captains to be detailed from line of Army for service as assistant adjutant-general, judge-advocate, and in Pay Department, and as many majors to be detailed in Inspector-General's Department, as in addition to the officers of those departments will provide sufficient number for the public service; to remain on such duty not longer than four years; to have pay one grade higher than that held by them in regiment or corps; all vacancies as major in Adjutant-General's, Judge-Advocate's, and Pay departments, and as lieutenant-colonel in Inspector-General's Department to be filled by selection from officers serving or who have so served by detail; vacancies in grade of captain in Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments to be filled from regimental or post quartermasters or post commissaries who have so served two years.....	40, 41
General McDowell: Merges Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's departments, and the Quartermaster's and Subsistence; provides for detail for three years from majors and captains of line of twelve assistant adjutant and inspector generals.....	41, 42
General Terry: Suggests amendments to General Sherman's bill.....	45
General Townsend: Provides for permanent organization of staff departments.....	51
General Marcy: No officer to be detailed until he has served four years with troops, and no detail longer than four years.....	56
General Meigs: Provides for details to rank of captain in Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments, lieutenants in Engineers, captains in Ordnance, Pay, and Judge-Advocate-General's departments.....	58, 59
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Views of another writer, who says perfection of, assists in the diffusion of peace.....	14
Similar to that of law, medicine, philosophy, etc., in this, that military men should be selected and promoted according to their special qualifications.—(Longstreet).....	49

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To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff.—(Washington) .....	184
Officers:	
No other possible means to obtain good officers but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay.—(Washington) .....	184
Pay:	
The present (staff) grades are about fair and just, and sufficiently remunerative to make them desirable.—(Sherman) .....	26
Give your officers good pay.—(Washington) .....	184
Pay Department:	
Conducted honestly and economically. Percentage of losses since 1808 stated.—(Marcy) .....	115
Permanent staff:	
As to the question whether there should be a permanent staff, there was no doubt.—(Coburn committee, 1873) .....	22
There was great diversity as to what portion should be permanent and what detailed.—(Ibid) .....	22
Higher grades should be permanently filled from best line officers who have been detailed in lower grades.—(McClellan) .....	30
Nothing is better settled in army organization than the need of a staff.—(Pope) .....	42
A sense of permanent responsibility is necessary to give the highest degree of cultivated and enlightened capacity.—(Wood) .....	48
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General Schofield, and some details .....	33
General Hancock, and some details .....	40
General McDowell .....	41
General Townsend .....	51
General Meigs .....	58
Post or company commander to pay command:	
I would not like it; would tie him down when he should be on the wing.—(Sherman) .....	92
It does not follow that a man may not be a very good company officer and yet a poor disbursing officer.—(Franklin) .....	107
Promotion:	
Principle of seniority the safest one.—(McClellan) .....	31
Should be within the department or corps.—(Brannan) .....	75
Prussian staff a permanent corps.—(Hancock) .....	99
Rank:	
It makes men more careful if they occupy a position of high rank and trust.—(Sherman) .....	26
Records:	
System of keeping originated in Adjutant-General's Office; now preserved in good form; when assistant adjutants-general were detailed, letters and correspondence regarded as private property; slight traces of old records for that period.—(Townsend) .....	50
Regular Army:	
In time of war; advantages of a sufficient .....	14
Saving:	
Saving in expense by having sufficient Regular troops .....	14, 15
The employment of large masses of new troops upon the breaking out of war involves an immense expenditure, out of all proportion with the savings resulting from reducing the peace establishment too much.—(McClellan) .....	30
The saving in the article of stores, provisions, and in a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with militia unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common course of events, would amply support a large army.—(Washington) ..	185
Staff:	
Ought to be liberal in its numbers. They are undergoing a system of instruction and preparation for war. We found in the Mexican war and in our civil war the large number of staff officers very advantageous.—(Sherman) .....	25

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Deficient in numbers during the late war; number of officers in permanent establishment should be very large in proportion to number of men.—(McClellan) .....	12
Before appointment in staff should be examined, first having served with troops.—(McClellan) .....	29
Most important part of skeleton army; preserves military knowledge and experience.—(Kautz) .....	12
Too small when war of rebellion began.—(Hardie) .....	19
Expanded during war of rebellion, but not changed.—(Van Vliet) ....	20
Simple, effective, and common sense; not faulty.—(Saxton) .....	20
Equal to any demands.—(Bingham) .....	20
It is the national military staff, not merely for the Regular Army.—(Vincent) .....	14
Not merely for present necessities, but to assist in raising an army and putting it in the field when war comes.—(Breck.) .....	15
The stationary staff of a military establishment should be substantially the same in peace as in war.—(Crawford, Secretary of War) .....	55
No part of our military organization requires more attention in peace than the general staff.—(Calhoun, Secretary of War) .....	55
Expend too much time over little things.—(Mackenzie) .....	71
The effect of continuing the same officer in a particular staff I consider bad.—(Hatch) .....	74
Should be capable of indefinite expansion.—(Gibbon) .....	81
Difficulty in organizing a new army is more in the special and staff corps than in the line.—(McClellan) .....	93
Staff duties have their origin in the fact that it is beyond human capacity for a commander to attend in person to all of those details of service which are unavoidable in military commands.—(Hancock)...	98
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To be such that there will be no departure in time of war.—(Banning committee) .....	11
To adjust and perfect the subtle and intricate machinery by which great masses of soldiers are fed, clothed, armed, moved, and inspired with confidence, and carried through victorious battles, is wrapped up in the perfection of staff organization.—(Coburn committee, 1873) .....	11
Efficient, not susceptible of much improvement.—(Calhoun) .....	11
Can be relied upon under the present system to perform duties in the most successful manner.—(Hancock) .....	17
Must rely in the future, as in the past, upon these departments for great war exigencies.—(Marcy) .....	19
We have experimented with many systems, the present successful.—(Baird) .....	20
Should regret to see any change in the interest of mere experiment.—(Foster) .....	21
I think the present organization was recommended by General Thomas, General Meade, and myself in 1868. The grades are about fair and just, and sufficiently remunerative to make them desirable.—(Sherman) .....	26
In proposed plan of organization I omit all regimental quartermasters and commissaries, and all officers of the general staff below the grade of major.—(Sherman) .....	26
Number of staff officers actually required is much greater than the number composing the several corps of the general staff of the Army. This number supplied by detail.—(Schofield) .....	32
Engineer, Ordnance, and Medical departments special corps, and important; the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay departments, essentially the supply departments, have worked well in war and peace; the Judge-Advocate's Department necessary and important; the Inspector-General's one of the most important, and the Adjutant-General essentially <i>the</i> staff corps of the Army.—(Hancock) .....	36-39
Do not think a study of army organizations of Old World will suggest any important change or modification in our Army as it is now.—(Merritt) .....	73

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Gen. W. S. Hancock: Gave great satisfaction .....	17
Gen. J. M. Schofield: Remarkably effective .....	17
Gen. I. McDowell: Army abundantly supplied .....	17
Gen. O. O. Howard: Expansion only required .....	18
Gen. C. C. Augur: Efficient .....	18
Gen. E. D. Townsend, Adjutant-General: Attracted admiration of military world .....	18
Gen. Saml. Breck, Adjutant-General: Wonderful results .....	18
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Gen. J. A. Hardie, Inspector-General: Provided ample administra- tive service .....	19
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Gen. S. Van Vliet, Assistant Quartermaster-General: Prompt and efficient .....	20
Gen. R. Saxton, Deputy Quartermaster-General: Stood the test nobly .....	20
Gen. J. D. Bingham, Quartermaster: Without a superior in the world .....	20
Gen. R. Macfeely, Commissary-General of Subsistence: Efficient ..	21
Gen. A. E. Shiras, Commissary-General of Subsistence: No exam- ple in all history where troops so well supplied .....	21
Gen. J. G. Foster, Engineers: Excellent .....	21
Gen. Q. A. Gillmore, Engineers: Efficiency never questioned .....	21
Gen. J. G. Parke, Engineers: As well as it was possible .....	22
Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, Engineers: Successful .....	22
The present, established 1837-38.—(Townsend) .....	18
What might be good for Germany and France not suitable to the United States.—(Sheridan) .....	16
Present system resulted so favorably in war, exceedingly unwise to re- vert to a system tried and condemned long ago.—(McClellan) .....	16
War experience attests its advantage.—(Shiras) .....	21
Essentially an American one; excellent.—(Foster) .....	21
To say that because a system of army organization and administration has worked well in Germany and France, or elsewhere, it should therefore be adopted in this country, is no more sound than to say the same thing of a political form of government.—(Pope) .....	44
Should remain unchanged.—(Terry) .....	45
If we are to hold ourselves in readiness to raise an enormous army rap- idly when war comes upon us, impossible without a staff quite as large, and as much separated into corps as now exists.—(Franklin) ..	47
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General Augur: No transfers unless by consent of officers transferred ..	46
General Ricketts: Transfer or detail impairs usefulness and weakens knowledge .....	48
General Wood: A greater freedom of transfers than at present would not be beneficial .....	49
General Townsend: If sure of a continuance and promotion in the line of duties of their choice, officers' zeal and fidelity rarely flag .....	49
Had the Executive uncontrolled power to transfer and appoint, there might be a time when, by skillful collection of agents from all branches of Army, a most dangerous power could be wielded .....	50
General Fry: If vacancies could be so easily created by transfer, it is not going too far to say that they might often be produced by transferring <i>out</i> better staff officers than they brought in .....	52
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There are no transfers between officers of the line and officers fully admitted to the Prussian staff.—(Hancock) .....	100
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Without an efficient staff, courage, good conduct, or skill unavailable—army becomes a mob.—(Coburn committee, 1873) .....	11
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With a defective staff must be exposed at commencement of a war to great losses, embarrassments, and disasters.—(Calhoun) .....	12
One of the greatest difficulties met with in organizing armies during the late war was in the deficiency of the number of educated staff officers.—(McClellan) .....	12
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War:	
Probability of.—(Breck) .....	15


















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